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Post-quantum cryptography is undergoing an in-depth scrutiny to assess practical as-
pects such as implementation performance and security in anticipation of its widespread
future adoption. Frodo is one such cryptographic scheme, submitted to the NIST post-
quantum standardisation effort. In this context, my contribution is twofold.
First of all, I apply several side-channel techniques to attack Frodo on a (emulated)
ARM Cortex-M0. By using a single power consumption trace of a matrix multiplication
involving secret material, I show how a divide-and-conquer technique can be used to
mount an efficient key recovery attack, which however does not fully exploit the avail-
able leakage. Divide-and-conquer indeed assumes that leakage is independent across
different subkeys, which is a limitation I overcome by mounting an extend-and-prune
attack that exploits previously recovered subkeys to formulate an educated guess on
intermediate variables. My study proceeds with the analysis of countermeasures: I
show a deterministic countermeasure aimed at thwarting the extend-and-prune attack,
I present a countermeasure that masks the Hamming weight thanks to the fact that se-
cret elements are much smaller than the size of the space they live in, and finally I show
how well-known countermeasures, such as blinding and masking, can be integrated into
Frodo and assess the corresponding overhead.
My second contribution is a detailed analysis of the performances of Frodo on an-
other embedded device, the ARM Cortex-M4. Although more powerful than the M0,
this is still a very constrained environment where not all the matrices needed in the
computations can be fully stored in memory, as they are too large. On-the-fly generation
of such matrices is therefore required. I take the optimisations a step further by utilis-
ing ARM assembly instructions to multiply and accumulate 16-bit values as halfwords
of 32-bit registers. Finally, I challenge the need for cryptographically secure PRNGs for
the generation of public matrices in favour of faster non-cryptographic PRNGs. The re-
sult is a dramatic improvement in performance accompanied by an educated discussion
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I tend not to believe the weather forecast of more than a week, as it turns out to be
too inaccurate for any meaningful planning. Scepticism is scientifically backed up by
Lorenz [Lor63], who studied how systems of deterministic ordinary non-linear differ-
ential equations with bounded solutions are unstable. In other words, very small dif-
ferences in initial conditions trigger considerably different results over time. Such a
phenomenon later took the name of the butterfly effect, following the picturesque image
of a butterfly causing a tornado on the other side of the world simply by flapping its
wings.
The metaphor to which the butterfly effect owes its name is certainly an exagger-
ation, but the concept is well suited to describe how my PhD, and consequently this
thesis, came to be. In 1980, the butterfly flapped its wings when Benioff [Ben80] con-
structed a quantum mechanical model of computation. He showed how quantum me-
chanical states could represent information and how to compute over such information
by manipulating the states so to achieve the equivalent of a classical Turing machine.
His timing could not have been better as Manin [Man80] and later Feynman [Fey82]
realised that quantum mechanics cannot be fully simulated on classical computers in an
efficient manner. Feynman [Fey82] therefore brought forward the idea that a computer
based on quantum states could be used to simulate quantum mechanics. He later re-
fined Benioff ’s theoretical model [Ben80] in an attempt to substantiate his idea [Fey86].
Once the computational model was established, it appeared that there were applications
other than simulating quantum mechanics for which quantum computers could be ben-
eficial, i.e. problems they could solve significantly faster than any classical computer.
A long line of research looking for problems that could be efficiently solved on quan-
tum computers was ignited. Initially, problems were tailor-made and found little prac-
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
tical application besides showing the potential of quantum computation. Each new re-
sult, however, inspired new and more sophisticated quantum algorithms solving more
and more interesting problems, until a milestone was reached. In 1994, Shor [Sho94]
developed an algorithm that leveraged a quantum subroutine to efficiently find the un-
known period of periodic functions. As he himself showed, such a functionality can be
relied upon to factor large integers or to compute discrete logarithms in (quantum) poly-
nomial time, as opposed to the exponential time required by classical computers.
1.1 Motivations
Quantum computing is not the only branch of computer science which has influenced
my work and, consequently, my thesis. In fact, my whole PhD can be thought of sitting
at the intersection of two sub-areas of cryptography: post-quantum cryptography and
side-channel analysis.
1.1.1 The impact of quantum computers on cryptography
The reason why Shor’s algorithm is so ground-breaking is that the security of several
widespread cryptographic schemes relies on the difficulty of solving those problems,
most notably RSA [RSA78] and Diffie-Hellman [DH76]. Therefore, if a quantum com-
puter powerful enough to implement Shor’s algorithm with the correct parameters ex-
isted, all schemes of the above kind would be insecure. On the one hand, building quan-
tum computers is still a hard engineering problem [DS13], most notably in how to deal
with error propagation during the delicate steps required to carry out computations
[KBF+15]. On the other hand, there are several good reasons to start preparing for a
world where the strength of quantum computers could be harnessed by powerful adver-
saries to break current cryptoschemes. Such a world would need algorithms withstand-
ing the known speed-ups offered by quantum computers: it would need post-quantum
cryptosystems.
From a security point of view, a very good reason why initiating the post-quantum
landscape does not have to wait for an actual full-scale quantum computer to be around
is called forward secrecy. This is a security notion which was originally associated
with key-agreement and key-exchange protocols and states that secrecy of session keys
should not be compromised by future disclosure of the private key. In other words, if
the private key is compromised at any given time, all past communication is still secure
2
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[Gün90]. A very similar concept is pertinent to the post-quantum branch and is obtained
by rephrasing the above notion: it is desirable that all present communications remain
secure even if at some point in the future a quantum computer will be available. Clearly,
none of the current communication infrastructures meet the forward secrecy property
unless post-quantum algorithms are used. A very motivated adversary (organisation,
state, etc.) could store all ciphertexts protected with classical cryptographic techniques
and wait for a strong enough quantum computer to be available to decrypt them all.
1.1.2 The security and performance milestones
Mathematical notions of security model adversaries as having certain “powers” defined
by the number of oracles they have access to when attacking a cryptosystem. The un-
derlying assumption which is common to many notions is that, besides said oracles,
an adversary has no control over the internals of the algorithm under attack. Such a
model was challenged by Kocher et al. [Koc96, KJJ99], who showed how those kind of
mathematical notions of security failed to capture many real-world situations: when-
ever a cryptosystem was implemented on a real device, it would inevitably offer to any
adversary some information about the internal values of the algorithm. This could be
leveraged to mount successful attacks, side-channel attacks, against the implementa-
tion. Some examples of such side-channels are:
• a hardware device consumes power in order to work. Obviously, this can be mea-
sured;
• due to basic physical principles of every electronic system, an electromagnetic field
is released and can be measured;
• depending on the complexity of its tasks, a device can take a variable amount of
time to perform them;
• in some very specific cases, with mechanical components involved, even sound
information can be influenced by activities of the device.
These facts might sound fairly obvious at first, but the crucial realisation of Kocher et al.
was that side-channels depend on the value of internal variables and on the operations




Since the seminal publications by Kocher et al. [Koc96, KJJ99], much ground has
been covered. Side-channel attacks have been proven successful against a wide range
of cryptosystems, implemented on the most diverse underlying platforms. Techniques
to attack and defend on the side-channel battlefield have been devised. For these rea-
sons, it is natural to assume that side-channel techniques would still be relevant in the
domain of post-quantum cryptography.
This is the reason why post-quantum algorithms have to be scrutinised through this
lens too. If we are going in the direction of having to defend ourselves from quantum
computing breaking our cryptography, we should do so without forgetting that attack-
ers will keep using traditional techniques as well. A quantum-resilient cryptographic
algorithm having trivial mathematical pitfalls is of no use to secure communications,
as much as an algorithm which gets compromised the moment it is placed on any device.
A further aspect worth considering is that of performance. Post-quantum algorithms
should offer at least comparable efficiency (e.g. in terms of time, memory) than the
algorithms they substitute in order to be considered for widespread adoption. Imagine
having to wait seconds or even minutes for every TLS-secure web page to be loaded
by an Internet browser! Therefore, a careful performance analysis of newly introduced
schemes is in order.
1.1.3 Where my research sits
The mix between the above two disciplines offers some interesting questions when ex-
amined jointly.
1. To what extent existing attacks in the literature of side-channel analysis apply to
post-quantum algorithms, and how are the latter affected?
2. Are there existing countermeasures working in the context of post-quantum cryp-
tography? Are there new possibilities?
Furthermore, a third interesting question stems from the necessity to bring post-quantum
algorithms to real-world deployment.
3. How can post-quantum schemes be implemented efficiently?
Inspired by these research questions, I formulated two motivations which have been
the main drivers of my contribution to the field throughout my years as a PhD student.
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1. Post-quantum schemes, if they were to be deployed in place of classical ones,
should offer comparable performance. This means that they should be imple-
mented, assessed and optimised on as many platforms as possible to acquire a
complete view over their potential applicability in the real world. Indeed, depend-
ing on the target platform, different trade-offs might be needed and some schemes
might turn out to be more suitable than others.
2. Once they are implemented on any platform, post-quantum schemes are subject to
the same implementation-specific attacks that threaten classical schemes. These
include side-channel attacks, which try to recover information about a secret be-
ing used from time taken, power consumed and so on. An important evaluation
aspect when deploying post-quantum schemes in the field, then, is to estimate
which attacks they might be targeted by and how to defend them against effective
attacks. Finally, such defensive mechanisms introduce an overhead that needs
careful evaluation to establish their practicality.
I now explore in more detail how I contributed toward the resolution of the above
questions, by diving into how my thesis is structured.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
Working in cryptography has been great for many reasons. What I have personally
found to be the most intriguing one, however, is its being highly interdisciplinary. Con-
tributions from many different branches of science and engineering are needed to make
even the smallest statement about whether an algorithm is secure or not. In Chapter 2,
I give an overview of such fields and the language that is used to combine them all:
mathematics (Section 2.1). Thanks to it, I can talk about foundations of cryptography in
Section 2.2, with a special focus on the theoretical constructions which I later analyse
from a security point of view. I then specialise the discussion even more, by giving more
details on the two branches at the intersection of which my thesis sits, post-quantum
cryptography (with an emphasis on so-called lattice-based systems) and side-channel
analysis, dealt with Sections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.
I use the tools and definitions stated in Chapter 2 to build my contributions. Inspired
by my second motivation, I start by addressing Question 1. In Chapter 3, I implement
Frodo, which is the specific lattice-based post-quantum algorithm that forms the focus
of this thesis, on the (emulated) ARM Cortex-M0 embedded device, together with the cor-
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
responding power consumption. I use two well known techniques from the side-channel
arsenal to attack it. In Section 3.3 I apply a so-called divide-and-conquer attack, which
targets each portion of a secret key individually and independently (hence the name).
However, given the inherent dependency of certain internal computations on multiple
portions of the key at the same time, I conclude that this is not the best approach an ad-
versary would choose to attack the scheme under analysis, Frodo. This is why I adopt a
more sophisticated approach called extend-and-prune in Section 3.4: the idea is that an
adversary would start retrieving portions of secret key sequentially, from first to last,
in order to leverage previously recovered secret chunks against later ones. The attack
turns out to be devastating, which sheds some light on a deeper connection between
what a side-channel adversary exploits versus what a traditional and mathematical ad-
versary exploits. I highlight such a comparison in Section 3.5, which triggers a valuable
discussion on parameter selection for this kind of algorithm.
Chapter 4 partially answers Question 2: once attacks have been covered, it is useful
to look at the other side of the coin and explore ways to defend post-quantum algorithms.
Interestingly, it turns out the that the extend-and-prune attack from Section 3.4 is as
devastating as it is easy to mitigate: Section 4.1 contains a deterministic technique to
break the underlying pattern exploited by it. I then take a different approach and de-
vise a countermeasure that is particular to the matrices used by Frodo and by other
post-quantum schemes, since some of them take values whose Hamming weight is low.
I explore this direction in Section 4.2, where I describe a countermeasure to mask the
Hamming weight of values, which therefore applies to attack scenarios where adver-
saries exploit the Hamming weight of secret elements. Coming up with new counter-
measures, however, is not the only option to protect post-quantum schemes, as I show
in Section 4.3 where I integrate known countermeasures from the literature into the
the post-quantum algorithms under analysis. Finally, Section 4.4 compares all above
countermeasures and lists pros and cons of each one.
Finally, it is now time to describe how I have contributed toward Question 3. Chap-
ter 5 reports implementations (c.f. Section 5.3) and optimisations (c.f. Section 5.4) of sev-
eral algorithms used in Frodo. On one hand, I carefully implement common subroutines
using very fast low-level instructions, on the other hand I propose a modification to the
original specifications of Frodo in such a way that a severe bottleneck, the generation
of a large matrix, is overcome. For this chapter, I target the ARM Cortex-M4, which is
considered to be small enough for many practical applications in the Internet of Things
(IoT) ecosystem, yet powerful enough to run standard cryptographic protocols. On top
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of the unprotected scheme, I also implemented all countermeasures from Chapter 4 in
order to compare them from the perspective of their performance, see Section 5.5.
Every story must come to an end. I collect overall conclusions of my work in Chap-
ter 6. On top of that, I make some historical consideration on the algorithms that are
used in Frodo (which got modified when my work was being finalised) and I show how
many of the conclusions I draw also apply to other algorithms in the literature involving
lattice-based schemes.
1.3 List of papers
During the course of my PhD, I have released several works of mine. A list of papers
whose content can be found in this thesis follows, while a list of papers of mine which
have been excluded from this thesis can be found in Appendix B.
1. Together with Joppe Bos, Simon Friedberger, Elisabeth Oswald and Martijn Stam,
I published the paper “Assessing the Feasibility of Single Trace Power Analy-
sis of Frodo” at the Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) conference in 2018
[BFM+18a]. In this paper, of which I am the main writer and contributor, my co-
authors and I explored the aforementioned side-channel techniques, described in
Chapter 3, to attack matrix multiplications by secret matrices. We applied such
techniques to one scheme in particular, Frodo [BCD+16, NAB+17], which makes
use of one public matrix whose values are uniformly random integers modulo a
power of two, multiplied by a secret matrix whose entries are drawn from a very
narrow distribution over the same space. This means that the possible entries are
very limited compared to the size of the space, which is a favourable setting for
side-channel adversaries. The content of this paper spans the whole of Chapter 3
and Section 4.1.
2. Together with the same co-authors, I released a paper in which we implemented
Frodo on the embedded device called ARM Cortex-M4 [BFM+18b]. Due to the na-
ture of the algorithms involved, which I will detail in Chapter 2, a straightforward
implementation is not possible due to the large dimensions of the public matrix
mentioned above. We therefore optimised the subroutines in such a way that all
algorithms fit on the device and exploit dedicated instructions. I was the main con-
tributor in terms of implementation, experiments and writing. This is the paper
that Chapter 5 covers. Note that, at the time of writing, an improved version of
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the paper is undergoing writing. The version I am the main writer and content cu-
rator of is indexed as version 20181120 : 031936 on ePrint, while the new version




I would like to start the main body of this thesis by asking the reader an imagination
effort. Metaphorically speaking, think of the book in your hands (or the file on your com-
puter) as a house. Any house sits on the side of a street, which defines its geographical
location and, to some extent, tells something about the dwellers. Inside the house there
are rooms serving different purposes, be it cooking, sleeping or showering.
Chapter 1 specified the address, that is to say it placed this house into context. Along
the lines of the metaphor, this house lies at a junction: it is located at the intersection of
“lattice-based boulevard” and “side-channel lane”, both in the “crypto neighbourhood”.
If you are familiar with theses like this one, it should come as no surprise how the
coming chapters will be different rooms, each somewhat self-contained and dedicated to
a specific task, all together making living (i.e. reading) this house hopefully pleasant.
However, how does the current chapter fit into the metaphor?
Latin comes to the rescue, as the word “preliminaries” finds its roots in the combina-
tion of the preposition “prae-” and the noun “limen”. The former simply means “before”,
while the latter, among other meanings, stands for doorstep. What is included in the pre-
liminaries should then come before the doorstep, it should prepare visitors (i.e. readers)
to what awaits them in the house (i.e. monograph). In other words this is the doormat
of my thesis, whose job is to make your shoes and the concepts you will need as clear as
possible.
With the above in mind, I will start by giving some basic notions of cryptography
(Section 2.2), in order then to hint how they fall apart once quantum computers are in-
cluded in the picture. Several reasons not to despair are promptly described for the
faint-hearted (Section 2.4), among which the so-called lattice-based cryptography is
scrutinised in more details. I will then glide towards a different area having little to
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do with post-quantum cryptography per se but representing the second founding pillar
of this thesis: side-channel analysis (Section 2.3).
2.1 Notation and Mathematical Background
Scalars are denoted by lower case italic letters, and are usually assumed to be in deci-
mal representation. When the binary representation of an integer i ∈ Z is needed, it is
denoted by 〈i〉. Vectors are denoted by lower case boldface letters, and matrices by upper
case boldface letters. I adopt index notation to denote values in vectors and matrices,
e.g. vi is the ith component of vector v (and is not boldface because it is a scalar), while
Mi, j denotes the scalar in row i and column j of matrix M. Note that the same holds for
the binary representation of integers, in such a way that the lth bit of integer i is 〈i〉l .
To indicate the whole ith row of matrix M, I will write Mi; column j, instead, is denoted
by Mᵀj , i.e. the jth row of the transpose. I will make use of three special matrices: the
identity matrix of size n, denoted by In; the matrix filled with ones of dimension n×m,
denoted by 1n×m; the vector filled with n zeros, denoted by 0n. Whenever vectors or ma-
trices need to be parametric, I use superscript. For instance, if matrix M is parametrised
by the parameter a, I write Ma. Concatenation is denoted by ‖.
I make use of two numerical sets only: the integers, Z, and the reals, R. For a strictly
positive integer q, I denote by Zq the remainders modulo q. All these sets are always
assumed to have the classical operations of addition and multiplication, hence they are
primarily used as groups, rings or (finite) fields.
Whenever a distribution D over a set S is used, I denote the operation of drawing
a sample by x $←− D(S). In the case where entries of a matrix M of dimension n×m are
drawn from the same distribution D(S), I write M $←−D(S)n×m. I denote by Supp(D(S))⊆
S the support of the distribution, i.e. the subset of the domain of D whose elements have
non-zero probability of being drawn. Note that when the set S is clear from the context,
I drop it from the notation. I denote the probability of obtaining the specific outcome
x ∈ Supp(D(S)) by Pr [X = x] =D(x), where X is a random variable following D(S) and
is often implicit from the context.





if it has mean µ and variance σ2, where σ is the standard deviation. The





with vector of mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. Its probability density function is given
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I will use several operations, the notation of which might be overloaded for the sake
of maintaining bearable formalism. For instance, multiplication is either omitted or
denoted by ·, which sometimes also indicates inner product between vectors or matrix
multiplication. To avoid any confusion, the context will undoubtedly clarify which one
is meant on a case-by-case basis.
2.2 Basic Cryptographic Notions
Nowadays, cryptography allows secure communication and interaction in many possi-
ble ways. The oldest of them all, dating back to ancient Greece and the Roman empire,
is that of concealing the content of a message from malicious eyes. The classic example
sees the character Alice wanting to exchange a message with Bob over an insecure chan-
nel, e.g. a battle field, the road between two poleis1 or, more recently, the internet. The
presence of a malicious actor, usually named Eve, is what makes the channel insecure.
In such a basic example, the goal of Eve is to learn the content of the message just by
eavesdropping on the channel. Such an adversary is called passive, and is the weakest
of the possible threats cryptographic schemes are supposed to withstand.
It has always been understood that the only way of achieving such a simple form of
confidentiality is by somehow transforming the original message, called plaintext, into
something unintelligible, the ciphertext. Furthermore, the intended recipient needs a
way of unravelling the ciphertext and learn the original message. Both the forward and
backward transformations must be based on some form of secret piece of information
only the legitimate parties possess, which is what prevents Eve from accessing the con-
tent of the communication. In modern terminology, the secret is usually named key.
Many notions in this chapter are covered from a high-level point of view, because
many details are beyond the scope of this thesis. The interested reader is referred to
Katz and Lindell’s book [KL07], which extensively covers all topics mentioned here.
2.2.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptography
The first paradigm that arose historically can be formulated as follows. Under the ini-
tial assumption that Alice and Bob know the same secret, i.e. own the same key, then
1Plural of polis, the name modern historiographers give to an ancient Greek city-state.
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Alice can use it to transform plaintext into ciphertext, performing an operation which
is referred to as encryption, and Bob can reverse it performing decryption. On an intu-
itive level, it can be easily seen how this paradigm works by drawing an analogy with
physical keys: if both Alice and Bob have a copy of the same key, then Alice can enclose
a message in a box using a locker, which can be opened by Bob only.
This paradigm is called symmetric-key encryption, because the key used is sym-
metric, that is to say the same for both sender and receiver. It is particularly handy
because secure channels are expensive (think of hiring an insured and guaranteed pri-
vate shipping company), while insecure ones are cheap (e.g. using public postal service).
Symmetric-key encryption allows a potentially very long message to be sent through a
cheap and insecure method, while maintaining its confidentiality thanks to encryption.
Only the key has to be sent by secure means, which is less of a problem being usually
fixed and small(er) in size.
Slightly more formally, a symmetric-key encryption scheme is formed of three algo-
rithms: key generation, encryption and decryption.
• KEYGEN(params) takes some publicly known parameters, and generates a sym-
metric key k;
• ENC(m,k) takes a plaintext m and a symmetric key k, and returns a ciphertext c;
• DEC(c,k) takes a ciphertext c and a symmetric key k, and returns a plaintext m′.
Correctness of the scheme requires m = m′. Note that this is a very simplified definition
of a symmetric-key scheme, but amply suffices for the purpose of this thesis. A more
precise definition, as well as what security means in the symmetric context, can be
found in Katz and Lindell’s book [KL07, Section 3.2].
Figure 2.1 graphically represents the three outlined algorithms and their use rela-
tive to each other. It is assumed that key generation is performed by the sender, who
then sends the key over a secure channel (thick arrow) and an encrypted message over
an insecure one (dashed arrow). The receiver simply applies decryption to retrieve the
original message.
2.2.1.1 One-Time Pad
Arguably the most important example of symmetric encryption scheme is the one-time
pad. First invented by Miller in 1882 [Mil82], the one-time pad derives its importance
from the work of Shannon [Sha49], who proved its perfect secrecy. The latter property
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Figure 2.1: Schematic of the three algorithms forming a symmetric encryption scheme.
Thick arrow represents a secure channel, while the dashed one stands for an insecure
channel.
roughly signifies that absolutely no information about the plaintext is contained in the
ciphertext.
A one-time pad is defined over fixed-length bitstrings, that is to say that the set from
which keys, plaintexts and ciphertexts all come from is Zn2 for a fixed positive integer
n. The three algorithms forming any symmetric encryption scheme are instantiated as
follows.
• KEYGEN(n) picks a uniformly random key k $←−U (Z2)n, where the only parameter
of the scheme is the length n;
• ENC(m,k) computes the ciphertext as the XOR between a message and the key,
i.e. c = m⊕k;
• DEC(c,k) simply reverts the above operation by computing the XOR between ci-
phertext and key, so that
c⊕k = (m⊕k)⊕k = m⊕ (k⊕k)= m .
Intuitively speaking, perfect secrecy follows from the fact that if an adversary sees a
ciphertext and does not know which key was used, then any plaintext is possible under
some key. As an example, consider n = 8, i.e. keys, plaintexts and ciphertexts are num-
bers between 0 and 255. If an adversary sees the ciphertext c = 100, she will never know
whether the plaintext was m = 7 encrypted using k = 99, or if m = 50 encrypted using
k = 86 because 7⊕99= 50⊕86= 100. Since the key is equally likely drawn uniformly at




The cost to pay for such a strong security guarantee is prohibitively high, though.
First of all, as the name suggests, each key should be used only once, for otherwise
the XOR of two (or more) plaintexts is revealed. Furthermore keys should be truly uni-
formly random and should be as long as plaintexts. For these reasons, symmetric-key
cryptography has developed in the direction of finding weaker yet realistically sufficient
security definitions achieved by schemes more usable than the one-time pad.
In general the shared knowledge of k can be leveraged to achieve very effective and
efficient algorithms in practice. However it is now time to discuss the clear problem be-
hind this approach: how can Alice and Bob agree on a key? Alternatively, whoever runs
KEYGEN needs a way to communicate the key to the other party. As briefly mentioned
above, the expensive solution adopted in the past was to exchange it over a secure chan-
nel. Most of the times, this meant meeting in person or through dedicated and protected
lines of communication. However limitations are evident, especially in the age of the In-
ternet when machines located around the world are constantly in the need for secure
communication.
2.2.2 Public-Key Cryptography
A major breakthrough in the field was made possible by the work of Diffie and Hell-
man [DH76] in 1976, who published for the first time a method allowing two parties to
agree on a common secret over an insecure channel without previous communication:
public-key cryptography (PKC) was officially born. It must be noted, however, that de-
spite Diffie and Hellman were indeed the first authors to publish the idea of PKC, it
was disclosed only in 1999 that three cryptographers at GCHQ, Clifford Cocks, James
Ellis and Malcolm Williamson, had invented several methods (very similar to what now
is known as Diffie-Hellman key agreement and RSA) to achieve PKC [gch]. Only the
secrecy around their work prevented them from being recognised timely.
The core and ingenious idea behind the so-called Diffie-Hellman key agreement is
that keys no longer need to be symmetric: two different but mathematically related
keys are used, only one of which has to be kept secret (the secret key) while the other
one is instead made public (the public key), hence the name public-key cryptography.
In its original formulation, the Diffie-Hellman scheme did not allow arbitrary chosen
messages to be sent, but was rather a method for two parties to agree on a common
secret with the idea of using it as (a base for) a symmetric key.
Soon after the Diffie-Hellman protocol, in 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [RSA78]
published an algorithm to send arbitrary messages without any previously agreed upon
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Figure 2.2: Schematic of the three algorithms forming a public-key encryption scheme.
Dashed arrows represent information being sent over an insecure channel.
secret. RSA, named after the authors’ initials, was the first public-key encryption scheme.
Along the same line, ElGamal [ElG85] later modified the original Diffie-Hellman proto-
col to allow a similar functionality.
Similarly to symmetric-key schemes, public-key encryption is formed of three algo-
rithms: key generation, encryption and decryption.
• KEYGEN(params) takes some publicly known parameters and generates two keys,
a public key pk and a secret key sk;
• ENC(m, pk) takes a plaintext m and a public key pk, and returns a ciphertext c;
• DEC(c, sk) takes a ciphertext c and a secret key sk, and returns a plaintext m′.
A more formal and comprehensive definition can be found in Katz and Lindell’s book
[KL07, Section 10.2].
Figure 2.2 represents the algorithms above and the relations among them. Com-
pared to Figure 2.1, it should be visually immediate that no secure channel is needed:
every communication happens over a potentially insecure channel.
Nomenclature Note. Terminology in the literature may vary. Sometimes what is
here referred to as “public-key cryptography” is instead called “asymmetric-key cryp-
tography”, to stress that keys are different in contrast to symmetric-key cryptography.
Similarly, the latter may be called “private-key cryptography”. To avoid any confusion, I
will exclusively use the terms that I have introduced here. Moreover in this text, public
and secret keys always refer to those used in a public-key algorithms, while symmetric
keys are used in the context of symmetric schemes.
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2.2.2.1 The ElGamal Encryption Scheme
Classical public-key schemes are based on the hardness of certain mathematical prob-
lems from number theory. In their seminal work, Diffie and Hellman [DH76] built a
mechanism to agree on a random number through exclusive exchange of messages over
an insecure channel, with the idea that it could then be used in a symmetric encryp-
tion scenario. Their scheme is based on the supposed difficulty of a number theoretic
problem, defined next.
Definition 2.1 (DLP). Let G be a cyclic and multiplicative group of order q and g be
its generator. For a given h ∈ G the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) asks to find the
positive integer x such that h = gx. The number x is called discrete logarithm of h.
As mentioned before, the discrete logarithm problem and the protocol Diffie and
Hellman [DH76] built on it effectively opened the way to the rich body of research
public-key cryptography has become. The next major milestone was achieved soon after,
when the RSA cryptoscheme allowed encryption of arbitrary messages [RSA78], based
on the hardness of factoring certain numbers. In 1984, ElGamal [ElG85] achieved a
similar functionality to DLP. This is a particularly important scheme, as its structure is
still used today in many modern cryptosystems. With reference to Figure 2.2, it works
as follows.
• KEYGEN(G, q, g) uses a cyclic and multiplicative group G of order q and generator
g as parameters. The secret key is drawn as x $←− U (Zq), while the public key is
computed as h = gx;
• ENC(m,h) takes a plaintext m ∈ G and the public key h, draws a uniformly ran-
dom y $←−U (Zq) and computes two values:
c1 = gy
c2 = hy ·m .
The ciphertext is simply the couple c = (c1, c2);
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and from properties of exponentiation.
Despite having been designed in the early stages of public-key cryptography, the
ElGamal encryption scheme is still an important and widely adopted cipher, most no-
ticeably as part of the PGP protocol [Gar95]. Clearly, every practical implementation of
the protocol needs to instantiate a group G where DLP is hard.
What makes ElGamal very relevant to this thesis, however, is its structure. At a
closer inspection, the encryption algorithm uses a mechanism to hide the plaintext
which should be familiar: hy is effectively a somewhat random element in G being mul-
tiplied with the plaintext. This is very close to what the one-time pad does, but on the
multiplicative group (G, ·) rather than the additive group (Zn2 ,⊕).
A crucial distinction with the one-time pad resides in how the “random” element is
chosen: it is a truly uniformly random key k in the one-time pad, while it is a somehow
constructed element hy in ElGamal. This is a fundamental difference in cryptography,
as the latter element is called pseudorandom, informally meaning that it is reasonably
random-looking to a computationally bounded adversary. On the contrary, an informa-
tion theoretic adversary, i.e. one with unbounded computational power, could simply
brute-force all possible exponents of y until the value c1 is found, and then use it to
learn m from c2.
The notion of pseudorandomness is tightly coupled with the difficulty of the under-
lying problem, instead of being unconditional (as is the notion of pure randomness).
In particular, hy is pseudorandom when given c1, hence being reasonably good against
computationally limited adversaries, only under the assumption that the so-called Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds. The latter is a computational hardness
assumption very much similar to DLP (cf. Definition 2.1) but tailored to the more spe-
cific problem Diffie and Hellman [DH76] studied. Under the same premises of Defini-
tion 2.1, it asks to distinguish between (ga, gb, gab) and (ga, gb, gc) for uniformly random
and independently chosen a,b, c ∈Zq.
The above discussion is intentionally intuitive, because the formal details are be-
yond the scope of this thesis. The interested reader is referred to Katz and Lindell’s
book [KL07, Section 3.1], which describes at length all the proofs and definitions to truly
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appreciate perfect secrecy, and exhaustively motivates the practical reasons why adver-
saries are usually limited in their computational power and why pseudorandomness
is enough. Finally, be aware that what is described as “security” above only embraces a
tiny fraction of the security notions available in modern cryptography. In fact, the above
scheme is to be considered plainly insecure for any real-world purposes.
2.2.3 The KEM+DEM Framework
Adopting RSA or ElGamal encryption schemes to exchange messages might at first
seem a valid alternative to pre-agreeing on a key and then using some symmetric-key
scheme to encrypt a plaintext and decrypt a ciphertext: the former part is just cut off
while the latter is achieved directly. In practice, however, public-key algorithms per-
form poorly compared to symmetric-key ones, especially when it comes to large mes-
sages. What has been established as the best method for communicating over insecure
channels is then to use public-key cryptography to share a symmetric key, which then
enables the parties to run much faster symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.
Such a division of roles takes the name hybrid encryption paradigm.
The naïve and plug-and-play solution just described, however, is problematic in prac-
tice: the potentially very different structures of public and symmetric cryptosystems
might require several additional layers to render the above method functional. For ex-
ample encrypting a, usually small, symmetric key might result in a ciphertext which is
easy to break, thus requiring a padding function. This expands the attackable surface
adversaries have at their disposal, sometimes to the point where the underlying strong
mathematical security is bypassed and instantiations of a secure scheme are broken in
practice [Ble98].
A better alternative is represented by the combination of a Key Encapsulation Mech-
anism (KEM) and a Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM). The overall idea is the
same as before: the former is a public-key encryption scheme used to send a symmetric
key, which is then used in the latter, being it a symmetric encryption scheme. Some
crucial differences, however, exist.
• The symmetric key sent using the KEM is not interpreted as a message chosen by
one party and to be encrypted, but is a random plaintext from the plaintext space
of the chosen scheme.
• Once decrypted, the KEM ciphertext is fed into a key derivation function (KDF) to
meet format requirements of the chosen DEM.
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The KEM+DEM framework was first introduced as a hybrid paradigm by Cramer
and Shoup [CS98], who used it to show a practical instantiation of their newly defined
public-key encryption scheme. In its modern sense, thoroughly described and analysed
by Shoup [Sho01], the functionality of a KEM+DEM framework is summarised by the
following seven algorithms: a key generation, a key derivation function, encapsulation
and decapsulation algorithms for the KEM part, and two similar ones for the DEM part.
• KEYGEN(params) takes some publicly known parameters and generates a public
key pk and a secret key sk. This is essentially a key generation algorithm of a
public-key scheme;
• KEM.ENC(pk) takes as input the public key and returns a shared key s and its
encapsulation, denote by cs;
• KEM.DEC(cs, sk) takes an encapsulated key and the related secret key, returning
the shared key s;
• KDF(s) takes a shared key and returns a symmetric key k;
• DEM.ENC(m,k) takes a plaintext m and a symmetric key k, and returns a cipher-
text c;
• DEM.DEC(c,k) takes a ciphertext c and a symmetric key k, and returns a plain-
text m′;
As before, I omitted many formal details, which can be found in the seminal work by
Cramer and Shoup[CS98] and in the later ISO standard proposal by Shoup [Sho01].
Figure 2.3 gives the last schematic of this chapter, somewhat combining those in Fig-
ures 2.1 and 2.2. Algorithms above the KDF form a public-key encapsulation scheme,
while everything below is a symmetric one. The KDF itself makes sure that the shared
secret s is transformed into a usable key under the symmetric scheme chosen to instan-
tiate the DEM part of the framework. This ensures that the KEM encapsulation algo-
rithm can pick a uniformly random “message”, and not one chosen by the user which
might turn out to be weak. On top of that, the benefits of both worlds are clear from
Figure 2.3: no secure channels (thick arrows, cf. Figure 2.1) are needed, and messages
are exchanged using the faster DEM, as opposed to encrypt messages using public-key


















Figure 2.3: Schematic of the algorithms forming a KEM+DEM framework. Dashed ar-
rows represent information being sent over an insecure channel.
2.3 Side-Channel Analysis
Historically, security notions have been built in such a way that a scheme, if proven
secure, would withstand attacks against adversaries whose powers and view over the
scheme were part of the notion itself. In other words, what an adversary is able to learn
about the scheme, whether it is plaintext, ciphertext, signature and so on, was dictated
by the security notions. It comes without saying that a proof of security against a certain
adversary offers no guarantees about attacks from adversaries who have powers or
behave differently than those for which the proof holds.
Kocher et al. [Koc96, KJJ99], in their seminal work, presented a class of adversaries
that are more powerful than those captured by usual security notions, for which clas-
sical security proofs do not hold. Adversaries modelled by security proofs were only
allowed to observe or tamper with the input and output of cryptosystems, as part of the
so-called black box model. However, Kocher et al. [Koc96, KJJ99] showed that, when-
ever a scheme is implemented in the real world, adversaries can learn much more infor-
mation by observing or tampering with the physical environment around the scheme.
20
2.3. SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS
Generally speaking, a side channel is any source of information from which adver-
saries can derive insights on the targeted scheme in order to learn secret material.
Famous examples include time taken by an algorithm, power consumed by a device or
electromagnetic radiations emanated from it. In this thesis, I only focus on power con-
sumption, being it the most relevant for constrained devices that have been my main
target throughout all my works. The information itself an adversary can learn from
such channels is called leakage.
2.3.1 How devices consume power
An accurate and precise engineering description of how electronic devices work and how
internal components and their physical characteristic affect security are out of scope
for this thesis. I refer the interested reader to the comprehensive book by Mangard,
Oswald and Popp [MOP07], which is considered to be among the best references for an
introductory explanation of side-channel analysis and that also drives the discussion
contained in the present section.
The power consumption of a device while performing one run of an algorithm is
collected in a power trace, which is simply a vector of voltage values sampled during the
time of execution. How many samples are collected per second, and therefore how long a
power trace is, depends on the acquisition setup. Mangard, Oswald and Popp [MOP07,
Section 4.1] model each point of a power trace as
Ptotal = Pop +Pdata +Pel.noise +Pconst .
A description of each component follows.
• Pop is the contribution to the overall power consumption that depends on the op-
eration being performed. Clearly, different operations require different underlying
logic to perform the designed function, therefore consume power differently.
• Pdata is the contribution coming from the data being computed upon. Numbers
are represented and stored differently depending on their value.
• Pel.noise is the consumption of “everything else” on the device. When measuring
multiple traces of the same operations over the same data, the fact that they still
look different is due to this component. This component is also called environmen-
tal noise throughout this thesis.
• Pconst is the least interesting component, and is inherent to the device itself.
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Clearly Pel.noise and Pconst are effectively noise, i.e. they “corrupt” the power traces,
and they are independent of any information an adversary wishes to learn. Pop and
Pdata, instead, are the components of the overall power consumption where useful in-
formation can be derived from. The extent to which such information is available and
exploitable, however, is very difficult to state in general. Different attacks exploit differ-
ent aspects of those two components, therefore a different model is needed. For a given
attack scenario, the extent to which Pop and Pdata are exploited is described by the
following model
Pop +Pdata = Pexp +Psw.noise
where
• Pexp is the part which is exploitable by adversaries and that contains the infor-
mation they target.
• Psw.noise, called switching noise, is the part of the power consumption that is due
to switching activity of those parts of the circuit which are independent of the
exploitable data.
Pexp and Psw.noise can be a mix of Pop and Pdata, and their actual nature depends
on the attack scenario. These quantities allow the definition of a very useful metric, the
signal-to-noise ratio, which helps quantify how much interesting information there is




Remark 2.1. Pexp includes all exploitable information that an adversary has (theoret-
ically) available. However, as I will show later, the actual exploitation of all of Pexp
requires careful characterisation of a device, which may not be practical. Thus in many
attacks, adversaries only exploit parts of Pexp, which implies that “the other parts”,
which are statistically dependent and therefore cannot be included in Psw.noise either,
remain unaccounted for. I detail the effects of this in Chapter 3, and refer to this phe-
nomenon as algorithmic variance.
2.3.2 On power models
The previous subsection dealt with how to model a point in a power trace. These distinc-
tions are useful also to understand how an adversary carries out an attack. Essentially
all side-channel attacks follow the high-level description below.
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• Power traces from the targeted device, which contains and uses a secret key, are
collected. Depending on the attack scenario, these can be as few as only a single
power trace up to several hundred thousands, with known or even chosen plain-
texts.
• The adversary chooses a power model, that is to say a mathematical description of
Pexp, based on targeted operations and data. Such a power model is then applied
to all possible key, or subkey, values and to the known or chosen plaintexts.
• The corret key, or subkey, value is chosen according to some statistical tool that
compares the power model and the real power traces.
The power model an adversary chooses plays a fundamental role in the description
above, as it can make the difference between a devastating attack and a complete fail-
ure. The easiest option is to simply use an analytical function that is thought to approx-
imate well enough the behaviour of the device. Mangard, Oswald and Popp [MOP07,
Section 3.3] themselves mention a few of them, namely Hamming weight and Hamming
distance of some values being computed upon. The intuition behind the effectiveness of
these functions as power models is that certain internal components consume power
depending on the number of bits that they handle. For instance, the power consumption
of the bus is directly proportional to the bits it carries, thus the Hamming weight of
numbers being sent, while registers switch, hence consume power, depending on which
consecutive values are stored in them, which is proportional to their Hamming distance.
Unfortunately for adversaries, it is not always easy nor possible to approximate the
consumption of every internal part of the device with said two functions. Therefore, a
general procedure to derive a meaningful power model for the attack strategy and the
target device is needed.
2.3.3 Computing the power model: templates
If the ready-to-go power models do not work for the operations and device under attack,
the most general and comprehensive solution is to derive the power model from the
device itself. This is known as profiling the device and is an operation which is rather
expensive to perform and fairly heavy in assumptions. The idea of building a profile




Template attacks were first introduced by Chari et al. [CRR03] (although the term
was already present in the paper by Kocher et al. [KJJ99]). The idea is that an adver-
sary creates statistical descriptions, called templates, of the device’s leakage for specific
intermediate values by profiling the target device (or an equivalent one). Subsequently,
one can use Bayesian methods (e.g. maximum likelihood estimation) to determine which
template best matches the observed leakage, eventually leading to key recovery. In this
sense, templates are used as power models in the description of the previous subsection.
I will give a more technical description of the mathematics behind templates in Sec-
tion 3.2, where I will specialise the discussion on the algorithm I analyse and describe
templates more in detail in that context.
2.3.4 Attack strategies
Once a power model is chosen based on the algorithm, the device and the operations
under attack, an adversary applies it to key guesses and compares the result with real
power traces. Statistical functions called distinguishers are used to then establish which
of the key guesses is more likely to be correct, i.e. the one actually in use by the device.
Different attacks adopt different distinguishers in order to succeed. However, there exist
also multiple ways in which a distinguisher is applied. In the remaining of this thesis, I
will make use of two of them in particular. The curious reader can learn more from the
usual reference [MOP07, Chapters 5, 6, 8, 10].
2.3.4.1 Divide-and-conquer
This is the most classical attack strategy, dating back to the original paper by Kocher et
al. [KJJ99]. As the name says, the approach followed by these types of attack is to split
the key into independent subkeys and to retrieve them separately. The computational
effort involved is therefore equal to the effort to retrieve one subkey times the number
of subkeys, assuming no differences between subkeys.
The clear advantage is the efficiency of such a methodology, as well as the fact that
it can be parallelised. The major drawback is that, in attacking subkeys separately,
there is the implicit assumption that subkeys are independent and are operated on
independently too. Sometimes this assumption simply holds, as is the case for, e.g.,
AES, while sometimes it is just an approximation to simplify the overall attack. As
I will show in Chapter 3, the type of leakage stemming from the scenarios I analyse
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depends on several subkeys simultaneously, thus opening the way for a different attack
strategy.
2.3.4.2 Extend-and-prune
There are situations in which subkeys are independent, as in general having dependant
subkeys might be problematic for security, but some internal operations compute over
multiple subkeys and, therefore, useful information leakage on multiple subkeys exist.
In Frodo, this is true because, when performing a row–column multiplication, the
accumulator depends on all positions, therefore updating it leaks much more than just
one position. Chari et al. [CRR03] encountered a similar scenario while presenting tem-
plates attack against the cryposystem RC4, and therefore developed the extend-and-
prune strategy.
The idea is fairly simple: instead of attacking positions independently from one an-
other, the attacker proceeds in order from first to last. Information derived from earlier
positions can be leveraged to formulate more precise and comprehensive guesses as
part of the power model, therefore exploiting more information leakage from the power
traces.
In practice, the extend-and-prune algorithm works as follows in the case of Frodo,
where secret positions s1 to sn are targeted. Imagine a k-ary tree of depth n where
the nodes at level i in the tree correspond to a partial guess s1, . . . , si−1 for the secret;
for a given node at level i, its k out-going edges are labelled by the k possible values
that si can take. This way, each path from the root to one of the kn possible leaves
uniquely corresponds to one of the possible values that the secret vector s can take. A
distinguisher can sequentially calculate a score for a vector s by traversing the tree from
the root to the leaf representing s where, for each edge it encounters, it cumulatively
updates the score of s. I defer a more mathematical description of the procedure to
Section 3.2.
2.3.5 Other side-channels
The discussion so far has been rather biases toward power consumption as the vector
of side-channel information. This is due to the fact that power consumption is the most
interesting leakage source in the context of embedded devices, since it is rather practical
to measure it. It is also central in this thesis, because many of the techniques discussed
here had been proposed to leverage power consumption, despite being more general
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than that. It is fair to say, however, that power consumption is not the only medium
through which an adversary can gain insights on the intermediates of an algorithm.
Probably the second most exploited side-channel is time. Timing attacks were among
the first to be reported by Kocher [Koc96]: different operations quite naturally take a
different amount of time to be executed, however if such a difference depends on secret
material (e.g. whether a bit is 0 or 1 [BB03]) then timing can be used to derive it. This is
particularly relevant in lattice-based cryptography, as sampling is a crucial operation in
any scheme while being also rather hard to secure from a side-channel standpoint. This
was the case for a cache attack against the BLISS signature algorithm [BHLY16], in
which the discrete Gaussian sampler was targeted. For this reason, constant-time sam-
plers have always been a fairly hot topic in lattice-based cryptography, as demonstrated
by a rich literature [KRR+18, MW17, ZSS19, PRR19]. Finally, electromagnetic emana-
tion has also been used in the past to attack cryptosystems, and this has not changed
with lattice-based cryptography [EFGT17c].
singtr
2.4 From Pre- to Post-Quantum Cryptography
Modern cryptography is based on the so-called Kerckhoffs’s principle: the security of
a scheme must rely on the secrecy of the key only. In particular, secrecy of the design
and specifics of the scheme should not be relied upon when discussing its security. The
immediate advantage is that sharing the scheme itself, e.g. communicating how the
scheme works and should be used, can be done over a cheap and insecure channel, public
parameters and operands might need some extra care and shared over an authenticated
channel, while the expensive and secure channel is deployed to transmit the relatively
small key only.
The principle also provides a very natural way to reason about the security of a
scheme and the impact of attacks against it. If the key is everything which should be
kept secret, then all schemes admit a trivial attack: trying all possible keys! This ap-
proach is called brute-force attack and its cost can be mathematically expressed by the
number of keys an adversary would need to try in the worst case. If n is the number
of bits forming the key, then the worst case is represented by enumerating all possible
n-bit bitstrings, i.e. 2n. Every attack performing worse than this threshold is usually
not worth exploring, because a better alternative trivially exists. Conversely, any attack
which finds the correct key in less than 2n operations is deemed successful.
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The above metric gives a fair ground on which to reason about security and to com-
pare schemes, but does not represent the actual practicality of breaking a scheme: how
quickly can a person enumerate, say, 210 keys? The advent of computers drastically
changed the answer to this question: a key-length that might be infeasible to enumer-
ate by a person (a 4-digit PIN roughly corresponds to a 213.28 enumeration effort) is
likely to be broken in a fraction of a second by a computer. Complicating matters, com-
puters get faster and faster, and key-lengths which were thought to be reasonably hard
to break in the past, no longer are with the latest generation of computers. The most em-
blematic example is that of the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which is a symmetric
encryption scheme standardised in 1977. At the time it was believed that a 56-bit key
was enough, which however was brute-forced in less than a day in 1999, only 22 years
after. Since 2005, DES is no longer a standard and has been replaced by the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [MVM09].
Nowadays internet communication uses 128-bit keys for symmetric ciphers and
3072-bit keys for some public-key ciphers (e.g. RSA) or 256-bit keys for others (e.g.
Elliptic Curves). However, a revolution of even bigger proportions (in terms of break-
ing cryptography) than the advent of digital computers is around the corner: quantum
computers.
The idea behind quantum computers is to encode information in some property of
subatomic particles, which are then used in a physics experiment that mimic the be-
haviour of a program on a classical computer. At the end of the process a measure-
ment takes place, the information is decoded back and an output is read. Programming
quantum computers is different from programming classical ones, because the building
blocks one can use to build “programs” differ. Some of them have been used to achieve
massive speed-ups with respect to the classical counterparts, opening the way for faster
algorithms targeting certain problems.
One such algorithm was published by Shor in 1997 [Sho97], and is particularly dev-
astating for cryptography because, if a quantum computer powerful enough existed, it
would allow efficient solutions to the DLP to be found, hence breaking all instances of
the Diffie-Hellman protocol, of the ElGamal encryption scheme, and of RSA. As I dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, quantum computers are currently far from offering the computa-
tional power and the stability to harm any practical instantiations of the above schemes.
Nonetheless, the process towards quantum-resilient algorithms is long and candidates
have to go through a huge deal of scrutiny before being deemed safe to use, hence it
certainly does not hurt to start well before the first large scale quantum computer is
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available. Note that, although symmetric schemes are affected by some quantum algo-
rithms, it is generally understood that the consequences are far less severe than in the
case of public-key cryptography. Given a plaintext-ciphertext couple and considering the
key of a symmetric cipher as an “unknown input”, Grover’s algorithm [Gro96] allows in-
deed to find it using only a number of calls to the function proportional to the square
root of the input space. But this means that doubling the key-length, e.g. passing from
a 2128 to a 2256 keyspace is enough to still ensure 128 bits of security.
There are several mathematical problems and cryptographic schemes which are be-
ing analysed by the community. Probably the first example of a post-quantum scheme
was introduced shortly after Diffie and Hellman published their seminal work. McEliece
[McE78] based a public-key encryption scheme on the hardness of decoding random
code, which is widely believed to be an intractable problem even for quantum comput-
ers. This line of research is named code-based cryptography. Only one year after, Merkle
[Mer79] proposed in his PhD thesis the first signature scheme, i.e. a way of using public-
key cryptography to mimic the behaviour of a real-world signature, based on hash func-
tions. Hash-based cryptography was born. Almost a decade later a new post-quantum
scheme was devised, when Matsumoto and Imai [MI88] suggested to base cryptogra-
phy on problems related to multivariate polynomials, paving the way for multivariate
cryptography. Finally, the youngest of all proposals is without a doubt Supersingular
Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH), which defines a protocol similar to the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange but based on the hardness of computing isogenies of certain types of el-
liptic curves. The interested reader is referred to the seminal work by Jao and De Feo
[JF11] for more details.
A further class of problems against which quantum computers are believed to offer
little advantage is that of lattice problems. Ajtai [Ajt96] initiated the study by showing
how cryptographic primitives could be based on problems defined over lattices. Because
lattices and problems defined over them are the foundations of the security of algo-
rithms analysed throughout this thesis, a more comprehensive focus will be given in
Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 NIST standardisation effort
As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, quantum computers are not quite mature and
developed yet to harm cryptography, nonetheless achieving forward secrecy from today
is enough of a good reason not to wait for the first quantum computer to be around
to start building the post-quantum world. The latter is also a lengthy and complex
28
2.4. FROM PRE- TO POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
process, especially so because post-quantum algorithms are supposed to take the place
of all public-key cryptosystems: commercial products, open source protocols, even the
Internet itself have to be modified so to guarantee secure communication. Swapping all
those algorithms, i.e. radically changing all protocols and solutions based on them, is
not an overnight exercise and requires a long process of scrutiny and standardisation.
Whatever candidate exists to take the place of classical algorithms, it must be proposed,
evaluated, tested, parametrised and implemented before enough confidence about its
security is grown. Elliptic curve cryptography offers an emblematic example: proposed
by Miller [Mil86] and Koblitz [Kob87] in the eighties, it was not until the early two
thousands that it found wide application. If the same time-to-market scale was assumed
for post-quantum algorithms too, the moment of wide adoption might coincide with
some estimates for when full-scale quantum computers will be around.
For these reasons, the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) has
made a first attempt to trigger a community-wide search for post-quantum algorithms
that could be used instead of quantum-broken ones. The NIST post-quantum standard-
isation effort [Nat16a] gathered proposals of algorithms whose security is based on
mathematical problems for which quantum computers are believed to offer no signif-
icant speed-up over classical computers. The NIST standardisation effort has been very
important for my work, because some of my contributions were made towards scrutin-
ising a particular class of cryptosystems which were submitted to it.
The process was initiated at the beginning of 2016 with a technical report from
NIST highlighting the need for post-quantum cryptography [Nat16b], followed by a
call for proposals detailing the “rules of game” [Nat16a] at the end of the same year.
Groups from all over the world had time until the end of 2017 to design and submit
post-quantum schemes along all relevant information to assess their goodness: security,
performance, even side-channel resistance were all criteria according to which schemes
would be judged. The first round saw 64 candidates, divided in the two categories Key
Encapsulation Mechanism and Digital Signature, based on many different mathemati-
cal problems [Nat19]. At the beginning of 2019, candidates passing to the second stage
of the standardisation process were announced: by that point many schemes were either
withdrawn or found insecure by means of several attacks. Finally, the second round fin-
ished in July 2020 [Nat20] and the remaining candidates, now down to 15 in total, were
divided in two classes per each category: “finalists” and “alternate candidates”. The for-
mer were deemed the most successful in terms of the metrics outlined above, while the
latter, although not as appealing, were kept to offer trade-offs, for examples, in terms
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of security offered over performance or because they were based on different mathe-
matical problems than the finalists. Such a portfolio diversification has been indeed an
overall goal of the standardisation process due to the fact that many problems have not
sustained the “test of time”, being them relatively recent.
The impact that such a rapidly evolving process has had on my thesis has been rela-
tively mild. The scheme on which I focused most of my attention, Frodo, has reached the
status of alternate candidate among the Key Encapsulation Mechanism, therefore all
results contained in this thesis can be considered very much actual and still of interest
for a scheme that might be considered for standardisation in the future.
2.4.2 Lattice-based Cryptography
A lattice is a mathematical structure that can be intuitively thought of as a set of points
which are scattered around the space according to a fixed pattern. The formal definition
follows.
Definition 2.2 (Lattice). Let n be a positive integer. The set Λ⊆Rn is called a lattice if
it is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn.
The space I will be solely focusing on in this thesis is Rn, hence lattice points are
simply n-tuples of real numbers. The discreteness property formalises the idea that it
is formed of scattered points, i.e. it is always possible to draw an n-dimensional sphere
around a point such that it does not contain any other point in the lattice. Finally, the
pattern I mentioned lattice points follow is mathematically expressed by the notion of an
additive subgroup: the zero vector is always a lattice point and adding (or subtracting)
lattice points must result in a lattice point. This conveys how the pattern looks, together
with the notion of rank.
Definition 2.3 (Rank). Let n and k be positive integers. Let Λ⊆ Rn be a lattice, which
is said to have rank k, or to be k-dimensional, if dim(span(Λ)) = k. The latter simply
means that Λ contains at most k linearly independent vectors. Moreover, Λ is called full
rank if k = n, alternatively span(Λ)=Rn.
The rank of a lattice gives an intuition on how the lattice is shaped in its host space.
In the same way there can be a one-dimensional line living in a two-dimensional plane,
there can be a one-dimensional lattice: it simply looks like a dotted line made up of
equally spaced dots. All lattices involved in the cryptosystems described by this work
are full rank, hence from now on I will always assume k = n. A very important property
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the above definitions fail to catch is how to compactly describe a lattice, that is to say
how to reasonably talk about, communicate or store a lattice.
Definition 2.4 (Basis of a Lattice). Let n and k be positive integers and let B = {b1, . . . ,bk }
⊆Rn be k linearly independent vectors. Then




zibi : z1 . . . , zk ∈Z
}
is a lattice and the set B is called a basis of the lattice Λ. The opposite also holds: for
any given lattice Λ, any set of k linearly independent lattice points form a basis for Λ.
A basis fully specifies the whole lattice, as any other point can be obtained as a
linear combination of the basis vectors using integer coefficients. Note that the actual
components of a lattice point need not to be integer, but can be any real numbers. Any
given lattice has infinitely many bases, but not all of them are regarded in the same
way in lattice-based cryptography.
Definition 2.5 (Minimum Distance). Let n be a positive integer and let Λ ⊆ Rn be a





The reason why the minimum distance is the length of a shortest non-zero vector is
that, in general, the latter is not unique. For instance, the lattice Z2 ⊆R2 has four such
vectors: (1,0), (−1,0), (0,1), (0,−1) all of which have length λ1(Z2)= 1. Intuitively speak-
ing, a basis containing short vectors is considered a good basis, while a random-looking
basis is bad. The difference is crucial: a good basis is likely to contain, or makes it very
easy to find, a short lattice vector. As I shall detail now, such a problem is considered to
be very difficult even for quantum computers if one starts with a random basis.
2.4.2.1 Hard Problems over Lattices
The first problem I discuss is precisely that of finding a short vector in a given lattice.
Definition 2.6 (SVP and SVPγ). Let n be a positive integer and let Λ⊆Rn be a lattice.
The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) asks to find a vector of length λ1(Λ) given (a repre-
sentation of) Λ. In the γ-approximate SVP, instead, the vector to find can be of length at
most γ ·λ1(Λ) for a given γ≥ 1.
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Clearly SVPγ is the same as SVP for γ= 1, and becomes less and less demanding as
γ increases. Both of them are search problems, that is to say an explicit lattice vector
has to be output to solve the challenge. The main hardness guarantee of cryptosystems
contained in this thesis, however, is based on a closely related promise problem.
Definition 2.7 (GapSVPγ). Let n be a positive integer, Λ⊆Rn be a lattice and d > 0 be
a real number. The γ-approximate decisional SVP (GapSVPγ) asks to decide whether
λ1(Λ)< d or λ1(Λ)> γ ·d for a given γ≥ 1.
What makes GapSVPγ different from a usual decisional problem, where a simple
binary answer is required, is that there is a non-trivial gap (hence the name “Gap”) in
the input space of the problem: when λ1(Λ) lies in the interval [d,γ ·d] for the given Λ
and the specified d. For such instances the problem is undefined and either answer is
acceptable, although they are promised (hence the name “promise problem”) not to be
given, effectively labelling them as uninteresting.
The final problem I consider is only somewhat related to finding short integer vectors
in a lattice, which is one of the possible approaches to solve it, but instead asks to find
a lattice vector being the closest to a given non-lattice one.
Definition 2.8 (BDDα). Let n be a positive integer, let Λ⊆Rn be a lattice and let α> 0.
When given a vector v ∈ Rn lying at distance (inherited from Rn) at most α ·λ1(Λ) from
Λ, the α-Bounded Distance Decoding (BDDα) asks to recover the closest lattice vector
to v.
As I will describe later on in this chapter, the main mathematical tool used by all
cryptosystems in this thesis is a particular instance of BDDα.
2.4.2.2 q-ary Lattices
Random real lattices are infinite structures by definition. This is problematic when
they are used to implement cryptography on modern computers. Moreover, the fact that
the coordinates of vectors take real values make their representation on computers
cumbersome. For these reasons, lattice-based cryptography almost exclusively relies on
another class of lattices, which take the role finite fields have in classical cryptography.
Definition 2.9. Let n and q be positive integers and let Λ⊆Rn be a lattice. Then Λ is a
q-ary lattice if it satisfies qZn ⊆Λ⊆Zn.
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Lattices of the above form have integer coefficients, making them very easy to imple-
ment on digital computers. Furthermore, requiring them to contain qZn allows component-
wise equivalence classes modulo q to be defined, because if v ∈Λ then so is v+(k1q, . . . ,knq)
for any ki ∈Z. Therefore it is possible to choose
v (mod q)= (v1 (mod q), . . . ,vn (mod q))
as representative of the equivalence class. The lattice Λ becomes finite (modulo q) with
at most qn points.
Arguably the most appealing feature of q-ary lattices is that some hard problems can
be specialised over their structure, resulting in more designer-friendly problems which,
while still being based on very strong mathematical guarantees, in a sense “abstract
away” the connection with the underlying lattice.
2.4.3 The Learning With Errors Problem
Hardness of the vast majority of modern lattice-based cryptography is based on a single
problem, or variants thereof. Introduced by Regev in 2005 [Reg05], the Learning With
Errors (LWE) problem has grown in popularity ever since. It has proven to be an ex-
tremely versatile mathematical tool on which to base cryptography, to the point of even
making some previously uninstantiated applications possible [Gen09].
Definition 2.10 (LWE Distribution). Let n and q be positive integers, and let χ be a
distribution over Z. Let s be a vector in Znq. The learning with errors (LWE) distribution




a scalar e $←− χ (Z) and outputs the pair (a,b = a ·s+ e (mod q)) where a · s denotes the
inner product between vectors.
The LWE distribution, over which the problem is defined, has seemingly little to
do with lattices. This has been considered a very attractive feature from an implemen-
tation perspective, because cryposystems based on LWE usually have a fairly simple
structure and only require basic operations while still being based on solid hardness
guarantees. If this sounds familiar, it is because there is a q-ary lattice behind the
scenes.
Definition 2.11 (LWE Problem). Let n, m and q be positive integers. Let χ be a distri-
bution over Z and let s ∈ Znq be a uniformly random element in Znq. The learning with
errors (LWE) problem LWEn,m,q,χ, in its search version, asks to recover the vector s
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2.4.3.1 Connection with Lattices and Hardness
The bridge between LWE and lattices is actually easier to build than it seems. Let
A ∈ Zm×nq be the matrix whose rows are m samples drawn from the LWE distribution.
Then an m-dimensional q-ary lattice can be defined as
Λq (A)=
{
x ∈Zm : ∃y ∈Znq such that x=Ay (mod q)
}
.
The columns of A form a basis for Λq (A), hence the vector As is a lattice point in Λq (A).
The LWE distribution returns m samples b1, . . . ,bm, which are compactly denoted by
the vector b ∈Zm. Its components are perturbed by integers drawn from χ, all together
also denoted by a vector e ∈ Zm. This means that with high probability (based on the
distribution χ) b will not lie in Λq (A). A solver is therefore asked to solve a BDDα
instance on the lattice Λq (A).
A caveat in the above description is that the parameter α in the BDDα problem
is still unspecified. Intuitively speaking, α ensures that the lattice vector to be found is
very near to the given target vector, in such a way that both existence and uniqueness of
the former are guaranteed. This is precisely what the distribution χ in Definitions 2.10
and 2.11 is meant to achieve: it is chosen to be “narrow”, i.e. concentrated around zero
modulo q, in an attempt to ensure that each component of e is small. Thanks to pre-
cise bounds on the support of χ, it is possible to choose the parameter α to meet the
requirements of the BDDα problem in Definition 2.8.
Yet another possibility to show how the LWE problem relies on the hardness of lat-
tice problems is by considering the following q-ary lattice
Λq (A,b)=
{
x ∈Zm : ∃y ∈Zn+1q such that x= (A‖b)y (mod q)
}
where (A‖b) denotes the matrix whose first n columns are the columns of A, and the
n+ 1st column is the vector b from the LWE distribution. By choosing y = (s,0)ᵀ, it
holds that x = As ∈Λq (A,b). The choice y = (0, . . . ,0,1)ᵀ instead yields x = b ∈Λq (A,b).
Therefore it must hold that e = b−As ∈ Λq (A,b). Recall that e has entries from the
“narrow” distribution χ, meaning that Λq (A,b) is a q-ary lattice with very short vectors.
With high probability e is in fact the shortest, thanks to choosing χ to be “narrow”. Thus,
under this formulation, LWE is equivalent to solving SVP in Λq (A,b).
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These two techniques only hint to the reason how LWE is connected to hard prob-
lems defined over lattices, despite being simply defined as solving a system of noisy
linear equations. The seminal work by Regev [Reg05] gives a full formal proof for why
LWE is indeed very hard, based on the hardness of GapSVPγ. I refer to it for the proof
as well as for more formal details on the hardness of LWE.
A further appealing feature of LWE, shared with many other lattice problems, is the
so-called average-case to worst-case reduction. A brief preamble is needed. Recall the
description of a symmetric encryption scheme, visualised in Figure 2.1. The key k is
often required to be chosen uniformly from random over the appropriate space, say Zn2 .
If any key is truly equally likely, in particular a perfectly random-looking one has the
same chances of being chosen as the zero key, i.e. k = (0, . . . ,0). However, many ciphers
are easier to break in the latter instance. It is therefore possible to intuitively describe
two cases: the worst case (from an adversary’s perspective) is when the key looks indeed
random. In practice though the average case applies: the key is extracted and “bad”
instances, like the zero key, and “good” ones, say the random-looking key, are equally
likely. So while in practice average-case instances are used, security should desirably be
based on worst-case hardness. This notion is achieved by LWE: if adversaries can solve
an average-case LWE instance (used in practice), then they must be so powerful to also
be able to solve worst-case lattice problems, which are provably very hard. Clearly such
powerful adversaries are not believed to exist (even with quantum computers), hence
strengthening the confidence in the security of LWE.
2.4.3.2 Error Distribution
The error distribution that was originally put forward by Regev [Reg05] for LWE is
the Gaussian distribution. Intuitively, it ensures that only values close to the expected
value are drawn with non-negligible probability. To keep the well-behaved formulation
of solving noisy linear equations modulo q, however, the support of χ has to be Zq.
Regev therefore discretised the Gaussian distribution. In general there is no unique
way of generating a discrete variant of a continuous distribution, as it depends on the
properties to be maintained [Cha15]. The discretisation adopted by Regev works as
follows: a sample from the Gaussian distribution is drawn, multiplied by q and rounded










where X ∼ N (0, (αq)2). The standard deviation αq is chosen such that αq > 2pn, n
being the length of the secret vector s, in the main proof of hardness.
Since the seminal work, other choices for the error distribution have been supported
by proofs of security, e.g. uniform distribution from bounded interval [MP13] and binary
distribution [BLP+13].
2.4.3.3 Variants of LWE
Versatility is one of the features LWE is praised for. At the root of the considerable
amount of applications it is possible to base on LWE, there is the number of variants
LWE has been defined in. First and foremost, Applebaum et al. [ACPS09] showed that
hardness is preserved if the secret vector s ∈Zq is chosen from χ rather than uniformly
at random.
Definition 2.12 (Normal form). Let n, m and q be positive integers. Let χ be a distri-
bution over Z. The normal form LWE problem, in its search version, asks to recover the
vector s $←− χ(Zq)n when given access to m samples of the form (a,a·s+ e) for a uniformly
random a $←− U (Zq)n and a small error e $←− χ. The decisional variant, instead, asks to






Normal form allows the definition of new schemes, including those on which this
thesis focuses, at almost no cost in security with respect to standard LWE. Along the
same lines, reusing the matrix A for multiple secrets offers little to no advantage to an
adversary, hence the next variant which employs a secret matrix rather than vector.
Definition 2.13 (Matrix-LWE). Let n, n, m and q be positive integers. Let χ be a dis-
tribution over Z. The Matrix-LWE problem (in normal form) asks to recover the matrix
S $←− χ(Z)n×n when given access to (A,AS+E) for a uniformly random A $←− U (Zq)m×n
and an error matrix E $←− χ(Z)m×n.
Matrix-LWE essentially is formed of n LWE instances in normal form sharing A, i.e.
(A,ASᵀ1 +E
ᵀ





2.4.3.4 Structured versions of LWE and schemes based on them
A somewhat different direction has been taken by Lyubashevsky et al. [LPR10], who
devised a way to further improve the size of the matrices. The main bottleneck of LWE
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is the matrix A, which needs to be of considerable size for concrete instantiations. It is
not only large to send, but also to compute with. The solution involves more structure
on top of the usual Zq, which I only describe here in its most basic version.
Let n be a power of two and f (x) = xn +1 ∈ Z[x], which is irreducible over the ra-
tionals thanks to the choice of n. Then the ring Rq = Zq[x]/( f ) is defined to be the ring
of polynomials modulo f and where q is picked such that q = 1 (mod 2n) (this allows
faster computations). On these premises, the following problem can be defined.
Definition 2.14 (Ring-LWE). Let n and q be positive integers as above. The Ring-
Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problem, in its search version, asks to retrieve a
polynomial with uniformly random coefficients s ∈ Rq when given access to samples




and the error term comes from a
“small” distribution e $←− χ(Rq). The decisional variant asks to distinguish samples as
above from uniformly random samples from Rq ×Rq.
The structure of Definitions 2.11 and 2.14 should appear immediately closely re-
lated. Indeed very similar hardness considerations follow for Ring-LWE too, and are
contained in the seminal work by Lyubashevsky et al. [LPR10]. There are two crucial
points worth mentioning on Ring-LWE. First of all, the lattice problems it bases its
hardness on are no longer defined over generic q-ary lattices but over ideal q-ary lat-
tices. This extra layer of algebraic structures is induced by the polynomial nature of
Ring-LWE.
On the other hand, Ring-LWE exploits such an extra structure to encode more in-
formation in a single sample. To draw a rough and informal comparison, one Ring-LWE
sample (a,a · s+ e) ∈ Rq×Rq corresponds to n samples of the form (A,As+e) ∈Zn×nq ×Znq
in the LWE setting. The reason behind this is that, for the particular case of f (x) =
xn +1 ∈Z[x], the polynomial a ∈ Rq can be represented as a matrix A ∈Zn×nq as
A=

a1 −an −an−1 . . . −a2





an an−1 an−2 . . . a1

where ai ∈Zq are the coefficients of the polynomial a. On top of saving a factor of n on
the matrix A, the chosen parameters n and q also allow fast polynomial multiplication
via FFT-like (Fast Fourier Transform) computations. This fact will be particularly rel-
evant in Section 5.5.5 when comparing an implementation of a scheme based on LWE
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against a scheme based on Ring-LWE, because the scheme NEWHOPE is based on this
problem.
As always, such improved performances do not come for free. The main source of
scepticism around Ring-LWE is that adding algebraic structure to the problem means
that the underlying mathematical assumptions are no longer defined over generic lat-
tices but over ideal lattices, a subclass thereof. This means that there could potentially
be attacks on the latter instances that do not apply in the generic case, this making
Ring-LWE potentially less secure. To bridge the gap between the two, yet another prob-
lem has been defined which is a generalisation of both LWE and Ring-LWE.
Definition 2.15 (Module-LWE). Let n and q be positive integers as before and let d
be a positive integer. The Module-Learning With Errors (Module-LWE) problem, in its
search version, asks to retrieve a polynomial with uniformly random coefficients s ∈ Rdq




the error term comes from a “small” distribution e $←− χ(Rq). The decisional variant asks
to distinguish samples as above from uniformly random samples from Rdq ×Rq.
2.15, even in this simplistic form, is very similar to 2.14. Indeed, Module-LWE
[AD17, LS15, BGV14], from a very high level, entails to using small matrices of poly-
nomials rather than large matrices of scalars (as done in LWE) or single polynomials
(as done in Ring-LWE). This grants Module-LWE much more solid basis from a security
perspective while still allowing a degree of implementation optimisation by means of
FFT-like operations. Again, this will be relevant in Section 5.5.5 as SABER and KYBER
are based on this problem.
2.4.3.5 Samplers used in lattice-based cryptography
All previous definition required a “narrow” distribution over Zq, i.e. a distribution whose
samples are small with high probability. In Section 2.4.3.2 I specified that a discrete
Gaussian distribution is used to this end, since it is by far the most popular choice and
because is the one being adopted (or closely approximated) by the schemes analysed
in this thesis. Sampling from such a distribution is not an easy task, especially when
the quality of the samples, in terms of adherence to the theoretical distribution, has an
impact on security, as is the case for digital signature based on lattices. In this section
I outline several methods in which this can be achieved. I will give references for each
of them for the interested reader, as samplers are not a central theme in this thesis and
are reporter here for completeness only.
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Bernoulli. The Bernoulli distribution returns 1 with a certain probability p and 0
with probability 1− p. As trivial as this statement might sound, such a fact is
used to sample from the discrete Gaussian distribution by performing several ac-
ceptance/rejection tests of uniform random variables with different probabilities
(“biases”) to obtain samples which are closer and closer to the target distribution.
This usage of Bernoulli trials was proposed and utilised in the BLISS digital sig-
nature by Ducas, Durmus, Lepoint and Lyubashevsky [DDLL13].
Ziggurat. The Ziggurat method was originally proposed to sample from continuous
distributions [MT00] and was later adapted to discrete distributions in order to
be used in lattice-based cryptography [BCG+14]. The idea is to approximate the
curve of a (discrete) Gaussian distribution by rectangles of fixed and pre-computed
sizes and then, similarly to the above method, utilise them to reject or accept
uniformly distributed samples. This method was demonstrated on Lyubashevsky’s
signature [Lyu12].
CDT. The cumulative distribution function of a random variable X for any point x in its
domain is the probability of the event X ≤ x. For discrete distributions, this func-
tion can be computed on the discrete values the random variable can take and the
results can be stored in a table T, from which the name Cumulative Distribution
Table (CDT). Again, a uniformly random outcome is then tested against the value
inside the table and the smallest index i such that T[i] is bigger than outcome is
returned. This is perhaps the most relevant sampler in this thesis as Frodo uses
it.
Knuth-Yao. All previous method essentially assumed that a uniformly random vari-
able could be produced and its outcome was then accepted or rejected based on
some statistic or method. The Knuth-Yao sampler [KY76], instead, requires a uni-
formly random bitstring and builds a binary tree that has the possible sampled
values as leaves. The bitstring is then used to derive a left/right path along the
tree until a leaf is eventually reached and the corresponding value is returned.
2.4.4 Frodo
The NIST post-quantum competition [CJL+16] has ignited a considerable amount of
work in the academic community in the direction of bringing hard lattice problems (as
well as other post-quantum candidates, briefly discussed before) into real-world cryp-
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tosystems. Designers were asked to evaluate the security of their schemes in order to
propose concrete parameters and instantiations meeting certain security levels. Imple-
mentations were mandatory too.
Among all theoretical problems which are considered to be hard against quantum
computers, lattice-based ones were by far the most represented: more than a third of
the submissions base their security on lattices. The LWE problem and variants almost
monopolised the scene, with over a third of the schemes being based on them. As I
have already mentioned, the Ring-LWE problem offers very attractive features when it
comes to implementing schemes in practice. The fact that matrices are represented as
polynomials reduces keys size, as well as opening the way to computations based on a
variant of the Fourier transform.
Such practical improvements come at a cost, however. First of all, security is no
longer based on generic lattices, but on a more restrictive class of lattices called ideal
lattices. Such an extra structure is induced by the polynomial representation of matri-
ces, and it is still an open question whether this structure is exploitable by attackers
or not. Potentially there could be cryptanalysis that weakens the security of Ring-LWE
while not affecting standard LWE in any significant way. A second drawback stems from
the practical implementation of the Fourier transform. Several attacks over the years
have targeted it, highlighting how delicate a step it is.
For these reasons, I will focus on peculiar properties of LWE-based schemes. In par-
ticular, one character will play a fundamental role in this thesis: Frodo, a scheme whose
security is based on the matrix version of LWE in normal form. Note that multiple ver-
sions of Frodo exist: when I talk about it generically or on aspects which hold for all
variants I simply call it Frodo. I write FrodoKEM [NAB+17] to mean the Key Encap-
sulation Mechanism submitted to round 1 of the NIST post-quantum competition. The
version of Frodo before the NIST competition is referenced under the name FrodoKEP
[BCD+16], which I briefly describe in Section 2.4.4.8. Finally, during the completion of
this thesis FrodoKEM was modified as part of the second round of the NIST competi-
tion. While this last version is not covered by the coming chapters, I describe what has
changed in Section 2.4.4.9. Note that the algorithmic pseudocode descriptions in this
chapter differ slightly in notation and phrasing, but are otherwise taken directly from
the Frodo specification [NAB+17].
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2.4.4.1 An Old Structure for a New Scheme
For the sake of argument, I will now outline an amazingly insecure public-key encryp-
tion scheme which acts as a bridge classical cryptosystems and the new, post-quantum
scheme Frodo [NAB+17, BCD+16].
• KEYGEN(n, q,χ,n) generates a uniformly random matrix A $←− U (Zq)n×n and a
matrix S $←− χ(Z)n×n. It outputs pk = (A,B = AS (mod q)) as a public key and S as
a private key.
• ENC(pk,M) uses the public key pk to encrypt the message M ∈ Zm×nq as follows.
First a matrix S′ $←− χ(Z)m×n is drawn, then the ciphertext c is a couple formed of
C=S′A (mod q)
D=S′B+M (mod q) .
• DEC(sk, c) parses the ciphertext c into its two components and returns
M′ =D−CS (mod q) .
Correctness is trivial to verify, and so is insecurity: the secret key S can be derived
from the public key using simple algebraic operations. What is interesting about the
above non-crypto scheme is its structure: the second half of the ciphertext tries to mask
the message by adding it to a matrix which is a function of the public key and some
random matrix generated by encryption; the first half is generated to allow decryption
at the receiver end. In other words, this is an insecure cousin of the ElGamal public-key
encryption scheme. However, it fails at generating a pseudorandom public key from the
secret key: this means that computing the latter from the former is easy, and that the
message is not “one-time padded” with something difficult to predict by an adversary.
The solution to all these problems is easier than it seems, thanks to the learning with
errors problem.
2.4.4.2 Security Vs. Correctness
Matrix multiplications involved in the outlined insecure scheme can be seen as “error-
less” Matrix-LWE samples, so a very first attempt to fix it is by adding error matrices.
The patch would look as follows.
41
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
• KEYGEN(n, q,χ,n) generates a uniformly random matrix A $←−U (Zq)n×n and two
matrices S,E $←− χ(Z)n×n. It outputs pk = (A,B = AS+E (mod q)) as a public key
and S as a private key.
• ENC(pk,M) uses the public key pk to encrypt the message M ∈ Zm×nq as follows.
First matrices S′,E′ $←− χ(Z)m×n and E′′ $←− χ(Z)m×n are drawn, then the ciphertext
c is a couple formed of
C=S′A+E′ (mod q)
D=S′B+E′′+M (mod q) .
• DEC(sk, c) parses the ciphertext c into its two components and returns
M′ =D−CS (mod q) .
Compared to the protocol before, this attempt really just draws error matrices of the
right dimensions and adds them to already present matrix multiplications. Nonetheless,
such a conceptually simple patch has a drastic impact on the race between correctness
and security. On the one hand, the former is lost as
D−CS=S′E+E′′+M−E′S (mod q)
that is to say, the term S′AS disappears as before but many multiplications among
elements drawn from χ, i.e. “small”, still remain. Therefore M′ 6=M and full correctness
cannot be achieved. On the other hand, deriving the secret key from the public key now
is equivalent to solving an instance of the Matrix-LWE problem, and the message is
hidden by the term S′B+E′′ which is pseudorandom under the Matrix-LWE assumption,
in the same fashion the term hy in ElGamal was pseudorandom under the assumption
that DDH is hard.
Security now relies on the difficulty of a mathematical problem, which is widely
believed to hold. At the current stage, however, the scheme is unusable because each
entry of the matrix M is perturbed by the corresponding entry of the matrix S′E+
E′′−E′S, which has a very high chance of being non-zero. Unfortunately, there is no
way of using the above scheme while still retaining deterministic correctness, hence
probabilistic correctness is required. This means that there will always be a non-zero
probability of incorrect decryption, and it will be the job of a fine tuning of parameters
to make it as small as possible.
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Figure 2.4: Threshold encoding/decoding for B = 3.
In order to withstand some noise, the message is encoded into Zq rather than being
chosen from it. For the sake of this description, I fix the modulus q to be a power of
two, i.e. q = 2D for some positive integer D. This is consistent with the modulus adopted
in FrodoKEM. The process starts with a message
〈
µ
〉 ∈ {0,1}B, i.e. a bitstring that is of
length a positive integer B < D. Alternatively, 〈µ〉 is a number 0≤µ< 2B, then threshold
encoding is applied as
ec :
{
0, . . . ,2B −1
}
−→Zq
ec(µ) 7−→ q/2B ·µ .
Intuitively, Zq is partitioned into 2B subsets, each containing 2D−B elements. The
arithmetic mean between the two borderline numbers of each set is the centre, and
encodes a number between 0 and 2B−1. Figure 2.4 illustrates how Zq, represented as a
line, is split in the special case B = 3. By convention, a number sitting at the intersection
of two sets belongs to the set starting from it. Note that the line really is an opened
circle, since q = 0 (mod q) the two extrema are the same point.
Vice versa, threshold decoding takes a number in Zq and outputs the centre of the
set it belongs to. This is mapped back to a number between 0 and 2B −1 as
dc :Zq −→
{
0, . . . ,2B −1
}
dc(c) 7−→ b2B/q · ce (mod 2B)
where bxe = dx+0.5e is the rounding function, taking a positive real number and re-
turning the nearest integer (this formulation is consistent with the borderline numbers
convention described before). If the message of the probabilistic encryption is encoded
using this method, it is possible to allow for some errors to occur. Decryption will now
succeed as long as the error is not too large, i.e. if the decrypted ciphertext still lies in
the same set of the plaintext that was sent. In other words, the introduced error should
not exceed q/2B+1 in absolute value.
This is where the description of Frodo begins and where the insecure scheme out-
lined in Section 2.4.4.1 is turned into a fully-fledged post-quantum scheme. First of all,




Input: Bitstring µ ∈ {0,1}B·n·m
Output: Matrix M ∈Zm×nq
1: for i ≤ m do
2: for j ≤ n do
3: m ←∑Bl=1µ((i−1)n+ j−1)B+l ·2l
4: Mi, j ← ec(m)= q/2B ·m
5: return M
Algorithm 2 FrodoKEM.Decode
Input: Matrix M ∈Zm×nq
Output: Bitstring µ ∈ {0,1}B·n·m
1: for i ≤ m do
2: for j ≤ n do
3: µ← dc(Mi, j)= b2B/q ·Mi, je (mod 2B)
4: for l ≤ B do
5: µ((i−1)n+ j−1)B+l ←〈m〉l
6: return µ
M ∈ Zm×nq , meaning that the encoding scheme has to be applied entry-wise with the
same criteria: every B bits are encoded into a Zq element. In total, then, a message can
be up to B · n · m bits long. Each position Mi, j ∈ Zq is perturbed by S′iE
ᵀ
j +E′′i, j −E′iS
ᵀ
j
(mod q), which has to be less than q/2B+1 in absolute value for the correct plaintext to
be decoded. Algorithms 1 and 2 show the final encoding and decoding processes, respec-
tively.
2.4.4.3 Pseudorandomness Generation
Both uniformly random matrices, e.g. A, and those from χ, e.g. S and E, would require
a prohibitive amount of true randomness in practice. The designers of FrodoKEM have
solved this issue by using a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG): a truly random,
usually short, seed is given as input and an arbitrarily long pseudorandom output is
generated. There are two main advantages: the amount of true random bits is limited to
creating seeds, which are much shorter than full matrices, and communication overhead
is decreased since only short seeds need to be exchanged while matrices are generated
offline.
I shall start by describing how the uniform pseudorandom matrix A is generated,
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Algorithm 3 FrodoKEM.Gen-AES128
Input: Seed seedA ∈ {0,1}128
Output: Pseudorandom matrix A ∈Zn×nq
1: for i ≤ n do
2: for j ≤ n, j ← j+8 do




〉‖ . . .‖〈ci, j+7〉←AESseedA(p) where 〈ci,k〉 ∈ {0,1}16
5: for k ≤ 8 do
6: A i, j+k−1 ← ci, j+k−1 (mod q)
7: return A
Algorithm 4 FrodoKEM.Gen-cSHAKE128
Input: Seed seedA ∈ {0,1}128
Output: Pseudorandom matrix A ∈Zn×nq




〉‖ . . .‖〈ci,n〉← cSHAKE(seedA,16n,28 + i) where 〈ci, j〉 ∈ {0,1}16
3: for j ≤ n do
4: A i, j ← ci, j (mod q)
5: return A
and later focus on matrices drawn from χ, as the process is quite different. In the imple-
mentation of FrodoKEM, when A is sampled as A $←−U ({0,1})n×n, what actually happens
is that only a 128-bit seed seedA is drawn uniformly from random and A is deterministi-
cally generated from it by a PRNG. The saving in true randomness is huge, considering
that A effectively requires D · n2 bits, i.e. between 5.9 MB and 14.5 MB depending on
the parameter set.
In the specifications [NAB+17], the algorithm which takes as input a seedA and
returns A ∈Zn×nq is called FrodoKEM.Gen and comes in two flavours, depending on the
PRNG that is used to expand the seed. Algorithm 3 uses AES [MVM09] and works
as follows. Two indexes i, j are converted in binary and padded to reach a length of
128. The resulting bitstring is encrypted with AES using seedA as a key. The resulting
128-bit long ciphertext is interpreted as sixteen 16-bit numbers modulo q and stored
in A i, j, . . . , A i, j+7. This is repeated for all rows, indexed by i, and every eight columns,
indexed by j. Note that the j-loop runs over the columns of A, therefore jumps eight
positions at a time because that is the number of consecutive positions generated.




Input: A random 16-bit number r and the appropriate function Tχ
Output: A sample e ∈Z from χ
1: t ←∑16l=2 〈r〉l ·2l
2: e ← 0
3: for z ≤ s do
4: if t > Tχ(z) then
5: e ← e+1
6: e ← (−1)〈r〉1 · e
7: return e
In this case cSHAKE is initialised with seedA and with a customisation value which only
depends on the row index, and produces n 16-bit numbers modulo q which are stored
as one full row of A. Note that to generate A, cSHAKE is always used in its 128-bit
variant. Note that the factor 28 is an arbitrary constant introduced in the specifications
[NAB+17].
Algorithms 3 and 4 are very different and clearly not compatible with one another. A
fair comparison in performance of the two algorithms is also quite hard to establish due
to the large number of possible implementations of the two PRNGs. On the one hand,
AES is exceptionally fast when the underlying platform has dedicated instructions to
run it, e.g. AES-NI instructions on Intel platforms. On the other hand, when they are
not available, cSHAKE seems to offer better performance [NAB+17].
2.4.4.4 Sampling from χ
Pseudorandom sequences, as output by AES and cSHAKE in Algorithms 3 and 4 re-
spectively, can be directly used to generate matrices from the uniform distribution,
but an extra step is needed to generate matrices from the distribution χ. First of all,
cSHAKE128 or cSHAKE256 (depending on the chosen parameter set, AES is never
used) are applied to expand a seed into a pseudorandom sequence of the correct length.
This is split into a number of 16-bit pseudorandom numbers, which are fed into an
inversion sampling algorithm to produce a sample from χ.
Algorithm 5 describes how inversion sampling transforms a random number r into
a sample from χ by using its probability mass function, here represented by Tχ. The for
loop, which is concretely implemented in constant time to avoid timing leakage, returns
a value e ∈ {0, . . . , s}. The last step uses the least significant bit of the random number r
to multiply e by a sign.
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Algorithm 6 FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix
Input: A seed seedE ∈ {0,1}S, dimensions n1,n2, the appropriate function Tχ and a
domain separator c
Output: A matrix sample E ∈Zn1×n2 from χn1×n2




2: for i ≤ n1 do
3: for j ≤ n2 do




Output: Key pair pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq and sk = (s,S) ∈ {0,1}LEN ×Zn×nq .
1: s‖seedE‖z $←−U ({0,1})3LEN




6: B←AS+E (mod q)
7: return public key pk = (seedA,B) and secret key sk = (s,S)
Algorithm 6 describes the final algorithm that, given a seed seedE, returns a matrix
E distributed according to χ. The algorithm allows for matrices of any dimension to be
generated, hence the extra inputs n1,n2, and can use the same seed to generate distinct
matrices. The latter feature is made possible by the domain separator c, which com-
pletely changes the output pseudorandom sequence of cSHAKE even if the same seed is
used. Multiple matrices can be then produced from the same truly random seed, hence
further saving on the cost of true randomness. Finally, note that in this case cSHAKE is
used either in its 128-bit or in its 256-bit variant depending on the parameter set. Since
this is mostly irrelevant for this thesis, I avoid specifying the variant.
2.4.4.5 Frodo Algorithm Descriptions
It is finally time to explicitly state the three main algorithms forming FrodoKEM. Being
a KEM, it is formed of key generation, encapsulation and decapsulation, cf. Figure 2.3.
Algorithm 7 is the key generation algorithm of FrodoKEM, which is very similar to




Input: Public key pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq .





3: S′ ←FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix(seedE′ ,m,n,Tχ,4)
4: E′ ←FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix(seedE′ ,m,n,Tχ,5)
5: A←FrodoKEM.Gen(seedA)
6: B′ ←S′A+E′ (mod q)
7: E′′ ←FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix(seedE′ ,m,n,Tχ,6)
8: V←S′B+E′′ (mod q)
9: C←V+FrodoKEM.Encode(µ) (mod q)
10: ss← cSHAKE(B′‖C‖k‖d,LEN,7)
11: return Ciphertext c = (B′,C,d) and shared secret ss
Algorithm 9 FrodoKEM.DECAPS
Input: Ciphertext c = (B′,C,d) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zm×nq × {0,1}m×n×B, secret key sk = (s,S) ∈
{0,1}LEN ×Zn×nq and public key pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq .
Output: Shared secret ss ∈ {0,1}LEN.
1: M←C−B′S (mod q)
2: µ′ ←FrodoKEM.Decode(M)
3: return FrodoKEM.CCA(c, s, µ′, pk)
matrices at (pseudo)random are generated and the fact that the secret key contains the
vector s as well. This will be used in Algorithm 10 to make the scheme secure against
chosen ciphertext adversaries [KL07, Section 10.6].
Algorithm 8 specifies the encapsulation algorithm. The value µ is drawn uniformly
at random and encoded using Algorithm 1. The latter turns it into a matrix, which is
then hidden by S′B+E′′, which is pseudorandom under the assumption that Matrix-
LWE is hard (and that cSHAKE is a secure PRNG). The sender then retains µ and
transmits the encapsulated key.
Decapsulation, in Algorithm 9, allows the uniform pseudorandom matrix S′AS to be
cancelled out, then applies the decoding procedure described in Algorithm 2. As long as
the introduced error does not exceed the critical threshold of 2B+1/q, the two parties will
indeed share the bitstring ss. This can then be fed into a key derivation function and
the communication can happen securely thanks to the DEM part of the protocol.
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Algorithm 10 FrodoKEM.CCA
Input: Ciphertext c = (B′,C,d) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zm×nq × {0,1}LEN, secret vector s ∈ {0,1}m×n×B,
recovered vector µ′ ∈ {0,1}m×n×B and public key pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq .
Output: Shared secret ss ∈ {0,1}LEN.
1: seedE′‖k′‖d′ ← cSHAKE(pk‖µ′,3LEN,3)
2: S′ ←FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix(seedE′ ,m,n,Tχ,4)
3: E′ ←FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix(seedE′ ,m,n,Tχ,5)
4: A←FrodoKEM.Gen(seedA)
5: B′′ ←S′A+E′ (mod q)
6: E′′ ←FrodoKEM.SampleMatrix(seedE′ ,m,n,Tχ,6)
7: V←S′B+E′′ (mod q)
8: C′ ←V+FrodoKEM.Encode(µ′) (mod q)
9: if B′ =B′′ and C=C′ and d=d then
10: return ss← cSHAKE(B′‖C‖k′‖d′,LEN,7)
11: else
12: return ss← cSHAKE(B′‖C‖s‖d′,LEN,7)
NIST1 NIST2
n 640 976
q = 2D 215 216




Table 2.1: Parameter sets of FrodoKEM.
FrodoKEM is secure against chosen ciphertext adversaries [KL07, Section 10.6]. For
convenience of representation, I included the extra steps required to achieve such a level
of security separately in Algorithm 10.
2.4.4.6 Parameter sets
Algorithms 7 to 10 can be instantiated in practice with two parameter sets, which are
summarised in Table 2.1. I call them NIST1 and NIST2, and they target the NIST-
defined 128 (tier 1) and 192 (tier 3) security levels respectively. Integers n, n and m
determine the matrices’ dimensions, q is the modulus, B the number of exchanged bits
encoded in each entry of the plaintext, while the last row indicates the probability of
failure, i.e. the probability that there are any discrepancies between the µ as generated
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Probability of (in multiples of 2−16)
0 ±1 ±2 ±3 ±4 ±5 ±6 ±7 ±8 ±9 ±10 ±11
NIST1 9456 8857 7280 5249 3321 1844 898 384 144 47 13 3
NIST2 11278 10277 7774 4882 2545 1101 396 118 29 6 1
Table 2.2: Probability mass function of χ for both parameter sets.
by the encapsulation and as derived from decapsulation.
As already mentioned, the failure probability is determined by the distribution χ.
The importance of adopting a “narrow” distribution for secrets and errors should be
clear from the discussion on correctness: the retrieved matrix M′ is perturbed by the
error matrix E′′′ = S′E+E′′−E′S, which is a function of the matrices drawn from χ. If
any of those matrices were too large, then entries of E′′′ would exceed the bound q/2B+1
required for decoding.
So the distribution χ should be chosen such that elements in E′′′ are within bound
with very high probability. Moreover, the security of the whole scheme should provably
be based on Matrix-LWE. The designer of FrodoKEM therefore chose one such distribu-
tion, which additionally allows efficient sampling: a discrete and symmetric distribution
approximating a rounded continuous Gaussian. For a positive integer s ∈Z, the support
of χ is Supp
(
χ
)= {−s, . . . , s}. Every integer z which lies inside the support is drawn from
χ with probability listed in Table 2.2. Each row of the latter can be interpreted to be a
function Tχ : Supp
(
χ
)→Z, one per parameter set: the probability of a value z ∈Supp (χ)
is simply computed as χ(z) = Tχ(z)/216. Note from Table 2.2 that s = 11 for NIST1 and
s = 10 for NIST2. Since s ¿ q, χ is guaranteed to produce numbers in Zq despite being
formally defined over Z.
2.4.4.7 Security
The interested reader is referred to the specifications of FrodoKEM [NAB+17] for de-
tails on the security aspects of FrodoKEM. Note that the distribution χ used here is
slightly differs from the “narrow” distribution I defined for LWE in Section 2.4.3. In
general such a discrepancy detail might be problematic, because it could potentially
signify that the proof of security no longer holds for the parameters FrodoKEM adopts.
In the specification [NAB+17], however, this aspect is taken care of and an alternative
proof based on a variant of BDDα is provided.
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CCS1 CCS2 CCS3 CCS4
n 352 592 752 864
q = 2D 211 212 215 215
n = m 8 8 8 8
B 1 2 4 4
Failure 2−41.8 2−36.2 2−38.9 2−33.8
Table 2.3: Parameter sets of FrodoKEP before the NIST competition.
Probabilities (times 2x)
0 ±1 ±2 ±3 ±4 ±5 ±6
CCS1 88 61 20 3
CCS2 1570 990 248 24 1
CCS3 1206 919 406 104 15 1
CCS4 19304 14700 6490 1659 245 21 1
Table 2.4: Probability mass function of χ before the NIST competition.
2.4.4.8 Frodo before NIST
Frodo made its first appearance in the literature well before the NIST competition took
place. Bos et al. [BCD+16] originally proposed Frodo as a Key Exchange Protocol (KEP)
based on the hardness of Matrix-LWE in normal form. The core operations are essen-
tially the same as the NIST candidate, however different parameter sets were proposed.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 contain the parameter sets that were put forward in the original
publication [BCD+16]. Note that, despite mostly having the same names, these parame-
ters are not interchangeable with those in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 because the protocol in the
original publication is radically different. Comparing Tables 2.1 and 2.3, it can be noted
how different the probabilities of failure are: this is only due to the security notions the
two schemes meet. FrodoKEP and FrodoKEM [NAB+17] are hardly comparable as full
schemes, however many internal operations were maintained. Since this thesis mainly
focuses on such internal operations, there will be no ambiguity and arguments will go
through for every version of Frodo. In fact, many conclusions will hold for generic matrix
multiplications in LWE-like contexts, hence embracing more schemes than just Frodo,
as I will explain in Chapter 6.
Despite being superseded, FrodoKEP is very important for this thesis. One reason
is historical: I had started working on the ideas explored in Chapter 3 before the NIST
competition began, which resulted in most of the content published in the corresponding
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paper of mine to be focused on FrodoKEP. The other main reason is that FrodoKEP is
such that there are no long-term secrets involved: every session has its own ephemeral
secret matrices. This motivated the study for a single-trace setting, where only lim-
ited information can be gathered by an adversary. Such a distinction with FrodoKEM,
where a long term secret does exist, is behind the evolution of many arguments from
single-trace to a multi-trace setting, the latter being the typical scenario of DPA (see
Section 2.3).
2.4.4.9 Frodo after this thesis
Much like FrodoKEM has a predecessor, FrodoKEP, it also has a successor. Once the
main body of my research and experiments were over, and the writing of this thesis
was well under way, the NIST post-quantum competition proceeded one step further
and entered the second round. Frodo is among the schemes that survived the scrutiny,
and was slightly updated to incorporate insights and feedback from the community
[NAB+19]. In Chapter 6, I will detail to what extent my work applies to the updated
scheme. At then of the second round, Frodo was also chosen as an alternate candidate
in round 3 [Nat20].
2.5 Literature Review
Lattice-based cryptography is a relatively young field in the broader cryptography lit-
erature, as its roots can be dated back to the nineties. From an historical point of view,
there were several works that pre-dated many of the constructions discussed in this
thesis and must therefore be acknowledged and credited for initiating the body of work
I will dive into. The first in line was the cryptosystem called NTRU, designed by Hoff-
stein, Pipher and Silverman around 1996 [HPS96] and later refined and published in
1998 [HPS98]. NTRU is formed of operations among polynomials, which is why it is usu-
ally listed among the “structured” lattice-based cryptosystems. Apart from being among
the first schemes based on lattices, NTRU is particularly relevant today because, differ-
ently than other schemes proposed at the time, it is still considered a valid candidate, to
the point that several submissions of the NIST post-quantum standardisation effort are
based on it or variants thereof [ZCH+19, BCLv19]. Another, yet analogous, reason why
NTRU is still very relevant nowadays is the considerable amount of works that anal-
ysed practical aspects of the scheme such as implementation performance [Sil99] and
security [HS98, SW06a]. An honourable mention should also go to other cryptosystems
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that have not aged as well but that inspired many subsequent works, including those
most relevant to the topics of this thesis. These include the works by Ajtai [Ajt96], Ajtai
and Dwork [AD97], and Goldreich, Goldwasser, Halevi [GGH97a, GGH97b].
The Learning With Errors problem was introduced in 2005 by Regev [Reg05], along
with a public-key cryposystem based on it. What LWE added to the picture is a way
of working with lattices under the efficient blanket of modular arithmetic: on the one
hand the security guarantees come from solid mathematical theory, on the other all a
machine needs to be instructed to do is (mostly) modular sums and multiplications. It
should come as no surprise that, from then on, a race to bring lattice-based cryptography
to the real world started.
Another milestone was hit by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [LPR10] who in-
troduced the Ring-LWE problem. Very loosely speaking, in its simplest form (which is
sometimes called Poly-LWE) Ring-LWE considers the fact that instead of using a public
uniformly random matrix over Zq, it is possible to draw only a uniformly random vector
and then build a circulant matrix from it. While this is only the intuition on the surface,
what happens to the underlying lattice is that it is ideal. The precise meaning of this
word is beyond the scope of this thesis, many details are given in the original paper
[LPR10], but in essence ideal lattices are a special kind of lattice, therefore it might
be the case that doing so weakens the security guarantee of schemes based on such
a problem. So far, no ones has demonstrated a significant difference in solving LWE
and Ring-LWE, which are commonly treated as equivalently secure for any practical
purpose.
The fact that Ring-LWE uses vectors, actually polynomials, rather than matrices
means that public and secret keys are shorter, which is very appealing when it comes
to implementing a scheme. Also, a transformation exists, the Number Theoretic Trans-
form (NTT), such that both addition and multiplication between polynomials can be per-
formed component-wise. Again, this is very convenient from a performance perspective.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that cryptosystems based on Ring-LWE were the
first to find practical applications [dCRVV15, CMV+15]. Bos et al. [BCNS15] showed
Ring-LWE could be used inside the TLS protocol, which eventually inspired the cre-
ation of NewHope [ADPS16], a Key Exchange Protocol which was later featured in an
experiment by Google to deploy post-quantum cryptography to secure internet commu-
nications [Bra16].
Being fast and rather compact are two key features which also drove the imple-
mentation of lattice-based schemes, particularly those based on Ring-LWE, on more
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constrained environments. For example, Alkim, Jakubeit and Schwabe [AJS16] imple-
mented NewHope on the ARM Cortex-M0 and Cortex-M4, while Oder and Güneysu
[OG17] implemented it on a FPGA. Clearly, implementations of schemes based on un-
structured lattices, other than those described in this thesis, appeared as well, like that
of Howe at al. [HOKG18]. I mentioned the latter paper in Chapter 5 too as being particu-
larly relevant to compare my own implementation. In fact, the main difference between
our works being that Howe et al. did not use SIMD instructions. This idea has also been
deployed in the context of Ring-LWE by Kannwischer, Rijneveld and Schwabe [KRS19]
who exploited them to speed up polynomial multiplications on the ARM Cortex-M4.
Implementations on smaller and smaller devices, however, call for side-channel anal-
ysis. A fairly wide range of them has already been successfully applied to lattice-based
schemes at large, by exploiting execution time [SW06b], cache hits and misses [BHLY16,
Pes16], power consumption [PPM17, ATT+18] and electromagnetic radiation [EFGT17b].
The work by Primas, Pessl and Mangard [PPM17] is particularly interesting as they
mount a single-trace attack, much like in the same spirit as in Chapter 3, against the
NTT of a typical Ring-LWE public-key scheme. Interestingly, this exploits a peculiar-
ity of structured lattices, which in this case do offer more attack surface, even if only
for side-channel adversaries. Also, they claim traditional masking would be ineffective
against their attack. In the context of LWE, instead, Aysu at al. [ATT+18], as I already
mentioned in Chapter 3, performed a similar attack to my extend-and-prune one: they
targeted a FPGA implementation and retained all possible guesses for the first posi-
tion of the secret, but then continued with only a single guess, which is what I called
laser beam in Chapter 3, for the others. In this sense, I improved upon their work in
the flexibility of the attack. Non-invasive side-channel attacks, like those mentioned
so far, are not the only concern in the context of lattice-based cryptography. Fault at-
tacks are invasive techniques which try to destabilise intermediate computations by
tampering with the device (e.g. by injecting high voltages or lasers). They seem to find a
fertile ground against several algorithms of lattice-based schemes [VPR19], being them
signing [EFGT17a], decryption [KY11] or error sampling [BBK16]. The latter case is
precisely what my co-authors and I have tried to defend against in our paper [HKM+19]
to which, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, I contributed too little to be included in this the-
sis. In essence, we propose to apply several statistical tests to the output of the sampler,
e.g. checking for repeating sequences (in order to thwart zeroing), computing sample
mean and variance (to check whether they adhere to the theoretical secure values) or
perform a chi-square test (which is more stringent on the actual distribution in output).
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Any faults, programming errors or erroneous activity leading to an unusual distribution
would then be caught.
As always in the field of cryptography, works followed to patch the situation: sev-
eral countermeasures were also published. These range from blinding by Reparaz et al.
[RdCR+16], who used the fact that randomness could homomorphically be applied to the
ciphertext, to masking schemes [RRdC+16, OSPG18]. In this context, it is interesting to
notice how the last two papers take very different approaches when it comes to shifting
values back to the unmasked domain: Reparaz et al. [RRdC+16] developed a rather com-
plex probabilistic decoder which applies non-linear threshold decoding and accounts for
errors by repeating experiments to transform arithmetic shares of the secret to boolean
shares of the plaintext, while Oder et al. [OSPG18] unmasked the ciphertext sequen-




Analysis of Single-Trace Power
Attacks against Frodo
The conceptual path followed by Section 2.4.4 to introduce Frodo stresses how ideo-
logically similar some post-quantum schemes are to classical, as in pre-quantum, cryp-
tosystems. They essentially share the same structure built upon different mathematical
problems. It should not be too surprising, therefore, that some attack vectors which are
essentially problem-independent still apply and need to be analysed. This is the case
of side-channel attacks which, as introduced in Section 2.3, apply whenever something
sensitive is implemented, no matter where the security guarantees come from.
The current and next chapters describe the main core of the work I did during my
PhD, which was precisely aimed at assessing to which extent existing techniques in the
side-channel analysis domain apply, or do not apply, to post-quantum schemes.
The majority of the content of this chapter was published at the Selected Areas in
Cryptography (SAC) 2018 conference [BFM+18a]. My coauthors were Joppe Bos, Simon
Friedberger, Elisabeth Oswald and Martijn Stam. I was the main author of the paper
and the main contributor to content, writing and experiments.
3.1 Overview
Some background is useful to understand why the research described in this chapter
took the form presented here. The choice to focus on template attacks stemmed from the
fact that it is not always possible to use usual unprofiled power models, e.g. Hamming
weight and distance. This way I achieved a good level of generality. The extend-and-
prune methodology was chosen because it is the technique that best fits the incremental
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nature of the matrix multiplication carried out in LWE-based schemes. Indeed, it shows
the best outcome from an adversarial point of of view.
It must be noticed, however, that the assumption about unprofiled power models
not succeeding is purely determined by the setting, as there are examples where they
work just fine. In the context of post-quantum cryptosystems, this is the case in the
work by Aysu et al. [ATT+18], who demonstrated the efficacy of horizontal Correlation
Power Analysis (CPA) in a single trace setting against Frodo’s matrix multiplication AS
when implemented in hardware. Their attack assumes knowledge of the architecture in
order to target specific intermediate registers. They further assume that the Hamming
distance is a good approximation of their specific device’s leakage. They do rely on an
extend-and-prune strategy, but they do not further explore challenges that may arise
in contexts where the device’s leakage is too far from Hamming weight/distance for an
unprofiled method to work.
My coauthors and I filled this gap by investigating single-trace attacks against soft-
ware implementations of “ring-less” LWE-based constructions, as used by Frodo. We
focused our attention on matrix multiplications as they are fundamental in any plain-
LWE scheme and because it is where secret matrices are used the most. Moreover, Frodo
is designed with some side-channel considerations that limit the attack surface, thus
making our target choice very relevant: algorithms run in constant-time, NTT trans-
forms cannot be used, hence cannot be the target of side-channel attacks [PPM17], and
the sampling of secret matrices, which is usually rather delicate, is done via a simple
CDT sampler, that are based on tables and implementable in constant time, apart from
being targeted already by other works in the literature [KH18]. All in all, matrix mul-
tiplications indeed are a very natural candidate for attackers to choose.
When Frodo is used as a key agreement protocol, the secret S is ephemeral and the
calculation of AS+E that I target is only performed once (or twice), resulting in only
a single trace. This limited usage implies that only a subset of side-channel techniques
apply. When Frodo is used as a KEM, the overall private key (of the KEM) is used
repeatedly for decapsulation and the usual techniques relying on a variable number
of traces do apply. However, even then my work provides useful guidance on security,
and indeed, my results can be translated to any “small secret” LWE scheme, that is, any
scheme where the individual entries of S are “small” in the space over which the scheme
is defined. I will give more details about this aspect in Chapter 6.
Even if only a single trace corresponding to AS+E is available, each element in S
is still used multiple times in the calculation of AS, enabling so called horizontal dif-
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ferential power analysis. Here the single trace belonging to AS is cut up into smaller
subtraces corresponding to the constituent Zq operations. Hence, the number of sub-
traces available for each targeted Zq element (of S) is determined by the dimension of
the matrix A. For square A as given by the suggested parameters, this immediately
leads to a situation where high dimensions for A, thus S, on the one hand imply more
elements of S need to be recovered (harder), yet on the other hand more subtraces per
element are available (easier). To complicate matters, the elements of S are chosen to be
relatively small in Zq, with the exact support differing per parameter set. All in all, the
effect of parameter selection on the natural side-channel resistance is multi-faceted and
potentially counterintuitive. I therefore provide guidance in this respect in Section 3.5.
For my investigation, I opted for the ARM Cortex M0 as the platform for Frodo’s im-
plementation. The Cortex-M family has high practical relevance in the IoT panorama,
where my choice for the M0 is primarily instigated by the availability of the ELMO
tool [MOW17], which I use to simulate Frodo’s power consumption (see Section 3.2 for
details).
Overall, I target up to three points of interest, corresponding to three assembly in-
structions: loading of a secret value, the actual Zq multiplication, and updating an ac-
cumulator with the resulting product. For a classical divide-and-conquer attack, where
all positions of the secret matrix S are attacked independently, the templates can easily
be profiled at the start, but as I find in Section 3.3, the resulting algorithmic variance
is too high to allow meaningful key recovery.
Therefore I switch to an extend-and-prune technique (Section 3.4), allowing inclu-
sion of predictions on intermediate variables (such as partial sums stored into an ac-
cumulator). This approach drastically reduces the algorithmic variance and hence in-
creases the effective signal strength. I show how different pruning strategies allow for a
trade-off between performance and success, concluding that for reasonable levels of suc-
cess, this type of pruning needs to be less aggressive than that employed by Aysu et al.
[ATT+18]. I also find that of the two Frodo parameter sets given in the NIST proposal,
the one designed for higher black-box security is in fact the most vulnerable against
side-channel cryptanalysis.
3.2 Preliminary Notions
The core operation of Frodo is the calculation of B←AS+E. Without loss of generality,
I will henceforth concentrate on only a single column of the secret matrix S, which
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will be denoted by s. Thus all attacks in this chapter target the operation b ← As+
e, where I try to recover the vector s for known A and b based on the leakage from
primarily the matrix–vector multiplication As. Note that, given A and b, it is possible
to check whether a guess s is correct by checking whether b−As is in the support of
χ. This suffices with very high probability, because a wrong s would make the result
pseudorandom.
The analysis of a single column recovery s could easily be extrapolated to the recov-
ery of the full secret matrix S by taking into account the number of columns n and the
fact that columns can be attacked independently. Furthermore, for the original Frodo
key agreement, a subsequent step in the protocol to arrive at a joint secret, the so-
called reconciliation, is component-wise. Consequently, correctly recovering one column
of S immediately translates to recovering part of the eventual session key (between 8
and 32 bits, depending on the selected parameter set). A similar argument applies to
the public key encryption scheme on which the KEM variant [NAB+17] is based. How-
ever, the introduction of hash functions in the final KEM protocol structurally prevents
such a threat and full recovery of S is required.
While I focus on Frodo’s operation As, results apply equally to the transpose opera-
tion sᵀA, or indeed to any scenario where a small secret vector is multiplied by a public
matrix and there is a method to test (as in the case for LWE) with high probability
whether a candidate s is correct. Moreover, despite the focus being on the parameter
sets relevant to Frodo (which has relatively leak-free modular reductions due to its
power-of-two modulus q), the techniques apply to other parameter sets used in differ-
ent LWE-based schemes as well. Chapter 6 contains more details on this aspect of my
work.
3.2.1 Matrix–vector multiplication.
Algorithm 11 contains the high level description of textbook matrix–vector multipli-
cation. This is usually deployed since asymptotically faster methods have overheads
which makes them unsuitable for the matrix dimensions found in practical lattice-based
schemes.
For every iteration of the outer loop, the accumulator sum is initialised to zero and
updated n times with as many Zq multiplications. This means that for every secret
entry si an adversary can exploit n portions of the power trace, namely each time it is
used in Line 5, motivating the use of a horizontal attack.
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Algorithm 11 Matrix–vector multiplication as implemented in Frodo.
Input: A ∈Zn×nq ; s,e ∈Znq
Output: b←As+e
1: b← e
2: for r = 1, . . . ,n do
3: sum ← 0
4: for i = 1, . . . ,n do
5: sum ← sum+ Ar,i · si
6: br ← (br + sum) mod q
7: return b
Note that Line 5 does not include an explicit modular reduction. As the modulus q
is a power of two, the accumulator sum is allowed to exceed q and will only be reduced
modulo q when it is added to the error in Line 6. The modular reduction is really just a
truncation, thus does not depend on the value contained in the register holding b and
therefore I do not exploit its contribution in my analysis.
3.2.2 Experimental Setup
As the target architecture for my experiments I chose the entry level ARM architec-
ture, the Cortex series, because it represents a realistic target and is extremely widely
distributed. The Cortex series has several family members, and for the M0 a high qual-
ity leakage modelling tool exists. Understanding different attack strategies on different
noise levels requires many experiments (I used well over 106 full column traces per pa-
rameter set), which becomes problematic on real devices. Thus I opted to use simulated
yet realistic traces which are quicker to generate, modify, and analyse. This allowed me
to speed up my analysis, and therefore enable the exploration of a wider noise spectrum.
3.2.2.1 ELMO
ELMO [MOW17] (whose implementation is also public [MOW]) is a tool to simulate
instantaneous power consumption for the ARM Cortex M0 processor. This simulator,
created by adapting the open-source instruction set emulator Thumbulator [Wel], has
been designed to enable side-channel analysis without requiring a hardware measure-
ment setup. ELMO takes ARM thumb assembly as input, and its output describes the
power consumption, either at instruction or cycle accuracy. The resulting traces are
noise free, that is, they are based deterministically on the instructions and their inputs.
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(a) First chunk of power trace as simulated by
ELMO of my ARM implementation
Instruction Operation
ldrh r5,[r0,r4] load si
ldrh r6,[r1,r4] load Ar,i
muls r5,r6 si · Ar,i
adds r3,r3,r5 sum+ si · Ar,i
(b) Breakdown of instructions forming the repeating
pattern.
Figure 3.1: Visual representation and detailed structure of target power traces.
ELMO’s quality has been established by comparing leakage detection results be-
tween simulated and real traces from a STM32F0 Discovery Board [MOW17]. As raw
ELMO traces are noise free, the tool is ideal to study the behaviour of template attacks
across different noise levels efficiently: both template building and creating noisy traces
are straightforward.
Let me stress that ELMO does capture differential data-dependent effects, such as
those caused by neighbouring instructions, as well as higher order leakage terms. Con-
sequently, even though ELMO traces are noise free, the trace for the same machine line
of code (same operation with the same operand) will differ depending on the context,
leading to the already mentioned algorithmic variance, see Section 2.3. Since ELMO’s
entire model is known and well documented, I treat it as a black box and only query
simulated power values by giving as inputs the necessary information.
3.2.2.2 Reference implementation
I implemented the innermost loop of Algorithm 11 in ARM assembly, the code is avail-
able in Appendix A, which was wrapped in C code for initialization and loop control.
This gives a fine control over the code ELMO simulates the power consumption of and
prevents the compiler from inserting redundant instructions which might affect leak-
age. The code in Appendix A is then just repeated n times because of the outer loop in
Algorithm 11.
Figure 3.1a plots a partial power trace of the ARM implementation, as simulated by
ELMO. After initialisation, a pattern neatly repeats, corresponding to the equivalent
of Line 5 in Algorithm 11. After excluding unimportant points (e.g. loop structure), the
most relevant instructions responsible for the pattern are given in Figure 3.1b.
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3.2. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
The index i stored in r4 is used to load values from a row of A and s, whose addresses
are in r1 and r0, respectively, into r6 and r5. These are then used to perform one
element multiplication, whose result overwrites r5. Finally the accumulator is updated
in r3 and eventually returned.
Negative numbers are wrapped around modulo q. This is in contrast to Frodo’s orig-
inal convention of truncating numbers after 16-bit independently on the parameter set.
I expect the higher Hamming weights to amplify leakage, thus making my decision,
motivated by simplicity of analysis, very conservative. Finally, intermediate multipli-
cations and partial sums are truncated only when exceeding 32 bits, given the M0 is a
32-bit architecture.
3.2.2.3 Realistic noise estimate
As mentioned before, ELMO traces are noise free. However, when attacking an actual
ARM Cortex M0, environmental noise will be introduced. For the experiments, I will
artificially add this noise, which I assume independently and identically distributed for
all points of interest, according to a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2.
For the profiling that led to the development of ELMO [MOW17], the observed
value1 of σ was approximately 4 ·10−3. I will use this realistic level of environmental
noise as a benchmark throughout. Furthermore, I will consider a representative range
of σ roughly centred around this benchmark. I chose σ in the interval [10−4,10−2) with
steps of 5 · 10−4. Compared to the variance of the signal, my choice implies σ ranges
from having essentially no impact to being on the same order of magnitude of the power
traces as a whole, thus on the same order of magnitude as the signal variance.
3.2.3 Template attacks
As I briefly described in Section 2.3, a template attack is a powerful technique that
builds on the idea that the power model an adversary exploits is built from the device
under attack (or an equivalent one) directly. I deferred details until now because the
generic formulation is quite heavy in notation and is out of scope for this thesis. Here,
instead, I instantiate the relevant formulae for the case of Frodo. As I will briefly show,
template attacks apply particularly well in this scenario, as the keyspace is very limited
compared to many pre-quantum cryptosystems. Two distinct phases exist.
1Personal communication with C. Whitnall.
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3.2.3.1 Profiling phase
The goal of this step is to profile the device in order to analyse the effect of different key
guesses. In this case, only
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ (e.g. 23 for NIST1 and 21 for NIST2) possible secret
values exist, while the public operand of the Zq multiplication is uniformly random but
known.
The precise procedure according to which templates are built depends on the attack
strategy, as described in Section 2.3.
• In the divide-and-conquer strategy, an adversary builds templates before starting
the attack because each subkey, i.e. each position of S, is targeted independently.
Moreover, only loading of the secret and multiplication from Line 5 can be tar-
geted. Therefore, it is enough to build
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ · q templates, i.e. one per each
couple (s,a) ∈Supp (χ)×Zq.
• The extend-and-prune strategy instead builds templates on-the-fly and adaptively,
targeting secret positions in order from first to last. This means that, since early
positions are recovered first, a guess for the value of the accumulator can also be
formulated, therefore including the corresponding addition in the power model.
Practically speaking, this means that, when targeting si,
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ ·n templates
must be built for each candidate vector (s1, . . . , si−1), where the factor n comes from
the number of elements in a column of A.
Despite having very different approaches, I introduce a common formalism to denote
templates. Let L (s, c,a) ∈Supp (χ)×Zq×Zq →RT be a function that takes as inputs the
operands of the operation a · s+ c and returns the vector of ELMO voltage values from
the corresponding power trace. Since ELMO is a deterministic function, i.e. to same
inputs correspond same outputs, those simulated power points are only coming from the
contribution of Pexp, see Section 2.3. To ease the notation, I call gs,c,a =L (s, c,a) ∈RT . In
other words, gs,c,a is a vector of T simulated power points corresponding to the signal an
adversary wishes to extract information from. The inputs of L are the previous value
of the accumulator c ∈ Zq, which can be just set to zero for divide-and-conquer since it




. I adopt the well
known assumption [MOP07, Section 4.4] that noise follows a multivariate Gaussian
distribution. Thus the target power trace of a · s+ c is modelled as a random variable








In other words, a template is a statistical model that I assume is shaped as a multivari-
ate Gaussian distribution, whose mean is the contribution of the signal to the power
trace and whose variance is that of the noise contribution. Both these quantities are
precisely what is profiled from the device in the possession of the adversary.
3.2.3.2 Matching phase
Once templates have been built, an adversary computes a likelihood for each template
and estimates which one better models the target power traces. Being the templates
built on different key candidates, this translates to a posterior probability distribution
on the key space. This is achieved by applying Bayes’ theorem. Recall that ts,c,a is the
statistical model of the power trace of a · s+ c, I denote by Ts,c the matrix whose rows




∣∣Ts,c ]= (∏a f (ts,c,a | k))Pr [k ]∑
`∈Supp(χ) (
∏




ts,c,a | `)=Φ(g`,c,a,Σ`,c,a)(ts,c,a) .
In essence, templates are Gaussian distributions, while the collected power traces, or
their points of interest thereof, are samples. Bayes’ theorem is therefore used to derive
how likely it is for a power point to be drawn from the distribution described by each
template. Since there is one per key candidate, the most likely distribution immediately
yields a most likely candidate.
Both formalisms of the profiling and matching phases are fairly standard notions,
which can be found in the book by Mangard, Oswald and Popp [MOP07, Section 5.3].
3.2.3.3 Simplification of covariance matrix
Working with a full covariance matrix is tricky, as the formulae require its inverse to be
calculated, which is a delicate task because of potential numerical instability problems.
Therefore, I adopt a sequence of assumptions to simplify the model. I assume the noise
distribution does not depend on the data being processed, i.e. Σc,a,s = Σ. To simplify
computations and avoid numerical instability when matching templates with target
power traces, I further assume that covariances are equal to zero. This means that the
covariance matrix Σ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal is filled with σ21, . . . ,σ
2
T , where
T is the number of time points included in the power trace.
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Overall, such assumptions do not strictly hold in practice, but they have been exten-
sively studied in the literature [CK14], [MOP07, Section 5.3], leading to the conclusion
that their associated numerical benefits outweigh the loss of precision due to model
errors.
3.2.3.4 Simplification of the distinguisher
The description of template attacks, particularly of the matching phase, showed for-
mal details on the mathematics behind the application of templates. If one was to work
with those formulae directly, however, efficiency and numerical stability problems would
arise. The inversion of a matrix with small entries and fractions involving very small
numbers require much care. The final goal of a template attack, however, is not strictly
to derive a posterior probability distribution over the key space, as Bayes’ theorem al-
lows one to do, but to decide which key candidate is the most likely in use by the device
under attack. Bayes’ formulae overshoot at such a goal, which can be achieved with
several well known simplifications.






where gs,c,a is the part of interest to the adversary, the true signal which only depends
on its inputs. In light of this, I rewrite the above as follows
ts,c,a = gs,c,a +Na
where Na ∼ NT (0T ,Σ) represents the noise component. The index a simply means the
vector of noise values corresponding to the computation when a ∈ Zq is used. Noise
values themselves, however, are independent of a.
Now I start from Equation (3.1) and simplify away all terms that do not depend on
the key candidate k. Indeed, additive and multiplicative factors which are applied to
all candidates do not essentially change their order, hence whichever had the highest
probability before the transformations will have the highest score after them. First of
all, I can neglect the denominator as it is simply a scaling factor equally applied to all
candidates. Its formulation does not indeed depend on k. Applying a monotonic function
also does not change the orders of score, hence taking the logarithm is allowed. After
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The first term is a constant for all candidates k, therefore the final definition of scores
is





which can be rewritten as












To recap, the term Pr [k ] is simply χ(k); the summation over a indicates the use of
n power traces, one per element in a column of A; the last summation using i as index
ranges over all time points considered in the attack. This fact will be made explicit in
the next section.
3.3 Divide-and-Conquer Template Attack
As every entry of s is an independently and identically distributed sample from χ, I can
potentially target each position separately. Thus I first consider a divide-and-conquer
template attack. A distinct advantage of this approach is that the total number of tem-
plates is fairly small and hence profiling can be preprocessed.
When considering the breakdown of the inner loop (Figure 3.1b), I ignore the load-
ing of the public operand (it essentially leaks nothing exploitable), which leaves three
potential points of interest. On the one hand, the loading of the secret operand and
the multiplication contain direct leakage on the secret, and all relevant inputs appear
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known. For the accumulator update on the other hand, the leakage is less direct and
the value of the accumulator so far cannot be taken into account: it depends on the com-
putation so far, violating the independence requirement for divide-and-conquer. Thus,
the attack in this section is limited to two points of interest, namely the loading of the
secret and the Zq multiplication. From the point of view of the formalism defined in
Section 3.2, this means that the parameter c in Ts,c can simply be ignored (and fixed to
0) because it does not affect the two chosen points of interest. When this is the case, I
will write Ts. I will give more details on this aspect in Section 3.3.4.
Of course, one could still generate templates for all three points of interest by treat-
ing the accumulator as a random variable. However, as the accumulator value is a di-
rect input to the accumulator update and its register is used for the output as well, the
resulting algorithmic variance would be overwhelming. Indeed, as I will show below,
already for the loading of the secret there is considerable algorithmic variance related
to the previous value held by the relevant register. These limitations are intrinsic to a
divide-and-conquer approach; in Section 3.4 I show how an extend-and-prune approach
bypasses these problems.
3.3.1 Estimating success rates
For each entry si, the distinguisher outputs a distinguishing score vector that can be
linked back to a perceived posterior distribution. Selecting the element corresponding
to the highest score corresponds to the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate and the
probability that the correct value is returned this way is referred to as the first-order
success rate.
Ultimately, I am more interested in the first order success rate of the full vector s.
As I assume independence for a divide-and-conquer, I can easily extrapolate the success
rates for s based on those for individual positions as a full vector is recovered correctly if
and only if all its constituent positions are. The advantage of using extrapolated success
rates for s, rather than using direct sample means, is that it provides useful estimates
even for very small success rates (that would otherwise require an exorbitant number
of samples). Thus, analysing the recovery rates of single positions is extremely informa-
tive. Additionally, it gives insights on why the extend-and-prune attack in Section 3.4
greatly outperforms divide-and-conquer.
Other metrics, beyond first-order recovery rate, are of course possible to compare
between distinguishers [SMY09]. However, I regard those alternatives, such as oth-
order recovery or more general key ranking, only of interest when first order success
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rate is low. While for divide-and-conquer this might be the case, for extend-and-prune
the first order recovery is sufficiently high to warrant concentrating on that metric only.
3.3.1.1 Estimating position success rate
Let Pr [S ] be the first order position recovery rate where S is the event that the distin-
guisher indeed associates the highest score to the actual secret value. I experimentally




Pr [S | s ]Pr [s]
where Pr [s] corresponds to the prior distribution χ and the values for Pr [S | s ] are es-
timated by appropriate sample means. To ensure the traces are representative, I range
over A and s (and e) for the relevant experiments and generate traces for the full com-
putation b ← As+e. This allows me to zoom in on individual positions, highlighting
where algorithmic variance occurs. While one could also use direct, position-specific
sample means for Pr [S ], my approach links more closely to the confusion matrix and
has the advantage that it depends less on the sampling distribution of s when running
experiments.
3.3.1.2 Extrapolating overall success rate
If I assume independence of positions, it is easy to express the overall success rate for
recovering s. If I, temporarily, make the simplifying assumption that Pr [S ] is the same
for all n positions, then the first order recovery rate for s is Pr [S ]n (recovery of s will
be successful if and only if recovery of each of its elements is). Even for extremely high
Pr [S ], this value quickly drops, e.g. 0.99n ≈ 5.5 ·10−5 for NIST2.
3.3.2 Results with basic distinguisher
The first set of experiments I propose comes from my original publication at the SAC
conference, where I chose to simplify the divide-and-conquer approach in favour of a
deeper analysis of extend-and-prune, here described in Section 3.4.
As I have already mentioned, the only points of interest considered in this section
are the loading of the secret and multiplication. Furthermore, I take a step forward in
the simplification of Equation (3.1) by assuming that the covariance matrix Σ is not
only diagonal, but also with fixed variances. In other words, Σ = σ2I2. As I will show
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(a) Recovery rate for first position only.

























(b) Recovery rate for second position only.
Figure 3.2: Comparison of recovery rates between first and second positions. The dashed
black line indicates my choice of realistic noise level.
in Section 3.3.3, this a first approximation that does not hold in general, however it
simplifies the scores in Equation (3.2) to










Note that I have already specialised T = 2, i.e. two points of interest, and that I dropped
any reference to the parameter c.
Being it an approximation, it introduces a certain degree of error, which depends
on the operation. For the sake of keeping the computations simple, I ignore this fact
for this distinguisher (thus the name “basic”). This is done in order to simplify away
the contribution of algorithmic variance and, more in general, of any cross-dependency
between points. In other words, such cross-dependencies need not to be estimated now.
I defer an in-depth analysis to Section 3.3.3, where I show how including algorithmic
variance in the templates improve success rate.
3.3.2.1 Experimental results
I target each position of s individually, but only report on the first and second one.
Figure 3.2 displays the success rate for all parameter sets. Each point in each curve
is based on 8 ·105 experiments. The left panel (Figure 3.2a) plots the success rate for
the first position, whereas the right panel (Figure 3.2b) plots it for the second position.
The x axis ranges over the noise interval I discussed in Section 3.2.2.3. In other words,
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templates work in a very low noise regime on the left and in a very high noise regime
on the right.
3.3.2.2 The impact of algorithmic variance
The striking difference between Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, especially in the low environ-
mental noise regime, is due to algorithmic variance. As I mentioned before, algorithmic
variance particularly affects the loading of the secret, i.e. the first instruction in Fig-
ure 3.1b, due to the previous register value contributing to the leakage. This problem
only appears from the second position onward; for the first position, no algorithmic
variance is present as the initial state is fixed and known. This makes Figure 3.2b rep-
resentative of all subsequent positions.
With the exception for the two small CCS parameter sets, even with virtually no
environmental noise, the success rate for the second position is far from 1. Moreover,
when environmental noise is added, the success rate initially goes up. This phenomenon
is known as stochastic resonance [MSPA08] and has been observed for side-channels
before [WO11]. Even for CCS1 and CCS2, that have the lowest algorithmic variance
level, the success rate for the second position is slightly lower than for the first position.
For completeness, the assumption that the noise covariance matrix Σ for my two
points of interest is a diagonal matrix σ ·I2, is suboptimal in the presence of algorithmic
variance. Using a diagonal matrix Σ that incorporates the algorithmic variance would
improve the distinguisher while reducing the stochastic resonance. I will explore this
case in more detail in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.2.3 Full vector recovery
The success rates for full vectors are more relevant to compare either amongst param-
eter sets or with other attacks, be it lattice or other side-channel attacks. As a simpli-
fication, I assume that the recovery rate for the second position (Figure 3.2b) is rep-
resentative for all positions bar the first, whose contribution is limited anyway given
concrete values of n (the total number of positions). This is a fair assumption to make
because the first position does differ from all the others, because registers and preceding
instructions are independent from the secret and can therefore be taken into account in
the templating phase.
To ease comparison, for each parameter set I determined the σ for which the divide-
and-conquer attack approximately achieves a success rate for recovering s of around
2−128 (corresponding to 128-bit security). For the smallest parameter sets, CCS1 and
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CCS2, all the σ in the range are susceptible (i.e. lead to success rates of at least 2−128),
whereas for the NIST parameter sets, none of the σ appear insecure. For the original
large sets CCS3 and CCS4, any σ below 7·10−3, which includes my realistic benchmark,
leads to a loss of security below the 128-bit level.
I acknowledge that a further reduction in residual bit security might be possible
by considering key ranking, or possibly even novel lattice reduction algorithms that
take into account side-channel information. To the best of my knowledge, none of these
approaches have been applied in the context of LWE schemes and therefore I cannot
comment on their efficacy.
3.3.3 Including algorithmic variance to improve the
distinguisher
The root cause of algorithmic variance generating the stochastic resonance observable
in Figure 3.2b lies in the inputs given to ELMO during the generation of target power
traces but that cannot be given when templates are generated. This is because, to simu-
late a real device, target power traces are simulated using whole rows of A and columns
of S, while templates profile specific Zq multiplications only. An adversary only has a
restricted view in the latter procedure, namely of only one secret position at the time.
This does not mean, however, that a smart adversary cannot include knowledge of the
device (of ELMO, in this case) into the templates, and build them accordingly. More
details about the functioning of ELMO are needed to explore this idea.
Each point in a power trace generated by ELMO is a deterministic function of
a triplet encoding previous, current and subsequent instructions; and two couples of
operands, one for the previous and one for the current instructions. This already sug-
gests why during template generation some information is missing: when targeting any
i 6= 1, an adversary does not know all the operands.
More precisely, with reference to Figure 3.1b, the operands for the three listed types
of instruction are as follows, where I denote by a and s the two vectors from A and S,
respectively, being multiplied. I denote the vector of multiplications by m, i.e. mi = si ·ai.
• The two operands of ldrh instructions are the value previously stored and the one
overwriting it, therefore I write ai = ldrh(ai−1,ai) for e.g. the loading of the public
multiplicand.
• The muls instruction simply has its two inputs as operands, i.e. mi = muls(si,ai).
72
3.3. DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER TEMPLATE ATTACK
Note that the output overwrites the register of the first operands, hence r5 in this
case. For this reason loading of the secret is si = ldrh(mi−1, si).
• The add instruction uses the value previously stored in r3 and what is in r5 as
operands. As I mentioned before, I do not use this instruction for the attack.
In a divide-and-conquer approach, one wants to be able to parallelise and pre-process
templates and there is only a limited amount of information one can include in them,
hence giving rise to algorithmic variance. Everything that cannot be captured in such
parallelisable fashion, despite being related to other parts of s itself, degrades the qual-
ity of templates: adversaries can profile a position including only what is in their view
for that position, secret values of other positions must necessarily be left out.
The previous value held by register r5 when loading a secret is not known (nor
guessable for the above reason) by an adversary, as well as the previous value in r3
when adding to the accumulator. These two points will therefore show algorithmic vari-
ance. I ignore the contribution of the instruction preceding the first ldrh because it is
part of the loop structure and can be fully profiled.
A different discussion applies to multiplication. Theoretically speaking, operands of
the previous instruction, i.e. loading of ai, have nothing unknown. However, an a pri-
ori profiling of all combinations of ai−1, ai and si would require kq2 templates. Such
a number ranges between ≈ 225 for CCS1 and ≈ 237 for NIST1. Despite being within
feasible reach, these numbers undermine the practicality of any attack, given how in-
tense profiling is. Fixing ai−1 = 0, for instance, would be a solution but would inherently
introduce some algorithmic variance. I overcome the issue by treating ai−1 as unknown,
and estimating algorithmic variance on multiplication accordingly.
Remark 3.1. My analysis strictly follows the implementation reported in Figure 3.1b. I
acknowledge that there are alternatives which would keep the functionality but would
slightly change leakage: swapping the two ldrh instructions, swapping operands of the
muls instruction, swapping operands of the the add instruction and any combination
thereof. The analysis would be extremely similar to that reported here, therefore I ig-
nore such alterations.
I will now describe both points of interest and how the acquired knowledge can be
used to improve the performance of the divide-and-conquer distinguisher.
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3.3.3.1 Loading of the Secret
I denote by ELMOldrh(si−1,ai−1, si) ∈R the power value produced by ELMO when com-









χ(r) ·ELMOldrh(r,a, s) .
Since ai−1 is known and guesses are needed for all possibilities of si, the above for-






χ(r) · (ELMOldrh(r,a, s)−µldrh(a, s))2 .
One thing to be noticed is that the above turns out to be essentially independent of
s. In other words σ2
ldrh
(a, s) ≈ σ2
ldrh
(a, s′) for all s, s′ ∈ Supp (χ) up to an error between





Applying a formal definition of expected value and variance in this case is cumbersome,





. These are kq2, which is a feasible but uncomfortable number to enumer-
ate. Moreover, a simpler yet accurate approach exists: I draw values from the correct
distributions and compute sample mean/variance.
Similarly to the above, I denote by ELMOmuls(ai−1, si,ai) ∈ R the power value pro-
duced by ELMO when computing muls(si,ai). Note that ai−1 is needed in input because
it is an operand of the preceding instruction, hence does influence the power value. For




, I draw α = 216 values a1,. . . , aα uniformly at ran-
dom from Zq. These represent a random selection of values that ai−1 can take. I then













(ELMOmuls(a j, s,a)−µmuls(a, s))2 .
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Figure 3.3: Histograms of power values when multiplication between ai = 0 and three
values for si (0, 1 and 2; blue, red and yellow respectively). I drew α = 216 values uni-
formly at random from Zq for ai−1.
Similarly to the above case, algorithmic variance is essentially independent of a. In
other words σ2
muls
(a, s) ≈ σ2
muls
(a′, s) for all a,a′ ∈ Zq up to an error between 10−24 and
10−21. I therefore denote the right hand side of Equation (3.4) by σ2
muls
(s) from now on.
Figure 3.3 shows three histogram plots of power values when ai = 0, si assumes
three values (0, 1 and 2; blue, red and yellow respectively) and ai−1 is drawn uniformly
at random. There are 216 samples for the latter, while the values of si affect the mean of
each distribution. Note that all histograms have almost identical shapes, therefore the
underlying distributions have the same variance.
3.3.3.3 Improving the distinguisher and results
Equipped with the templates built as described above, in both their mean and algorith-
mic variance components, I can apply them in the matching phase of a template attack
against ELMO traces.
I denote by tldrhi and t
muls
i the points in the target power trace computing the ith
multiplication. I also assume that environmental Gaussian noise is introduced, with
mean 0 and variance σ2e . In other words,
tldrhi =ELMOldrh(si−1,ai−1, si)+N (0,σ2e)
tmulsi =ELMOmuls(ai−1, si,ai)+N (0,σ2e) .
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(a) Success rate of template attacks including al-
gorithmic variance and environmental noise.
























(b) Success rate with the further inclusion of
“ghost” variance.
Figure 3.4: Comparison between success rates.
The first position is somewhat special because registers are pre-filled with constants.
An adversary can simply take care of this in the templates.
I use the distinguisher in Equation (3.2), this time without assuming that all vari-
ances are equal. Therefore, the score of a guess k ∈Supp (χ) is defined as









where T is the matrix whose rows are tldrh and tmuls. Compared to Equation (3.2),
the summation over the time points has been made explicit by expressing the only two
points of interest, while the summation over different values for a has been replaced by
that with index i, ranging over a.
I applied the distinguisher to 30 seeds, each seed being a different (A,S) couple.
Hence I effectively mounted 240 full column attacks, as there are 8 columns in each S.
I repeated them 20 times for 20 different values of σe. It ranged in [10−4,10−2) with
steps of 5 ·10−4. Figure 3.4a plots position recovery for all parameter sets. All positions
have been included, hence no distinction between first and others is made. As usual, the
vertical dashed line represent the “realistic” noise level.
Including algorithmic variance in the templates and as part of the distinguisher has
improved success rate considerably for all parameter sets. Stochastic resonance has en-
tirely disappeared from the CCS3 and CCS4 parameter sets. However, it is still present
in the NIST1 and NIST2 parameter sets, although much less pronounced. This is due
to the fact that, as hinted in several places above, also the definition adopted for al-
gorithmic variance in the two points of interest represent an approximation of reality.
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Including all possible information in a mathematically sound formula and estimating all
templates for all possible values would be problematic. For the sake of filling the gap, I
experimentally derived a variance, which I call “ghost” variance, that, if added to the de-
nominators of the distinguisher in the case of NIST1 and NIST2, produces Figure 3.4b.
Such a “ghost” variance is σ2g = 0.00532. Stochastic resonance has now completely dis-
appeared and success rate for those two parameter sets has slightly improved across all
σs.
The two graphs of Figure 3.4 are asymptotically similar, particularly so from the
“realistic” noise level on. This means that the “ghost” variance affects results only with
low environmental noise, which is not an interesting scenario when utilising traces from
a real device. The result achieved by Figure 3.4a is therefore sound and satisfactory.
3.3.4 The role of the accumulator
I conclude my study of the divide-and-conquer strategy by exploring why it is indeed
beneficial to exclude the addition with the accumulator from the points of interest. For
that point to be of any interest to an adversary, it would need to contain more sig-
nal about the current secret position under attack than noise. The problem is that the
value of the accumulator before the addition does not belong to the adversary’s view and
contributes, therefore, to the algorithmic noise on that point of interest.
In practical terms, for a fixed value of the public operand and a uniformly random
value of the accumulator, distributions of power values when different secret values are
involved should be separable enough (where by “enough” I mean given the limited trace
chunks available). Figure 3.5 shows precisely such a scenario for the NIST1 parameter
set: each overlapping histogram is formed of ELMO power values corresponding to the
addition with the accumulator. As I mentioned above, there are three variables that
contribute to the computation: the public operand, which is known and fixed to a non-
zero value, the secret operand, which is a different one for each histogram in Figure 3.5,
and the value of the accumulator. To simulate an adversary not knowing the latter,
I drew 216 uniformly random values from Z232 , because it can be any 32-bit number.
What Figure 3.5 narrates is twofold: first of all the signal, i.e. the contribution of the
secret element, is in the mean of the distributions; however, means for several secrets
are so close to each other and variances, which is worth noticing are fairly independent
of the secret, are so wide that differences are hard to identify. Only in some corner cases
this would be doable, e.g. the left-most lightblue distribution corresponding to the value
1 against the right-most purple distribution corresponding to the value 215 −1. This is
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Figure 3.5: Histograms of power values when addition with accumulator is performed





, the value of the public operand is fixed to a non-zero value at random, while
216 samples are drawn uniformly at random from Z232 , to simulate the 32-bit random
value of the accumulator.
especially true since telling distributions apart is a task requiring more traces the more
mixed together they are, and the setting considered in this chapter greatly limits it.
3.4 Extend-and-Prune Template Attack
For the divide-and-conquer approach from the previous section, I assumed that the po-
sitions of s are independent of each other. While this assumption is valid for the gen-
eration of s, it turned out that for the leakage, it is not. However, Algorithm 11 deals
with the elements of s sequentially, from position 1 to position n, which I will exploit by
a well-known extend-and-prune approach.
In this case, the extend-and-prune algorithm operates as follows. I imagine a k-ary
tree of depth n where the nodes at level i in the tree correspond to a partial guess
s1, . . . , si−1 for the secret; for a given node at level i, its k out-going edges are labelled by
the k possible values that si can take. This way, each path from the root to one of the kn
possible leaves uniquely corresponds to one of the possible values that the secret vector
s can take. A distinguisher can sequentially calculate a score for a vector s by traversing
the tree from the root to the leaf representing s where for each edge it encounters, it
cumulatively updates s’s score.
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The challenge of an extend-and-prune algorithm is to efficiently traverse a large tree
(as big as the key space) while still ending up with a good overall score. The standard
way [CRR03] of doing so is to first calculate the score for all nodes at level 2. For each
level-2 node, the score will be that of the edge from the root to that node. Thus the trivial
level-1 guess is extended to all possible level-2 guesses. The next stage is to prune all
these guesses to a more reasonable number. For all the remaining level-2 guesses, one
then extends to all possible level-3 guesses, and then again these guesses are pruned
down. Such a process repeats until reaching the final level (n+1), where the complete s
is guessed.
The advantage of this approach is that, when calculating a score for si, the distin-
guisher already has a guess for s1, . . . , si−1, which allows it to create templates based
on this guess. My distinguisher will only use the previous secret si−1 and the value of
the accumulator so far (an inner product of (s1, . . . , si−1) with the relevant part of A) to
create a template. As the total number of possible templates becomes rather unwieldy
(around k2 · q ·232), the profiling is interleaved with the tree traversal and pruning is
used to keep the number of templates manageable.
The success of an extend-and-prune attack depends on the pruning strategy, specif-
ically how many candidates to keep at each step. To the best of my knowledge, there is
no comprehensive study comparing different pruning strategies in different scenarios.
When Chari et al. [CRR03] introduced template attacks to the cryptanalyst’s arsenal,
they suggested a pruning strategy that depends on the scores themselves. I instead
fix the same number of candidates to keep at each step, which is a classical approach
known as beam search [Red77]. The size of the beam, that is the number of candidates
to keep after pruning, is denoted by b.
3.4.1 Greedy pruning using a laser beam (b = 1)
I start by considering the greediest pruning strategy by restricting the beam size to
b = 1, meaning that after each step I only keep a single candidate, that with the highest
score, for the secret recovered so far. This “knowledge”, provided it is correct, has two
very immediate effects. Firstly, the algorithmic variance I observed in the loading of
the secret can be reduced as I assume I typically know the previous secret held by the
relevant register. Secondly, by recovering s from first to last I can predict the value of
the accumulator, which brings into play a third point of interest, namely the update
of the accumulator (the last point in Figure 3.1b), as here too the algorithmic variance
disappears.
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(a) Column recovery rate of divide-and-conquer.























(b) Column recovery rate of extend-and-prune.
Figure 3.6: Comparison between column recovery of my two template attacks.
Figure 3.6 presents the vector recovery rates of both divide-and-conquer attack with
improved distinguisher, see Section 3.3.3 (in the left panel, Figure 3.6a), and of extend-
and-prune using b = 1 (Figure 3.6b). The former is extrapolated based on position re-
covery rates from Figure 3.4b, whereas the latter has been estimated directly, based on
2 ·103 experiments per setting.
The difference between Figures 3.6a and 3.6b is striking. For the extend-and-prune
approach I almost completely removed algorithmic variance and, when virtually no en-
vironmental noise is present either (σ ≈ 10−4), this resulted in a vector recovery rate
of essentially 1. However, when considering the realistic noise level as indicated by the
dashed vertical line, not all parameter sets are as affected. A simple modification to the
pruning strategy, however, makes sure that little hope remains.
3.4.2 Increasing the beam size (b > 1)
So far I only considered b = 1. Increasing the beam size b will result in a slower key
recovery (linear slowdown in b) but should yield higher recovery rates. For b = 1 I men-
tioned two advantages of extend-and-prune, namely reduced algorithmic variance and
an additional point of interest. For b > 1 a third advantage appears, namely the ability
for the distinguisher to self-correct. This self-correcting behaviour has also been ob-
served (for the first position) by Aysu et al. [ATT+18], who essentially used a beam size
b > 1 for the first position and then revert to b = 1 for all remaining ones.
To assess the effect of the beam size b, I ran two types of experiments. Firstly, for
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Name bmin
b
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CCS1 30709 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CCS2 27 0.1 0.13 0.36 0.53 0.68 0.76 0.85 0.90 0.94
CCS3 12 0 0.48 0.77 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99
CCS4 11 0.03 0.63 0.91 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
NIST1 63 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.33 0.41 0.50
NIST2 11 0 0.07 0.63 0.84 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Table 3.1: Minimum values of b to achieve column recovery rate equal to 1, and heuristic
column recovery when b is fixed to the listed values.
each parameter set and noise level σ = 0.0096 (the most aggressive of my scale), I ran
around 103 experiments and looked at the smallest beam b for which all experiments
ended with the actual secret s as part of the final beam (allowing an adversary to iden-
tify s by a subsequent enumeration of all final beam candidates). The resulting values
are reported in the bmin column of Table 3.1. With the exception of CCS1, I notice that
bmin is at most 26, so again only a few bits of security remain. As bmin will invariably
grow as the number of experiments does, until eventually it is as large as the key space,
in the second set of experiment I estimated final vector recovery rate as a function of
the beam size, for b ≤ 10. The results are again reported in Table 3.1 and are fairly
damning: even for NIST1 a recovery rate of around 50% is achieved.
It is very interesting to notice how in Table 3.1, CSS1 seems to be particularly tough
to beat. As I will describe in detail in the next and last part of this chapter, this has to
do with how few subtraces are available there.
3.5 Choosing your parameters
So far, I have compared increasingly effective attack strategies, where I compared dif-
ferent parameter sets purely by name, so without further reference to their actual pa-
rameters. I now investigate the effect of these parameters on the efficacy and efficiency
of the attack. Specifically, I consider the effects of n and
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ on the natural side-
channel vulnerability of the resulting matrix–vector multiplication.
Figure 3.7 provides a scatter plot of (n,
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣) for the various parameter sets
suggested [BCD+16, NAB+17]. Furthermore, I encoded the success rate of the extend-
and-prune attack with beam b = 1 (Section 3.4.1) and realistic noise level (dashed line
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Figure 3.7: Visual representation of all parameter sets. For each of them, the x axis
lists n, and the y axis lists
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣. The number of concentric circles around each
parameter set encodes how successful my attack is against it.
in Figure 3.6b) with concentric circles around each parameter set. The number of circles
is simply the ceil of said success rate times ten, and is helpful in visually quantifying
the outcome I achieved in each setting.
The effect that the choice (n,
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣) has on the hardness of the LWE instance has
been well studied [APS15], but from a side-channel perspective, new meaning emerges:
n corresponds both to the number of (sub)traces an adversary obtains on each compo-
nent of s and to the number of positions to retrieve, whereas
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ quantifies the
keyspace size for individual positions.
Although the divide-and-conquer attack suffers badly when more positions need to
be recovered, the extend-and-prune approach is far more robust in this respect. For
instance, the main difference between CCS1 and CCS2 is that n is two times larger in
CCS2 than in CCS1, thus providing a much easier target for my attack. Thus increasing
n overwhelmingly has the effect of making life easier for an adversary as more leakage
will be available. In other words, while increasing the dimension n makes the LWE in-
stance harder, it makes the underlying matrix–vector multiplication easier to attack in
the side-channel scenario. This conclusion does rely on square A, so n = m. In case A
is a non-square matrix, then m refers to the number of traces and n to the number of
positions to recover. The hardness of LWE appears to be mainly governed by n, where in-
creasing n makes both the LWE instance harder and it complicates side-channel crypt-
analysis. Similarly, both for LWE and for the side-channel analysis, increasing m makes
attacks potentially easier, with the effect for side-channels much more pronounced.
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The qualitative effect of increasing
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ is straightforward: a large keyspace
means that there are more options to choose from, with corresponding signals that are
closer together, making distinguishing harder. This effect is illustrated by comparing
the two parameter sets NIST1 and CCS2. These two sets have roughly equal n, but
NIST1’s
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣ is about three times that of CCS2: my attacks confirm that CCS2 is
a lot easier to attack than NIST1.
3.5.1 Effect of modifying NIST1
I conducted a final experiment to gain more insights on parameter set selection. I fo-
cused my attention on the two NIST parameter sets: they have roughly the same k
(it differs by only two) but NIST1 has two thirds fewer traces than NIST2. I therefore
increased n in NIST1 to match NIST2’s (n = 976) and analysed the extend-and-prune
attack in two settings: when b = 1 and σ is the realistic value, and when b = 10 and
σ= 0.0096, i.e. the worst noise level I have considered so far. In the former case the suc-
cess rate increased from 0.01 to 0.11, almost equating the success rate of 0.12 observed
in the NIST2 setting. In the b = 10 case, the success rate reported in Table 3.1 (0.50)
skyrocketed to 0.94, again very close to NIST2’s. This strongly indicates how having
larger matrices, hence more traces per secret element, goes in favour of the adversary.
Therefore in general being overpessimistic in the choice of n might prove fatal if side-




Swapping sides: from offence to
defence
The structure of Frodo, and in general the kind of operations involved in LWE-based
schemes, are rather peculiar. As shown in Chapter 3, the iterative structure of matrix
multiplications can be exploited to mount the fairly devastating extend-and-prune at-
tack, along with the fact that secret elements take values from an unusually small set
of possibilities compared to pre-quantum schemes.
In the present chapter, I start off from where I left: extend-and-prune. I will show
two strategies to protect against it, with different trades-off. Then, to counteract divide-
and-conquer, I first explore how the structure of Frodo can be leveraged to build up
defences, and finally show how well-known countermeasures from the literature can be
integrated in the protocol.
The content of this chapter, with the exception of Section 4.1 which was part of the
original paper [BFM+18a], is mostly unpublished. Nonetheless, I am the main author
and writer. In particular, Section 4.2 is based on an original idea, which I developed
specifically for this thesis, while I claim no paternity on the ideas contained in Sec-
tion 4.3, which are established facts from the literature. My contribution in the latter
section has been to apply them in the context of Frodo.
Analysis of countermeasures can follow two orthogonal directions. First of all, it is
desirable that the overhead introduced to protect an implementation is low. I address
the performance of the countermeasures I propose here in Chapter 5. The other di-
rection is their effectiveness in the setting they are designed to protect. This can be
assessed with experiments or with an informed analysis on their structure: I use both
such options in my analysis. Sections 4.1 and 4.3 contain an informed analysis, while I
85
CHAPTER 4. SWAPPING SIDES: FROM OFFENCE TO DEFENCE
develop some experiments in Section 4.2.
4.1 Thwarting extend-and-prune
As seen in Chapter 3, extend-and-prune is a particularly devastating template attack:
it needs a single trace only and its success rate is rather high, especially when the
pruning strategy retains more than one candidate per round. On the downside, extend-
and-prune is significantly more difficult to mount than a divide-and-conquer using tem-
plates, as it requires on-the-fly templating.
Extend-and-prune leverages incremental computations over a partial result to build
templates, including a wider time window than those generated when performing divide-
and-conquer. Three key elements that the extend-and-prune technique exploits are:
1. the initial state of the system is known, this includes the first value of the accu-
mulator (which is zero) and values of internal registers holding elements of A and
S;
2. previously recovered secret elements are leveraged to reduce algorithmic noise
and to formulate an educated guess on the value of the accumulator;
3. the same incremental computations over the partial result, again the accumulator,
being executed in more than one portion of the trace. This is due to the single-trace
context.
What makes point 2 possible is that, in the implementation I considered in Sec-
tion 3.2, the accumulator is iteratively summed with ring multiplications. Doing so ex-
poses intermediate partial sums, since adaptive templates are used. Point 3, instead,
simply follows from how textbook matrix multiplication is implemented.
Initialising the accumulator with a non-zero unknown value seemingly addresses
point 1. There are several options to achieve this, which I will discuss more in detail in
Section 4.1.1.
Points 2 and 3 are more structural, and effectively signify that the computation is
performed in the same way for every row of A. In other words, the first position of the se-
cret is always the first one to be multiplied by an element of A. This seeming alignment
holds every time a column of S is involved, i.e. n times. Thus, the adversary exploits
multiple trace chunks for the whole computation, using previously recovered secrets to
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reduce algorithmic noise and therefore enhance leakage on the currently targeted one.
Section 4.1.2 shows how to break such a pattern.
4.1.1 Masking the accumulator
The most natural initial assignment of the accumulator is hinted by Algorithm 11 itself:
b← e on Line 1. That is to say, instead of starting from 0, the accumulator is set to the
correct entry of E. Despite the simplicity, the security gain is marginal: since the error
follows the same narrow distribution of the secret, the amount of effort on the adver-
sary’s side to overcome such a patch is simply given by the generation of
∣∣Supp (χ)∣∣2
templates for the first iteration. This is equivalent to mounting an extend-and-prune
attack on a vector of length n+1 with a pruning strategy that retains all candidates for
the first position. In other words, the formulation is equivalent to attacking(







where the adversary is required to build templates for the first two positions of the
newly built secret, as no actual operation involves er.
A more effective alternative is to introduce randomness in the process and actually
mask the accumulator. The latter is therefore initialised to a random element of Zq, ring
multiplications are added in and, at the very end, the initial value is subtracted from the
sum. Algorithm 12 implements such an approach, where red lines highlight differences
compared to Algorithm 11. In particular, Lines 3 and 4 are where a random number
is sampled and used to initialise the accumulator sum. The mask is later removed on
Line 7.
Templates would now need to include guesses for the initial value of the accumula-
tor, as well as guesses for the first position of the secret. Differently than before, where
the error term did not significantly increase the effort, this randomised approach re-




templates. Furthermore, a very large number
of them should be retained as part of the pruning strategy, making the whole attack
significantly more cumbersome.
Masking the accumulator effectively makes its exploitation infeasible, as a similar
argument as in Section 3.3.4 applies: an adversary would see the previous partial sum
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Algorithm 12 Matrix–vector multiplication with masked accumulator.
Input: A ∈Zn×nq ; s,e ∈Znq
Output: b←As+e
1: b← e
2: for r = 1, . . . ,n do
3: x $←−Zq
4: sum ← x
5: for i = 1, . . . ,n do
6: sum ← sum+ Ar,i · si
7: br ← (br + sum− x) mod q
8: return b
as a uniformly distributed random variable. Differently than divide-and-conquer, how-
ever, the order of operations can still be exploited: previously retrieved secret elements
can be used to decrease algorithmic variance when performing the ldrh and muls in-
structions. On top of that, masking the accumulator requires randomness, which might
be problematic to generate on some devices. For these reasons, I offer an alternative
countermeasure to extend-and-prune.
4.1.2 Shifting rows
As previously mentioned, every row of A is multiplied by the target column of S in the
same way. In other words, s1 is always the first element used, s2 always the second and
so on. This regularity is exploited by the adversary in that she has n trace chunks for
s1 where the accumulator is known (to be 0), thus making the latter’s retrieval easier.
Guesses for s1 are leveraged to predict the accumulator and obtain an advantage when
targeting s2, up until sn. Breaking the pattern is therefore enough to thwart extend-
and-prune.
Simply shuffling the order in which elements from A and s are multiplied together
suffices for the purpose. Specifically, if s1 was the first element to be multiplied when
the first row of A is processed, the second when the second row of A is used and so on,
there would not be a single trace chunk where s1 is preceded by the same computation,
hence making the exploitation of any “previous” knowledge infeasible.
Algorithm 13 is yet again the matrix–vector multiplication, with the red lines being
the difference compared with the unprotected version. In particular, on Line 6 I compute
the same summation as before, but with a different order of addends each time. In
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Algorithm 13 Matrix–vector multiplication with rows of A shifted.
Input: A ∈Zn×nq ; s,e ∈Znq
Output: b←As+e
1: b← e
2: for r = 1, . . . ,n do
3: sum ← 0
4: for i = 1, . . . ,n do
5: j ← (i+ r−2) mod n+1
6: sum ← sum+ Ar, j · s j
7: br ← (br + sum) mod q
8: return b
Figure 4.1: Visualisation of the shift countermeasures. Rows are indicated by grey
boxes, while the red one highlights elements multiplied as first ones in a matrix multi-
plication. The left matrix is A when unprotected, while the right one is A after the shift
is applied.
formulae, b is computed as
b1 = A1,1 · s1 + A1,2 · s2 + . . .+ A1,n−1 · sn−1 + A1,n · sn
b2 = A2,n · sn + A2,1 · s1 + . . .+ A2,n−2 · sn−2 + A2,n−1 · sn−1
...
bn = An,2 · s2 + An,3 · s3 + . . .+ An,n · sn + An,1 · s1
where operands are added exactly as written. Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation
of the same process: row i, drawn as a grey box, is shifted i−1 positions to the right.
The vertical red box highlights the secret elements which are multiplied first in both
cases: unprotected (left) and protected (right).
The two key ideas that break extend-and-prune are as follows.
• Knowledge of the accumulator being zero helps only for a single trace chunk per
secret position, i.e. when computing A i,i·si for all i, which is far from the statistical
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significance needed to mount any attack. Similarly to the conclusions drawn for
masking the accumulator, the latter is hardly exploitable.
• Retrieving “early” secrets and leveraging them to attack “later” ones is infeasible.
This is due to the fact that s0 has exactly the same attack surface as all other
positions in terms of information known by an adversary. This is in contrast to
masking the accumulator, which left the exploitation of previous secrets open.
Theoretically speaking, extend-and-prune works better than divide-and-conquer even
if the shifting is applied, however to successfully mount it one would need to almost
never prune the guesses tree. Clearly, having such a computational power would also
open the way to brute force, making all attempts at using extend-and-prune of little
practical interest.
4.1.3 Summary
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 presented two potential countermeasures to thwart the extend-
and-prune strategy. Masking the accumulator is the most obvious and natural solution,
although it has two major drawbacks: requiring randomness and allowing for exploita-
tion of previously recovered secrets. On the contrary, changing the order of addends
while performing matrix–vector multiplication is completely deterministic, yet struc-
turally prevents many of the benefits extend-and-prune has over divide-and-conquer.
Although theoretically still possible, extend-and-prune against shifting would be infea-
sible to mount.
The main reason why they are both of interest lies in their performances. As I will
show in Chapter 5, shifting is really challenging to implement if the matrix A is not
fully present in memory, as is the case for devices in the IoT ecosystem. There, random-
ness is also not a severe limitation, rendering masking the accumulator preferable over
shifting.
With the Frodo protocol switching from KEP to KEM, the multi-trace setting is ever
more concerning. On the one hand, the attack surface increases as techniques from that
setting, e.g. DPA, apply. On the other hand, classic countermeasures can also be used to
protect an implementation.
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4.2 Hamming weight model
As briefly explained in Section 2.3, the power consumption of a device is modelled by
the sum of three components: the exploitable part, the switching noise (or algorithmic
variance) and the environmental noise. Leakage is found in the first component, and
is itself the object of a mathematical model. In other words, leakage is a function of
the processed data, whose mathematical representation is often unknown. To cope with
this uncertainty, two approaches are possible: formulate a working assumption about
the function leakage follows, or learn it from the device.
I have already explored the second approach in Chapter 3, that is to say templating
the target device. The first approach, instead, entails to pick a reasonable mathematical
function and to work under the assumption that leakage behaves apparently according
to it. How reasonable a choice can be, mainly depends on how strong the relation be-
tween the chosen function and the underlying hardware is. For example, buses might
leak the Hamming weight of the carried bits, while registers might leak the Hamming
distance of inputs when they are updated, since these functions are closely related to
how power is used by these components [MOP07, Section 3.3].
4.2.1 Homogenising Hamming weight
ELMO’s traces are a simulation of how triplets of assembly instructions and their
operands contribute toward the power consumption of an ARM Cortex-M0 [MOW17].
Because they are based on real experiments, they essentially fall into the second cate-
gory mentioned above: they represent the outcome of templating that particular micro-
processor.
In the present subsection, instead, I assume leakage is shaped as the Hamming
weight of internal quantities. Despite the fact that building a power model is usually
done by adversaries prior to mount attacks, as having a well defined and simple math-
ematical model greatly simplifies computations, I present how the peculiar structure of
Frodo allows for a simple countermeasure that decreases signal to noise ratio. The idea
is to transform the secret such that all elements have the same Hamming weight. This
way, an adversary would no longer be able to discern guesses based on their predicted
Hamming weight, making finding the right secret more challenging.
As it always happens when reasoning around power models, estimating their practi-
cality, i.e. assessing whether the assumptions they are built upon find practical instan-
tiation in the real-world, is almost solely based on cases. This is due to the fact that
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Index 2h−1 . . . h+k+1 h+k h+k−1 . . . h h−1 . . . k+1 k k−1 . . . 0
〈a〉 〈x〉h−1 . . . 〈x〉k+1 1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
〈x〉 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 〈x〉h−1 . . . 〈x〉k+1 1 0 . . . 0
Table 4.1: Binary representation of the two operands a and x.
is very difficult to find two distinct devices that share the leakage behaviour, let alone
to find a power model that correctly represent a large class of them. In other words, a
power model that fits well for a setup, might fail spectacularly on another. This was the
case, for instance, for the divide-and-conquer attach in Section 3.3: Aysu et al. [ATT+18]
comfortably worked with a Hamming distance power model, which did not work for me.
Devices that do leak Hamming weight of some intermediates, depending on where and
when the power measurement is conducted during computations, exist and have been
attacked in the past, see for example [MOP07, Figure 4.5]. This means that assuming
an adversary has access to measurements which can be meaningfully analysed with
Hammin weight of some intermediate values is sound.








where H (·) denotes Hamming weight.
Proof. Since x < 2h, 〈x〉, which is the binary representation of x, is at most h bits long.
Moreover, since x 6= 0, it has at least a 1. Let H (x)= t > 0 and let 0≤ k < h be the smallest
index such that 〈x〉k = 1. For notational convenience, let a = x ·2h and let




= a− x .
Table 4.1 lists all bits in 〈a〉 and 〈x〉, together with their indexes.
The goal is to count how many 1s 〈b〉 has. First of all, 〈b〉0 , . . . ,〈b〉k−1 are equal
to zero, because so are the corresponding bits of a and x. Then 〈a〉k = 0 but 〈x〉k = 1,
which means a 1 needs to be carried from the first position of 〈a〉 being equal to one. By
construction, that is 〈a〉h+k because the first h positions of 〈a〉 are zeros and so are the
next k, being them equal to the first k positions of 〈x〉. Moving the carry and subtracting
the kth bit yields 〈b〉k = 1, 〈a〉h+k = 0 and 〈a〉h+k−1 = . . .= 〈a〉k+1 = 1.
This is summarised in Table 4.2, where 〈a〉 is shown after the (h+k)th bit has been
carried to position k. The binary representation of x is reported again, so that bit-wise
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Index 2h−1 . . . h+k+1 h+k h+k−1 . . . h h−1 . . . k+1 k k−1 . . . 0
〈a〉 〈x〉h−1 . . . 〈x〉k+1 0 1 . . . 1 1 . . . 1 10 0 . . . 0
〈x〉 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 〈x〉h−1 . . . 〈x〉k+1 1 0 . . . 0
〈b〉 〈x〉h−1 . . . 〈x〉k+1 0 1 . . . 1 〈x〉h−1 . . . 〈x〉k+1 1 0 . . . 0
Table 4.2: Binary representation of a once 〈a〉h+k has been carried to position k, of x and
of their subtraction b. Note that in column k, 10 is the binary representation of 2.
subtraction can now be computed for all the remaining bits of 〈b〉. Having made the

























= 1+ (h− (k+1)− (t−1))+k+ t−1
= h .
Lemma 4.1 gives a constructive way of homogenising the Hamming weight of inte-
gers less than a power of two. In order to apply it to my setting, however, a few caveats
need to be addressed.
4.2.2 Application to a secret matrix
The overall idea is to apply a function f to S component-wise, such that f (S) is a matrix
whose elements all have the same Hamming weight. Clearly, f should be derived from
Lemma 4.1, thus its hypotheses must hold. The first problem is that S contains many
zeros, which is in fact the most common value. Since Supp
(
χ
)= {−s, . . . , s} modulo q, for
a certain integer s, a simple modular shift by s+1 suffices to map all its elements to
non-zero values.
A second caveat is that Lemma 4.1 is stated for integers, and is actually not valid if
x ·(2h −1) wraps around modulo q. All that is needed to take care of such an eventuality
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Parameter set s q Admissible h
CCS1 3 211 3,4,5,6,7,8
CCS2 4 212 4,5,6,7,8
CCS3 5 215 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
CCS4 6 215 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
NIST1 11 215 5,6,7,8,9,10
NIST2 10 216 5,6,7,8,9,10,11
Table 4.3: Admissible h for each parameter set, i.e. for which the hypotheses of
Lemma 4.1 hold.
is to check whether there exists a h such that, for all z ∈ {−s, . . . , s},(z+ s+1) · (2
h −1)< q
0< z+ s+1< 2h
where both equations must be true in Z. Numbers are small enough so that a simple
exhaustive search finds the admissible values for h. Table 4.3 lists them all for each
parameter set.
Since the h listed in Table 4.3 are such that the hypotheses of Lemma 4.1 are met,
they also correspond to the Hamming weight after the function










(S+ (s+1)) (mod q)
where S̃ is a matrix whose positions have Hamming weight h. Note that from a compu-
tational point of view, the latter can be implemented with one addition, one subtraction
and one shift, hence avoiding multiplications.
4.2.3 Integration to Frodo
Changes to S must be compensated somewhere else in the protocol to preserve correct-
ness. The decision on where to apply and where to remove a countermeasure is tightly
coupled to the attacker model: it is important to be clear about what the countermea-
sure is protecting against, which necessarily means being clear about what may attack
the system. This was the case for the countermeasure described in Section 4.1, which
took care of the extend-and-prune strategy.
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The Hamming weight homogenisation aims at thwarting the divide-and-conquer
strategy when the defender knows leakage follows the Hamming weight model and
can be applied both in the single-trace and multi-trace settings.
In general, every time there is an homogenised secret matrix S̃ which is multiplied












where 1n×n is a matrix with the specified dimensions whose elements are all equal to






The first multiplicative factor exists because 2h − 1 always has an inverse modulo a
power of two, since they are coprime. The latter and the subsequent additive factor are
solely based on public knowledge, hence not sensitive. A very similar line of reasoning
holds if S̃ is multiplied to the right.
This is directly applicable in a single-trace setting, as every computation involving
a secret matrix is potentially a target, even the ephemeral ones, e.g. S′. Note that the
transformation itself does not depend on which value a position of S takes, and that also
the correction factors are independent of the secret.
4.2.4 Experimental results
As I mentioned at the beginning of the section, ELMO traces are produced based on
the contribution of several quantities: multiplicative factors based on the triplet of in-
structions considered, Hamming distance between some operands, Hamming weight of
operands, etcetera. On the one hand, therefore, the Hamming weight of secret elements
certainly are part of the computational model producing traces, on the other many more
quantities are factored in. In other words, my working assumption that leakage is ex-
clusively a function of Hamming weight of the input does not hold for ELMO traces, but
is nonetheless interesting to assess the effect of Hamming weight homogenisation on
ELMO traces.
Figure 4.2 compares the success rate of divide-and-conquer with the improved dis-
tinguisher, see Section 3.3.3, with the same attack but where Hamming weight ho-
mogenisation was applied. In particular, note that Figure 4.2a is the same as Figure 3.4b
and is replicated here to simplify visual comparison with Figure 4.2b, which instead re-
ports success rate against Hamming weight homogenisation. Both figures target two
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(a) Success rate of divide-and-conquer with im-
proved distinguisher. Same as Figure 3.4b.
























(b) Success rate of divide-and-conquer with im-
proved distinguisher against an homogenised se-
cret matrix.
Figure 4.2: Comparison between success rates of divide-and-conquer with and without
Hamming weight homogenisation, against a single position.
points of interest (loading of the secret and multiplication) and refer to position success
rate.
Overall the success rate degrades, meaning that Hamming weight homogenisation
does indeed reduce the amount of signal an adversary can exploit even in a context
where the initial working assumption does not hold entirely. Clearly, Figure 4.2b has
been obtained by including the modification to the scheme also in the templates: since
the countermeasure is deterministic and contains no secret transformation, an adver-
sary can, and has to, account for it in the templating phase. Moreover, Hamming weight
of the secret is certainly not the only metric related to secret values that can leak sensi-
tive information, which is why, despite the degraded performance, Figure 4.2 shows two
very similar behaviours.
What is even more interesting to notice, however, is the exceptional cases to the
above discussion. There are situations, in the divide-and-conquer attack, where secret
elements and their associated quantities do not fall under the signal umbrella, but un-
der the switching noise (or algorithmic variance) one. In such cases, reducing the con-
tribution of Hamming weight could even improve the attack: this seems to be the case
for the CCS4 parameter set and for the NIST2 parameter set in the low-noise regime.
All in all, Hamming weight homogenisation is an interesting countermeasure in
theory, as it exploits a peculiar algebraic structure of small secrets in LWE. Moreover,
it shows that ideas usually applied to simplify attacks, i.e. assuming a known and well-
defined leakage profile rather than templating the device, can turn useful in defending
96
4.3. OTHER COUNTERMEASURES FROM THE LITERATURE
cryptoschemes too. In practice, however, this is the perfect example of how tricky it is
to affect the signal-to-noise ratio by tuning only one or few quantities involved, and
how doing so can backfire in certain cases. This discussion calls for more structural
approaches, which are coming up next.
4.3 Other countermeasures from the literature
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 described alternative implementations of some algorithms in the
Frodo protocol, mostly applicable to both KEM and KEP versions, to protect against the
two attacks I showed in Chapter 3. In this case, “protecting” takes different meaning
depending on the attack and on the countermeasure.
• The extend-and-prune attack strategy from Section 3.4 was experimentally proven
to be the best among the proposed combinations of strategies and distinguishers.
It was in a sense optimal, because it exploited all available leakage from the three
points of interest making up a Zq multiplication in my assembly implementa-
tion. Luckily, the assumptions on which it is based are also easy to falsify through
a fairly straightforward alternative implementation, as shown in Section 4.1. In
this case, therefore, the protection mostly thwarts the attack.
• The divide-and-conquer strategy from Section 3.3 is weaker but easier to apply
and faster to run. Moreover, the countermeasure I presented in Section 4.2 does
not structurally prevent the attack, but merely contributes to render it harder
only in the situation where leakage can be modelled with Hamming weight. De-
spite the fact that it is interesting how Frodo can benefit from an assumption that
is usually adopted to attack schemes, how to build a more solid defence against
divide-and-conquer remains an open point.
For these reasons, I now focus on other ways to prevent divide-and-conquer attacks
in the multi-trace setting. Indeed, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 were about thwarting extend-
and-prune and lowering the signal to noise ratio in devices leaking Hamming weight,
respectively. Single-trace scenarios indeed suffer from a low signal to noise ratio as the
total number of power traces available is very limited. This is not the case for multi-
trace settings where, if the ratio is low, an adversary could in principle simply acquire
more traces.
I will analyse two widely known countermeasures from the literature and apply
them to the FrodoKEM protocol. Most of the content of the current section is, there-
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Algorithm 14 FrodoKEM.DECAPS with blinding
Input: Ciphertext c = (B′,C,d) ∈ Zm×nq × Zm×nq × {0,1}LEN, secret key sk = (s,S) ∈
{0,1}LEN ×Zn×nq and public key pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq .




3: B′x ←B′−X (mod q)
4: Mx ←C−B′xS (mod q)
5: M←Mx−XS (mod q)
6: µ′ ←FrodoKEM.Decode(M)
7: return FrodoKEM.CCA(c, s, µ′, pk)
fore, public knowledge and inspired by techniques already present in the literature. For
benchmarking purposes, Chapter 5 will implement some of the ideas explained here.
4.3.1 Blinding
Side-channel adversaries make use of public information, e.g. the matrix B′ during
DECAPS, and assumptions on leakage to produce guesses which are then compared
against actual (or, in my case, simulated) power measurements. One way to prevent
attacks, therefore, is to take public information out of the equation by blinding it. In
other words the input, being it the plaintext in symmetrical ciphers or the ciphertext in
public key ciphers, is hidden with some internally generated random value. Depending
on the scheme, this can mean either adding or multiplying a random value to the input,
as is the case of RSA [MOP07, Section 9.1.3] where the plaintext is summed with a ran-
dom value to avoid secret exponent recovery, or exploiting the homomorphic nature of a
scheme to add the encryption of a random message to a ciphertext. This latter approach
has been followed by Reparaz et al. [RdCR+16] in the context of Ring-LWE.
In the case of FrodoKEM, the only multiplication to secure is that between B′ and
S during DECAPS, as it involves the long-term secret matrix and is performed multiple
times. First of all, 128 bits of fresh randomness are generated, which are then inter-
preted as a seed and expanded into an m×n matrix. Such a matrix is then added to the
ciphertext B′, the result is multiplied by S and, finally, a correction factor is applied to
restore correctness.
Algorithm 14 shows the modifications needed to blind B′ inside the DECAPS algo-
rithm. In particular, a seed is first produced because it is much shorter than the ex-
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panded matrix. At first glance it might seem that the situation has worsened since now
two multiplications involving S exist. However, both of them have unknown operands.
Since X is generated afresh and on-the-fly, an adversary does not know it, preventing
any formulation of guess for the XS multiplication. Moreover, since X is uniformly ran-
dom in Zq, so is B′+X (it is effectively one-time-padding it). Therefore guesses cannot
be formulated there either.
Ciphertext blinding also helps in other attack scenarios, for instance against adver-
saries who can tamper with the ciphertext to manipulate how the subsequent multipli-
cation by S is carried out. The main drawback, however, is that the secret is still intact
and fully present on the device, opening the way for other potential attack vectors.
4.3.2 Masking
Some of the concepts above can be applied directly to the secret, in such a way that
the actual protection is implemented directly upon the sensitive material, rather than
blinding the operations involving it. In this case, the technique is called masking [MOP07,
Section 9.1] and it should come as no surprise that the book by Mangard, Oswald and
Popp describes blinding and masking together: the underlying idea is very similar, since
it boils down to splitting the secret in two: a mask which is the equivalent of X and a
masked value which is equivalent to Bx in Algorithm 14.
Differently than ciphertext blinding, since S is a long-term matrix, masking can be
performed during KEYGEN in such a way that the mask and masked value, also called
shares of the secret matrix, are kept separate at all times. Clearly, this comes at the cost
of almost doubling the size of the secret key, since two matrices must be stored.
Algorithms 15 and 16 show the masking scheme applied to FrodoKEM. As I men-
tioned, the secret matrix S is split in two shares during KEYGEN and, while the public
key is computed with the full matrix, the two shares are returned separately as part
of the secret key. They are used in a similar way as Algorithm 14 during DECAPS to
compute the matrix M, however an extra step is needed. Shares must be refreshed, i.e.
a random matrix must be added to Ṡ and subtracted by S̈ to preserve correctness, other-
wise an adversary would be able to collect multiple traces about both immutable shares
and the divide-and-conquer attack would still be feasible. Refreshing shares does not
hinder their main properties, that is to say that Ṡ+ S̈=S (mod q).
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Algorithm 15 FrodoKEM.KEYGEN with masking
Input: None.
Output: Key pair pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq and sk = (s, Ṡ, S̈) ∈ {0,1}LEN ×Zn×nq ×
Zn×nq .
1: s‖seedE‖z $←−U ({0,1})3LEN




6: B←AS+E (mod q)
7: Ṡ← cSHAKE(seedE,16nn,0)
8: S̈←S− Ṡ
9: return public key pk = (seedA,B) and secret key sk = (s, Ṡ, S̈)
Algorithm 16 FrodoKEM.DECAPS with masking
Input: Ciphertext c = (B′,C,d) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zm×nq × {0,1}LEN, secret key sk = (s, Ṡ, S̈) ∈
{0,1}LEN ×Zn×nq ×Zn×nq and public key pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0,1}128 ×Zn×nq .
Output: Shared secret ss ∈ {0,1}LEN.
1: Ṁ←C−B′Ṡ (mod q)




5: Ṡ← Ṡ+X (mod q)
6: S̈← S̈−X (mod q)
7: µ′ ←FrodoKEM.Decode(M)
8: return FrodoKEM.CCA(c, s, µ′, pk)
4.4 Summary and comparison
I shall now recap all of the different techniques explored in this chapter and give some
indications on how they compare to each other.
• Shifting rows (or columns, depending on the multiplication) is a deterministic
technique to break the symmetry exploited by the extend-and-prune attack. It
is based on the simple idea of changing the order of operations every time a row
(or column) of the secret matrix is processed, in such a way that the first ele-
ment of each row (or column) is actually the first one to be processed only once.
Despite being just a matter of indexing on paper, I will show in Section 5.6 how
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tricky it gets when operands are not fully present in memory, as is the case for
A. Given the attacks it aims at defending against, this countermeasure applies in
the single-trace setting only, and is in fact useless against divide-and-conquer.
• As I mentioned in Section 2.3, attackers come up with power models to simplify
the process of elaborating guesses to then compare against the power measure-
ments. In the case of Frodo, however, knowing the device leaks according to a
certain mathematical function can be leveraged in the defender’s favour. In par-
ticular I showed that, in case such a function is the Hamming weight, Frodo can
be modified so that all secret elements have the same Hamming weight, thanks
to the fact that they are “small” modulo q. Needless to say, whenever the above
assumption does not hold, the countermeasure fails too. When it does, however, it
can be applied both in the single-trace setting and the multi-trace setting.
• Blinding is the process of breaking any relation between public information, hence
known to the adversary, and operations involving secret values. This way, an ad-
versary can no longer formulate guesses based on public knowledge. As before, it
can be applied to both settings.
• Finally, masking aims at splitting the long-term secret matrix in two (or more)
shares in such a way that leakage on each of them is independent of the secret,
because they themselves are.
Each countermeasure applies in certain scenarios and under certain assumptions,
therefore an overall comparison is hardly possible. In the single-trace setting, shifting
rows (or columns) effectively prevents the most dangerous attacks because, as shown
in Chapter 3, divide-and-conquer does not perform very well given the small number
of traces available. Single-trace attacks were indeed more of a threat to the original
FrodoKEP [BCD+16] rather than the newer FrodoKEM [NAB+17]. For the latter, an
adversary would more likely target the long-term secret matrix S, rendering multi-
trace countermeasures more relevant for real attacks. In this context, Hamming weight
homogenisation, despite being applicable and interesting from a theoretical point of
view, is based on very strong assumptions. Blinding is certainly preferable because the
amount of randomness required is very limited while offering good protection against
attacks targeting matrix multiplication in DECAPS. The drawback is that, since the
secret is left untouched, attacks exploiting other parts of the protocol could easily cir-
cumvent it. This is the reason why I believe masking offers the highest degree of protec-
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tion: the secret is split in two shares, which are independent from it if taken separately.
The structure of FrodoKEM is such that shares never need to be recombined, while the
constant refreshing makes any attack spanning multiple runs of the algorithm a lot
more expensive. If one wished for an even stronger security guarantee, masking (with
more than two shares) has been shown to be provably secure under certain assumptions
[PR13], which is a feature none of the other countermeasures presented here have. An-
other, very important, metric of judgement among countermeasures is the performance




As I mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, the ARM Cortex-M0 processor was chosen
as the target device mainly for the availability of the ELMO simulator, which made
possible a more comprehensive and deeper analysis than if I worked on the physical
device. If one had to choose where to implement FrodoKEM, however, the M0 would not
be a natural or ideal pick. Because FrodoKEM is based on “ring-less” LWE, security is
achieved through operations among fairly large matrices. Even generating and storing
one such matrix are non-trivial tasks on a constrained device. Targeting bigger devices
is therefore mandatory.
5.1 Overview
Performance of the implementation informs deployment in the real world. Constrained
environments, included in the Internet of Things (IoT) framework, are especially chal-
lenging platforms. For instance, a naïve implementation of FrodoKEM-640, as provided
by the original authors [NAB+17] on an ARM Cortex-A72, exceeds the resources avail-
able on such platforms, hence requiring particular care and analysis.
A popular choice for implementing cryptography on embedded devices is the ARM
Cortex-M4, which has more resources then the aforementioned M0 but still sits in the
IoT ecosystem of devices. The most delicate and resource intense operations are the
expansion of the public pseudorandom matrix A from a seed and various matrix mul-
tiplications by smaller matrices. I exploit a combination of on-the-fly expansion of A,
originally proposed in the specifications [NAB+17], with a particular set of instructions
available on my target platform through the Digital Signal Processing (DSP) extension.
These instructions fall into the Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) paradigm.
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As the ARM Cortex-M4 is a 32-bit architecture, it can hold up to 32 bits in each inter-
nal register. Conveniently, FrodoKEM-640 is formed of matrices defined over Zq with
q = 215, which can be embedded in Z216 for convenience of computation. This implies
that each element can be stored as a halfword in a register, and this is where SIMD in-
structions turn out to be most useful: when four values are correctly stored in the four
halves of two registers, it is possible to operate on them in parallel with a single instruc-
tion. I will heavily use the smlad instruction, which multiplies corresponding halfwords
from two registers, adds them together, accumulates the result to a third register and
stores the final output in a fourth one, all in one instruction.
Furthermore, I analyse a suite of algorithms and memory layouts of matrices: with
which function A is generated, either cSHAKE or AES, and whether it is involved in
a multiplication as a left or as a right operand are all slightly different variants which
require different optimisations.
Despite the carefully tailored optimisations, however, performance of matrix multi-
plications involving A is still dominated by its generation. A fine grained benchmark
does indeed show that the greatest number of cycles is spent performing AES and
cSHAKE. I analyse the rationale behind the choice of such cryptographically secure
PRNGs, and conclude that they are over-conservative for the task of generating a pub-
lic matrix from a public seed. I therefore suggest to use a different, non-cryptographic
PRNG in order to speed up the generation of A. I choose to implement FrodoKEM-640
using the PRNG xoshiro128∗∗ [BV18], which produces high quality pseudorandomness
at a fraction of the cycle count. I show how to embed it in FrodoKEM-640 and bench-
mark it against the official two PRNGs.
5.1.1 Achieved performance
I improve multiplication to the right of A by up to 62.8%, and by up to 78.9% when
multiplication is to the left of A, compared to the reference [NAB+17]. Such results are
achieved by carefully analysing the layout in memory of small matrices, and how por-
tions of A are generated and stored. I coded tailored algorithms for each situation, while
keeping SIMD instructions as a common design rationale for all the implementations. I
also apply some of the algorithms to multiplication between “small” matrices, i.e. when
A is not an operand: even in these cases I obtain improvements up to 78.9%, compared
to the reference.
With faster multiplication routines, generating the matrix A becomes even more
dominant than before. For instance, the number of cycles at a clock frequency of 24
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MHz spent to generate A accounts for 86% of the whole execution of FrodoKEM-640:
the remaining 14% can be as optimised as possible, but the difference will barely be
noticeable anyway. I therefore suggest the usage of xoshiro128∗∗ to generate A, which
suddenly becomes one of the cheapest operations in FrodoKEM-640: it gets reduced by
up to 96%.
5.2 Preliminary notions
Section 2.4.4 already gave all the necessary details on FrodoKEM-640, thus here I limit
myself to highlight those aspects which are particularly relevant for the implementa-
tions.
The ARM Cortex-M4 core is a popular choice for microcontroller usage and has be-
come a representative platform to benchmark cryptographic application for usage in
the IoT ([AJS16, HOKG18, KRS19, KRSS]). I target the ARM Cortex-M4 core as well to
allow for easy comparison against previous applied cryptographic research.
The ARM Cortex-M4 in my setup is mounted on a STM32F407 board, equipped with
1 MB of flash and 192 KB of memory. The default clock frequency is 168 MHz. The board
is equipped with a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) that derives entropy from
analog noise. A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is seeded with the noise and
with a dedicated clock. Its output is stored in the RNG_DR register, which is read when
randomness is needed. Checks to verify the absence of abnormalities in both the noise-
derived seed and dedicated clock are present too.
5.2.1 Implementation details of FrodoKEM-640
The matrix A is the main bottleneck to any implementation of FrodoKEM-640 on em-
bedded devices. Apart from being resource intensive to generate, it also simply does
not fit in memory. The ARM Cortex-M4 platform is therefore ideal to test on-the-fly
solutions, because it forces the generation of A in chunks.
In the official implementation of FrodoKEM-640, matrices are stored and operated
upon as arrays. The convention used to linearise a two-dimensional structure like a
matrix into one-dimensional arrays has a huge impact on performance on embedded
devices. It changes which elements are adjacent in memory, affecting how they are
loaded. There is no universal convention followed by matrices in FrodoKEM-640, rather
it comes down to convenience on a case-by-case basis. Throughout this chapter, I use
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teletype font to denote arrays obtained from matrices, e.g. a is the array corresponding
to matrix A. Indexes start from 0, and I will make use of pointer arithmetic notation de-
rived from the C programming language to make notation easier when handling arrays.
If an n×n matrix A is stored row-wise in the vector a, for instance, then a+n denotes
a pointer to the first element of the second row of A, as it lies n positions away from the
base address (always pointing to the top-left element of a matrix: A0,0).
Remark 5.1. It has to be noticed that there are ways of speeding up the computation
of AES and cSHAKE by exploiting the fact that the inputs are partly fixed for each it-
eration. By reformatting how bitstrings are given, it is possible to compute and store
parts of the internal state. For example, the plaintext of AES is mostly made of ze-
ros, hence portions of the first and second rounds could be precomputed and reused
at every iteration. Similarly, since seedA is fixed, the first few absorptions of cSHAKE
can be computed in advance. I do not explore these ideas further, as doing so would
mean to enter in the details of how the two PRNGs are implemented for only very lim-
ited gains. I instead decided to use them as black boxes and focus on the operations in
FrodoKEM-640.
5.2.2 Fast Arithmetic on an ARM Cortex-M4 Core
In recent works, the ARM Cortex-M4 core has been considered a representative plat-
form when benchmarking post-quantum primitives targeting embedded applications
[AJS16, HOKG18, KRS19, KRSS]. This platform has a word-size of 32 bits. The Cortex-
M4 has specific instructions which can work on two half-words (of size 16 bits) in paral-
lel following the Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) paradigm. The most relevant
instructions I use in my implementations follow.
• ldmia loads multiple (up to eight) full-word values from consecutive memory into
the corresponding amount of registers and, optionally, updates the pointer to the
memory accordingly.
• smlad multiplies four half-word sized values stored in two word registers and adds
them to an accumulator. More specifically,
smlad d,a,b, c
computes








+ c mod 232.
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• ldrh and strh are useful for loading and storing half-word sized values from mem-
ory in one instruction, without needing to load a full-word combined with masking
or shifting.
• bfi copies a bit field from one register into another one. This is useful for merging
two half-word values for using the aforementioned SIMD instruction.
Given the amount of available registers these instructions allow the multiplication
of two matrices five values at a time, in a pretty straightforward way. This is under
the assumption that the left matrix is given in row-major order and the right matrix
in column-major order such that they can both be accessed linearly. As will be outlined
in Section 5.3 this is not always the case, hence the need for dedicated subroutines
accessing non-adjacent portions of a linearised matrix.
5.3 FrodoKEM-640 Optimisations
Algorithms 3 and 4 differ in how they the fill the matrix A: cSHAKE returns one full
row a the time while AES only generates 128-bit ciphertexts, corresponding to eight
consecutive positions row-wise, hence allowing for a more flexible filling of A. Despite
these differences, AES and cSHAKE do show a certain degree of similarity, enabling
some common subroutines in ARM assembly to be reused in both cases. These will also
turn out useful once I describe how I optimised matrix multiplications other than those
by A, namely the ones between n×n matrices in ENCAPS and DECAPS.
I opted for addressing different multiplications in different sections, rather than di-
viding the discussion between PRNGs. Therefore, Section 5.3.1 describes the common
subroutines, which are used in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 that describe AS and S′A, re-
spectively. I conclude with multiplications between small matrices in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.1 Common Subroutines
Both AES and cSHAKE can generate a full row of A, although in slightly different
ways. This perfectly fits the case when A is the left operand in a multiplication, because
it implies that some of its rows are fully stored in adjacent memory locations, and hap-
pens during KEYGEN only. Even more conveniently, S is stored column-wise, effectively
opening the way to an inner product function based on SIMD instructions.
I call the first subroutine ip_n, as it computes the inner product between two vectors
of length n, which I assume have their elements stored in adjacent locations in memory.
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This will be the case for several matrices. The inner functionality and a description of
all instructions follow.
ip_n
1 mov %[r], #0
2 ldmia %[s]!, {r0, r1, r2, r3, r4}
3 ldmia %[a]!, {r5, r6, r7, r8, r9}
4 smlad %[r], r0, r5, %[r]
5 smlad %[r], r1, r6, %[r]
6 smlad %[r], r2, r7, %[r]
7 smlad %[r], r3, r8, %[r]
8 smlad %[r], r4, r9, %[r]
9 (lines 2-8 are repeated 64 times)
1 The register holding the final result, named %[r], is initialised to zero.
2-3 The instruction ldmia is used to load multiple registers at once. I load five reg-
isters, i.e. 20 bytes, exploiting the fact that all elements I am interested in are
adjacent in memory. The exclamation mark after the address registers indicates
that pointers, stored in registers %[s] and %[a], are also updated, hence no other
instructions will be needed in the next iteration.
4-8 Five SIMD instructions are everything I need to perform 10 multiplications and
10 additions (accumulations) on the output register %[r].
9 Since the above lines compute over 10 elements at a time, I need to repeat them
n/10= 64 times.
The function ip_n crucially relies on the vectors to be multiplied to have adjacent
positions in memory such that their addresses can be loaded once and then updated di-
rectly by the loading instruction. Unfortunately such an optimal scenario only happens
when AS is performed during KEYGEN. Apart from there, A has to be generated during
ENCAPS and for the re-encapsulation part of DECAPS. In these cases it is multiplied
to the left by the matrix S′, while still being generated row-wise for consistency and
correctness. On the bright side, S′ is generated row-wise.
The function I developed for the matrix multiplication S′A is denoted row_by_chunk
and is depicted in Figure 5.1. Four registers are loaded with eight consecutive elements






Figure 5.1: Visualisation of the row_by_chunk function. Circles refer to elements, where
for compactness I depicted a_temp holding four elements, while in reality it holds eight.
Lines show how elements are disposed in memory. Finally, the colour code simply high-
lights how multiplication by a_temp works.
As this procedure differs between cSHAKE and AES, I defer the details and the adopted
instructions for later, while for now referring to those elements as the vector a_temp.
Then, for every row of S′, the corresponding eight elements are loaded, SIMD-multiplied
with a_temp and the result is accumulated in the corresponding positions of the output
matrix. The colour code in Figure 5.1 visualises them. Code and a line by line description
follow.
row_by_chunk
1 mov r0, %[s]
2 mov r9, %[o]
3 ldmia r0, {r5,r6,r7,r8}
4 ldrh r10, [r9, #0]
5 smlad r10, r1, r5, r10
6 smlad r10, r2, r6, r10
7 smlad r10, r3, r7, r10
8 smlad r10, r4, r8, r10
9 strh r10, [r9, #0]
10 add r0, r0, #1280
11 (lines 3-10 are repeated 8 times)
1 The address of the matrix S′ is held in %[s].
2 The address of the matrix B′ is held in %[o]. I use hard-coded offsets to access the
correct position: each element in a column of B′ is 2n = 1280 bytes away from the
top element in the same column.
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3 Four registers are filled with eight elements of S′. Note that I do not use the ex-
clamation mark this time, because I manually modify the address to access non
adjacent memory locations (line 10).
4 One element of B′ is loaded: this is a 16-bit value, hence the instruction to load a
halfword is used.
5-8 Four SIMD instructions are used to perform 8 multiplications and 8 additions
(accumulations). I assume the elements of a_temp are stored in registers r1 up to
r4.
9 The partially updated element of B′ is stored back in place.
10 The address of S′ is shifted by 2n = 1280 bytes, therefore it now points to the
second row of S′.
11 Lines 3 to 10 are repeated a total of n = 8 times, hence partially updating a full
column of B′. The only caveat is that after four columns, the register r9 holding the
pointer to B′ must be updated by 4 ·2n = 5120 bytes with an extra add instruction,
otherwise the offset would exceed the maximum allowed by the architecture.
5.3.2 Optimising the Matrix Multiplication AS
Conveniently, the matrix A is the left operand and is stored row-wise. I can apply
cSHAKE as specified in Algorithm 4 whenever I need a row, while in the case of AES
I can fix the index i and run the j-loop from Algorithm 3. Once one or more rows are
generated, I can simply run the ip_n subroutine directly.
In Algorithm 17 four rows of A are generated at-a-time, which works slightly dif-
ferent depending on whether AES or cSHAKE is being used. In the first case, an extra
loop over the columns, eight by eight, is needed; while the latter PRNG generates full
rows straight away. Next, I multiply each of the generated rows by all columns of S and
accumulate the output vector. Note that ip_n returns a value, which is added in to b.
Within the two if-branches, the same code as in Algorithms 3 and 4 is used.
5.3.3 Optimising the Matrix Multiplication S′A
In the setting of the matrix multiplication S′A, it is crucial to understand how A is
placed in memory and how AES differs from cSHAKE. The row_by_chunk subroutine
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Algorithm 17 AS multiplication
Input: Seed seedA ∈ {0,1}128, output vector b ∈Znnq initialised with error matrix E, and
secret vector s ∈Znnq .
Output: b← b+AS.
Parameters: n = 640, n = 8, q = 215.
1: a_rows← {0}4n
2: for 0≤ i < n, i ← i+4 do
3: for 0≤ j < 4 do
4: if PRNG = AES then
5: for 0≤ k < n,k ← k+8 do
6: p←〈i+ j〉‖〈k〉‖0‖ . . .‖0 ∈ {0,1}128
7: a_rows+ j ·n+k ←AESseedA(p)
8: else if PRNG = cSHAKE then
9: a_rows+ j ·n ← cSHAKE(seedA,16n,28 + i+ j)
10: for 0≤ k < n do
11: for 0≤ j < 4 do . Unrolled loop











Figure 5.2: The matrix A as generated and accessed by AES (left) and cSHAKE (right).
Dashed arrows show in which order a_cols moves to different portions of A.
assumes eight consecutive elements in a column of A, which do need to be adjacent in
memory, are stored in the a_temp array. The latter is then multiplied by the correspond-
ing portions of S′. I denote the portion of A being generated each time as a_cols, which
is the counterpart of a_rows from Section 5.3.2.
Figure 5.2 visualises the process in both the AES (left) and the cSHAKE (right)
cases. In the former, an n×8 submatrix is generated by performing the whole i-loop
with a fixed j in Algorithm 3. Performing the same operation with an incremented
j yields the next submatrix, hence shifting a_cols to the right by 8 positions. Since
cSHAKE can only generate full rows, a_cols is simply filled with the first eight of them
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(only four are shown for compactness). Dashed arrows show in which direction a_cols
moves in both cases. Note that Figure 5.2 represents only four elements in a_temp for
compactness.
Once a_cols is generated and stored, values corresponding to a_temp have to be
loaded to be used by row_by_chunk. This is where cSHAKE and AES differ: a_temp
contains eight consecutive values in one column, and moves to the next column for the
next iteration. Once there are no more columns available in a_cols, a_temp jumps to
the subsequent eight rows. Such a wrap around happens after 8 columns for AES and
n columns for cSHAKE. In particular, in the former case a_temp jumps more often, but
the next eight rows are present in memory; in the latter a_temp covers the full eight
rows present in memory, then a_cols has to be filled with the next eight rows. The
following ARM assembly snippet illustrates how I dealt with such a discrepancy.
load_a_temp
1 __________aes_________|_________cshake________
2 ldrh r1, [%[a], #0] | ldrh r1, [%[a], #0]
3 ldrh r5, [%[a], #16] | ldrh r5, [%[a], #1280]
4 bfi r1, r5, #16, #16 | bfi r1, r5, #16, #16
5 ldrh r2, [%[a], #32] | ldrh r2, [%[a], #2560]
6 ldrh r5, [%[a], #48] | ldrh r5, [%[a], #3840]
7 bfi r2, r5, #16, #16 | bfi r2, r5, #16, #16
8 | add %[a], %[a], #5120
9 ldrh r3, [%[a], #64] | ldrh r3, [%[a], #0]
10 ldrh r5, [%[a], #80] | ldrh r5, [%[a], #1280]
11 bfi r3, r5, #16, #16 | bfi r3, r5, #16, #16
12 ldrh r4, [%[a], #96] | ldrh r4, [%[a], #2560]
13 ldrh r5, [%[a], #112] | ldrh r5, [%[a], #3840]
14 bfi r4, r5, #16, #16 | bfi r4, r5, #16, #16
The code snippet load_a_temp reports both AES (left) and cSHAKE (right) versions,
with differences highlighted in red. Starting from the address stored in %[a], even po-
sitions are loaded to the bottom half of each register, while odd ones are first loaded to
the bottom half of the temporary register r5 and subsequently moved to the top half of
the designated register (r1 up to r4) thanks to the bfi instruction. Such a procedure is
common to both halves of the snippet.
What differs is the offset when loading values from %[a]. In the case of AES (left)
the offset among values in the same column is a multiple of 16 bytes because a_cols is
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Algorithm 18 S′A multiplication
Input: Seed seedA ∈ {0,1}128, output vector bp ∈ Znnq initialised with error matrix E′,
and secret vector sp ∈Znnq .
Output: bp← bp+S′A.
Parameters: n = 640, n = 8, q = 215.
1: a_cols← {0}8n
2: for 0≤ k < n,k ← k+8 do
3: if PRNG = AES then
4: for 0≤ i < n do
5: p← i‖k‖0 . . .0 ∈ {0,1}128
6: a_cols+8 · i ←AESseedA(p)
7: for 0≤ i < n, i ← i+8 do
8: for 0≤ j < 8 do
9: a_temp← load_a_temp_aes(a_cols+8 · i+ j)
10: row_by_chunk(sp+ i,a_temp,bp+k+ j)
11: else if PRNG = cSHAKE then
12: for 0≤ j < 8 do . Unrolled loop
13: a_cols+ j ·n ← cSHAKE(seedA,16n, ,28 +k+ j)
14: for 0≤ i < n do
15: a_temp← load_a_temp_cshake(a_cols+ i)
16: row_by_chunk(sp+k,a_temp,bp+ i)
an n×8 submatrix of A. Instead, elements in the same column of a_cols when cSHAKE
is used are 2n = 1280 bytes apart from each other, hence offsets in the right half of the
snippet are multiples of 1280 (cf. Figure 5.2). This introduces an extra complication:
offsets are not allowed to exceed 4095, hence I have to spend an extra add instruction,
highlighted in red, to make the address in %[a] point to the first position of the fourth
row.
Algorithm 18 incorporates both AES and cSHAKE variants of the S′A multiplica-
tion. I denoted by load_a_temp_aes and load_a_temp_cshake the two halves of the
load_a_temp snippet. Once the appropriate values are loaded, the row_by_chunk func-
tion is applied. Note that it does not return any value, as the memory location of bp is
an input, hence results are immediately stored back. Loop structures make sure that
submatrices are traversed in the correct order.
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Algorithm 19 B′S multiplication
Input: Uninitialised output vector out ∈ Znnq , vectors bp,s ∈ Znnq containing B′ and S,
respectively.
Output: out←B′S.
Parameters: n = 640, n = 8, q = 215.
1: for 0≤ i < n do
2: for 0≤ j < 8 do . Unrolled loop
3: out[i ·n+ j]← ip_n(bp+ in,s+ j ·n)
5.3.4 Small Matrix Multiplication Optimisations
Multiplications involving A are by far the most time consuming. There are however mul-
tiplications between smaller matrices (n×n and vice-versa) which take a much smaller
portion of the overall computation time, but can still benefit from some of the subrou-
tines outlined in Section 5.3.1.
During DECAPS, the function ip_n can be used to efficiently perform B′S, since both
matrices are conveniently stored in memory. Differently than before, they are fully
present in memory, and the matrix B′ is not initialised to an error matrix because it
comes from the ciphertext. The result of multiplication is therefore saved in a different
vector and is later subtracted from C using a different function.
Algorithm 19 shows how to use ip_n for the B′S multiplication. Effectively I effi-
ciently perform the inner product along the bigger dimension n, while the two smaller
dimensions n are dealt with in a loop and in an unrolled fashion.
Similarly, I can compute the function V ← S′B+E′′ in both ENCAPS and DECAPS
using the row_by_chunk function. In this case, B is an n×8 matrix stored row-wise,
precisely like a_cols in the AES case because n = 8. It is worth noticing that B is
generated during KEYGEN, since it is part of the public key, and then used both in
ENCAPS and DECAPS as the rightmost operand in matrix multiplications. Therefore
a column-wise layout in memory would be more beneficial, but I do not explore this
idea further because the impact on the overall computation time would be marginal.
Algorithm 20 shows the pseudocode, which is exactly the same as in lines 6 to 9 of
Algorithm 18.
I postpone the showcase of performances my optimisations achieve to Section 5.5,
where a unified view on benchmarks, together with comparisons with other relevant
works, will be given. In the coming section, instead, I focus my attention on how A is
generated. So far I have been compliant with the design choices in the specification of
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Algorithm 20 S′B multiplication
Input: Output vector v ∈ Znnq initialised with elements of E′′, vectors b,sp ∈ Znnq con-
taining B and S′, respectively.
Output: v← v+S′A.
Parameters: n = 640, n = 8, q = 215.
1: for 0≤ i < n, i ← i+8 do
2: for 0≤ j < n do
3: b_temp← load_a_temp_aes(b+8i+ j)
4: row_by_chunk(sp+ i,b_temp,v+ j)
FrodoKEM-640 [NAB+17], and optimised the usage of AES and cSHAKE inside matrix
multiplications. I am about to offer an alternative greatly outperforming both.
5.4 Faster PRNG for A: xoshiro128∗∗
Generating the large matrix A is typically problematic on embedded devices. More gen-
erally, the competitiveness of FrodoKEM-640 on any device is hampered by the need to
deal with big matrices rather than small polynomials, as happens in its ring and module
variants.
A step in the right direction has already been taken with the design choice of expand-
ing true randomness with a PRNG. When it comes to generating large matrices, both
randomness cost and performance improve. Setting aside the unavoidable cost of gener-
ating a seed from random, the next question is which PRNG to choose. As I pointed out
several times, this choice impacts on how portions of a matrix are actually generated,
thus on performance.
To remedy the performance penalty incurred by FrodoKEM-640 for generating A, I
propose a third option for the PRNG by challenging the need for a cryptographically se-
cure PRNG to generate a public matrix. The purpose of cryptographically secure PRNGs
is to provide streams of pseudorandom numbers achieving some form of security. When
the seed of the sequence is secret, an adversary learning the first k bits should not
be able to predict the (k+1)th bit. If the internal state is compromised, reverting the
computation upstream until the seed is disclosed should also be infeasible.
Therefore, the whole point of a cryptographically secure PRNG is that, as long as
something inside remains secret, be it the seed or some internal state, an adversary
cannot tell the difference between the output stream and a truly random sequence, nor
recover anything that would allow backward reconstruction of the sequence. Trivially,
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Algorithm 21 xoshiro128∗∗
Input: State s ∈ ({0,1}32)4.
Output: Pseudorandom number r ∈ {0,1}32.
Parameters: None.
1: r ← (((s[0] ·5)<< 7)∨ ((s[0] ·5)>> 25)) ·9





7: s[2]← s[2]⊕ t
8: s[3]← (s[3]<< 11)∨ (s[3]>> 21)
9: return r
disclosing the secret reveals the deterministic nature of the sequence, hence making
any security notion useless.
For the above reasons, I suggest the usage of a non-cryptographic PRNG over a
secure one for the generation of the public matrix A, whose seed is part of the public
key. This is advantageous because non-cryptographic PRNGs are usually faster and
have smaller internal states, since they are only designed to achieve good statistical
properties. The latter is still a stringent property of A, as clear patterns and other
generic statistical weaknesses could potentially weaken the underlying LWE problem.
I give more insights on this point in Section 5.4.2.1.
5.4.1 Description of xoshiro128∗∗
I use xoshiro128∗∗ [BV18] as the designated PRNG for my implementation. There are
several reasons behind this decision. As the name says, it has a 128 bit state, which
is precisely the length of seedA. Moreover, the state is seen as an array of four 32 bit
values, which matches the word size of the target architecture. However, larger versions
achieving the same statistical properties are available too [BV18].
Statistical quality and performance are the main advantages of xoshiro128∗∗. The
design is inspired by the xorshift family of PRNGs [Mar03], which are linear functions
and therefore are very fast but do not always pass all statistical tests. To fix this is-
sue a scrambler is used, that is to say a non-linear layer to avoid linear dependen-
cies in output. The authors of xoshiro128∗∗ use a sequence of multiplication-rotation-
multiplication operations called a ∗∗ scrambler, hence the name xoshiro128∗∗. One
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word of the state is multiplied by constants of the form 2s+1 and rotated. Constants are
chosen to be efficiently implemented as one shift and one addition. Algorithm 21 shows
the pseudocode of xoshiro128∗∗, where << and >> indicate left and right rotations, re-
spectively. Firstly the output of the current iteration r is computed, then the internal
state s is updated.
Outputs of xoshiro128∗∗ achieve very good statistical quality. According to the orig-
inal publication [BV18], xoshiro128∗∗ passes the BigCrush test from the TestU01 suite
[LS07]. It is in fact one of the fastest doing so. On top of that, the authors designed a
test to discover statistical bias in the Hamming weight of w-bit words generated by a
PRNG, showing that xoshiro128∗∗ and closely related PRNGs succeed.
5.4.2 FrodoKEM-640 and xoshiro128∗∗, Love at First Sight
I used xoshiro128∗∗ to generate A inside FrodoKEM-640. I left everything else un-
touched, including the fact that cSHAKE is used to generate seedA and all secret and
error matrices. For the latter, security of the PRNG is indeed mandatory, as the seeds
are supposed to be kept secret. In the case of seedA, adopting a cryptographically secure
PRNG fed with true randomness makes sure that tampering with the seed of A is not
feasible, and that xoshiro128∗∗ is seeded correctly.
I opted for changing the order in which A is stored in memory: instead of having
row values adjacent in memory, I generate A column-wise. This is motivated by the fact
that the former convention is only convenient in KEYGEN, while being problematic for
ENCAPS and DECAPS. This way, the situation is reversed and is overall beneficial as the
latter two algorithms are supposed to run multiple times per key pair.
Column-wise layout in memory has another advantage: its symmetry with respect
to the AES and cSHAKE generate A. I can therefore simply swap the subroutines de-
scribed in Section 5.3.1 for the multiplications by A: ip_n can be used for S′A and
row_by_chunk can be used in AS. The former returns a value, which is then added to
the output matrix in the wrapping C code, but note that the latter stores results directly
to memory. Therefore there is one caveat to take care of: row_by_chunk was originally
designed to output B′, which is saved in rows of length n, while here I want it to output
B, whose rows are of length n = 8. A simple change of offsets in the loading and storing
instructions is then enough to solve the issue.
I realised three implementations: a first one in portable C where A is fully pre-
generated, an implementation in portable C where A is generated and multiplied on-
the-fly which I use as reference, and finally the optimised implementation.
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5.4.2.1 Security considerations
Swapping a cryptographic primitive for a construction which is not designed to meet
any cryptographic notion is always problematic. It is a choice that does indeed sound
like making the protocol relying on it insecure. However context is also very important
and, in the scenario I am supporting the usage of xoshiro128∗∗, several previous works
suggest how this design choice is not catastrophic for security after all. The main reason
behind this is that A does need to meet some statistical requirements, in such a way that
using a cryptographically secure PRNG certainly checks all the boxes. The interesting
question, however, is whether doing so is absolutely necessary to solve the problem
of generating “good” matrices A or whether the same statistical properties (without
secrecy properties, because A does not need any since it is public) can be achieved with
other constructions as well.
In his technical report, Galbraith [Gal12] tackles precisely this research question by
listing three properties that A needs to have in order for the resulting LWE instance to
withstand known attacks. I hereby list the properties he pinpointed for completeness.
• As discussed in Section 2.4.3.1, the connection between LWE and hard problems
over lattices heavily relies on A, to the point that it finds a place in the notation
itself of the lattice involved, namely Λq (A). If a good basis of this lattice was easy
to find via reductions from any base, clearly SVP and all related problems would
be easy to solve. Therefore, the first property is that A should not allow finding
good basis efficiently.
• Following the same notation of the scheme outlined in Section 2.4.4.2, it should
be hard to solve the equation C=S′A+E′ (mod q) for S′. Otherwise, an adversary
can retrieve the message by computing D−S′B (mod q).
• It should be hard to find short vectors v such that vᵀA= 0 (mod q). This is needed
to avoid statistical weaknesses like repeated rows or other linear relationships
between adjacent rows of A.
Galbraith then proceeds in listing several PRNGs that might well fit the purpose,
including some non-cryptographically secure ones like Linear Congruential Generator
[Knu97, Section 3.2.2] and Mersenne Twister generator [MN98]. He then generalises
his argument by stating that, and I quote, “We expect that much more lightweight pseu-
dorandom word generators could be used in our application without loss of security.”
[Gal12, Section 6].
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On top of Galbraith’s analysis, there exist other instances in the literature where
similar arguments where applied to use non-cryptographically secure PRNGs when
generating public values or parameters. Ajtai [Ajt05], for the generation of a public pa-
rameter for his public-key cryptosystem, discussed how, clearly, using a non-cryptographic
PRNG breaks down the security proof. However, since nothing about the parameter in
question is kept secret, an adversary knows how to reconstruct the sequence so any non-
random property could be exploited anyway. Perhaps more closely related to the Frodo’s
setting, Coron et al. [CMNT11a] use a non-cryptographic PRNG to expand a seed into
several rational numbers which are part of the public key. Indeed they specify that, in
their implementation, they used the PRNG in glibc [CMNT11b, Note 7].
5.5 Results and Comparison with Previous Works
Benchmarks are never straightforward to carry out, and interpreting their results to
derive recommendations is an even more delicate task. In this section I collect all perfor-
mance results of my implementations, as well as compare them with relevant previous
works.
As I mentioned in Section 5.2, the default clock frequency of the target development
board is 168 MHz. However when the main interest lies in how the implementation of
a specific function performs, i.e. how many clock cycles the operations in that function
take, then it is useful to run benchmarks at a lower clock frequency to compensate for
memory accesses. If there are any inside the benchmarked function, the final number of
clock cycles computed at a normal frequency might not be representative, as a good part
of them might have been simply wasted by the function waiting for memory to retrieve
the queried values. Memory is indeed notoriously slower than the microprocessor. On
the other hand, not contextualising benchmarks at a lower frequency can be misleading
and can lead to erroneous conclusions on the actual performance.
The STM32F407 development board offers a very neat and simple way of precisely
computing cycle count, thanks to the Data Watchpoint and Trace (DWT) registers. I re-
set and read the DWT_CYCCNT register around functions to have a confident measure
of how many cycles they take. I use the default 168 MHz clock frequency for benchmark-
ing algorithms, and the lower 24 MHz when benchmarking cycle count of internal op-
erations. This seems to be a popular choice in the literature [HOKG18, KRS19, KRSS],
thus making comparisons fairer.
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5.5.1 Relevant works for comparison
Howe et al. [HOKG18] recently implemented FrodoKEM-640 on the same target plat-
form, yet did not use SIMD techniques. Secondly the PQM4 project [KRSS], which I
partially used as the backbone of my implementation, is a unified framework to evalu-
ate post-quantum candidates on an ARM Cortex-M4. These two works are my source of
comparison.
Very recently, Kannwischer et al. [KRS19] implemented a plethora of schemes sub-
mitted to the NIST standardisation effort on an ARM Cortex-M4. The common denom-
inator of all schemes is their use of polynomials in Z2m[x]. Kannwischer et al. cre-
ated a tool which automatically explores different divide-and-conquer multiplication
approaches and generates assembly code for these different algorithms. The DSP as-
sembly instructions are also adopted.
An implementation for the ARM Cortex-M4 of a lattice-based scheme using different
moduli has also been implemented: Alkim et al. [AJS16] show how NewHope benefits
from an optimised implementation.
I compare my implementations against the portable C implementation denoted as
“optimised” in the official specifications [NAB+17]. Indeed, their “reference” implemen-
tation cannot possibly fit in my setup because A is fully generated, and it would occupy
2n2 = 819,200 bytes of memory, i.e. circa 820 KB against the 192 KB available. The
“optimised” implementation, instead, generates and multiplies chunks of A on-the-fly.
Since the latter is the only official implementation I can refer to for benchmarking pur-
poses, I call it reference for the rest of the chapter.
I use the same implementation of cSHAKE as in the PQM4 framework [KRSS],
which has been optimised in ARM assembly. Since AES is not part of the framework,
I opted for the Schwabe and Stoffelen [SS16] implementation, also optimised for the
ARM Cortex-M4 and used by Howe et al. [HOKG18] too. Finally, I deploy the im-
plementation of xoshiro128∗∗ in C code, available at http://xoshiro.di.unimi.it/
xoshiro128starstar.c.
5.5.2 Benchmarks at 168 MHz
I benchmark both the reference [NAB+17] and my optimised implementations for all
three PRNGs. I set the clock frequency to the default 168 MHz, and execute the whole
protocol 100 times, measuring cycle counts of KEYGEN, ENCAPS and DECAPS each time.
Results are shown in Table 5.1.
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Function
cSHAKE AES xoshiro128∗∗
Ref [NAB+17] This work Ref [NAB+17] This work This work
KEYGEN 99,762,353 88,288,589 105,892,559 95,593,272 14,205,132
ENCAPS 118,213,358 92,814,363 110,258,517 99,800,669 14,927,835
DECAPS 118,686,081 93,776,021 110,699,504 100,7471,40 15,731,086
Table 5.1: Cycle counts averaged over 100 executions and obtained at 168 MHz.
Overall, I improve the cycle counts of FrodoKEM-640 on the ARM Cortex-M4 by
18.4% when using cSHAKE, and by 9.4% when using AES. However, my optimised im-
plementation using xoshiro128∗∗ is on average 84.3% faster than the above two, which
is emblematic of how many cycles are spent in the generation of a publicly known matrix
whose only goal is to look random.
I can fairly accurately estimate the time taken by FrodoKEM-640 in the three cases
by dividing the total cycle count in Table 5.1 by 168 · 106 to obtain a time expressed
in seconds. My optimised implementations take around 1.64 seconds when cSHAKE is
adopted, 1.76 second with AES and 0.27 seconds with xoshiro128∗∗.
5.5.3 Benchmarks at 24 MHz
For the second part of my results showcase, I downclock the microprosessor to 24 MHz,
because I am interested in studying the number of cycles taken by my implementations
to perform its operations, thus excluding time spent waiting for memory from the pic-
ture. On top of this, I also disable data cache: this forces the Schwabe and Stoffelen
[SS16] implementation of AES to run in constant time, and slightly simplifies the flow
of execution. Since memory is not a bottleneck at this clock frequency, keeping data in
cache is not beneficial anyway.
Table 5.2 summarises the results of my implementations, in terms of clock cycles
measured at 24 MHz and with data cache disabled. Several aspects are worth noticing.
When it comes to the official PRNGs, my multiplication routines improve the refer-
ence ones by between 59.2% (S′A with AES) and 78.9% (S′A with cSHAKE). The most
prominent fact about my version using xoshiro128∗∗, instead, is the immensely better
generation of A: within the AS multiplication, it takes 91.1% less cycles than AES and
96.0% less than cSHAKE.
A further point of interest, which backs up my initial discussion on benchmarking
at different clock frequencies, is in the performance in clock cycles of AES at 24 MHz in
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Function
cSHAKE AES xoshiro128∗∗
Ref [NAB+17] This work Ref [NAB+17] This work This work
AS 90,053,180 78,068,108 48,764,566 38,449,619 10,811,476
Gen. A 73,612,819 71,948,659 32,315,402 32,327,961 2,867,639
Mult. 16,423,218 6,114,896 16,423,218 6,114,896 7,527,058
S′A 105,905,509 80,789,865 50,544,249 40,292,651 9,192,436
Gen. A 73,614,739 73,615,219 32,469,159 32,469,079 3,072,351
Mult. 35,955,867 7,578,258 17,240,744 7,041,221 6,115,378
KEYGEN 93,301,265 81,299,689 52,012,652 41,681,042 14,042,899
ENCAPS 111,616,496 86,255,368 56,255,552 45,758,155 14,657,940
DECAPS 112,084,038 87,212,153 56,684,122 46,720,217 15,456,163
Table 5.2: Cycle count of the reference and my optimised implementations, obtained at
24 MHz and with data cache disabled.
Table 5.2 when compared to that listed in Table 5.1 at 168 MHz. Despite AES consuming
fewer cycles than cSHAKE when artificially clocked at 24 MHz, FrodoKEM-640 turns
out to be slightly slower when using AES for the realistic 168 MHz frequency. This
reversed behaviour is explained by the crucial role that memory access plays in AES,
being based on tables, which is in turn almost neglected by counting cycles at 24 MHz.
I omitted matrix multiplications between small matrices from Table 5.2, as they
do not depend on the PRNG. However, I improved also in this area: S′B passed from
369,439 cycles to 111,103 (69.9% better), while B′S from 410,222 to only 84,461 (79.4%
better).
5.5.4 Comparison with Previous Works
As mentioned before, there are two relevant previous works I can compare my results
against. The first one is the PQM4 project [KRSS], which I also used as a framework
to embed and evaluate my code on the board. Secondly, Howe et al. [HOKG18] also re-
cently proposed an implementation of FrodoKEM on the same microcontroller. Table 5.3
compares the cycle counts of KEYGEN, ENCAPS, DECAPS, as well as of some internal
functions, across different PRNGs. All numbers, from all sources, have been obtained
on the same board running at 24 MHz. Howe et al. [HOKG18] also disabled data cache
since they used the same implementation of AES, thus the comparison holds. The im-
pact of disabling data cache on the implementation based on cSHAKE is negligible,
hence also the comparison with PQM4 [KRSS] is meaningful.
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PRNG Function PQM4 [KRSS] Howe et al. [HOKG18] This work
cSHAKE
KEYGEN 94,119,511 85,585,315 81,299,689
ENCAPS 106,992,266 112,103,350 86,255,368















Table 5.3: Cycle count of KEYGEN, ENCAPS, DECAPS and other functions as reported
by previous works and compared to mine. Numbers were obtained on the same board,
running at 24 MHz. Blank spaces refer to data not available.
5.5.4.1 A note on PQM4
At the time I performed experiments, PQM4 [KRSS] did not ship with a M4-specific
implementation of FrodoKEM-640, hence performance benchmarks were done on the
code that I used as a reference in this work. Moreover, only cSHAKE was implemented
and benchmarked.
The attentive reader will notice a small discrepancy between the results of PQM4
in Table 5.3 and those of my reference implementation in Table 5.2. This is due to an
update of the PQM4 framework (commit #23), in which the authors moved to a more
recent version of GCC for ARM on Arch Linux, i.e. arm-none-eabi-gcc version 8.2.0.
Since my setup is based on a different distribution I use arm-none-eabi-gcc version
7-2018-q2-update as provided by ARM at https://developer.arm.com/open-source/
gnu-toolchain/gnu-rm. For the sake of comparison, before said commit #23 PQM4
reported that KEYGEN took 94,191,951 cycles, ENCAPS took 111,688,861 cycles and
DECAPS took 112,156,317 cycles. These numbers are indeed much closer to how the
reference implementation [NAB+17] performs on my board, according to Table 5.2.
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5.5.4.2 A note on Howe et al. [HOKG18]
Howe at al. [HOKG18] implemented both the AES and the cSHAKE flavours, including
optimised routines in ARM assembly. Several differences with my work exist. First and
foremost, they do not optimise the S′A multiplication when cSHAKE is used, which
makes my implementation the first of its kind and explains the bigger gap in the first
section of Table 5.3. Note indeed that their ENCAPS and DECAPS cycle count when using
cSHAKE is extremely close to the reference implementation in Table 5.2.
Secondly, they change the memory layout of the matrix S in the AS multiplica-
tion, for the sake of optimising loading patterns in that specific case. However, unless
amended somewhere else in the code, this makes their implementation incompatible
with the reference, while I chose to make AS and S′A interchangeable with the refer-
ence.
Finally, they did not use SIMD instructions in their ARM assembly code, instead
optimised for load/store operations. SIMD instructions do offer a speed-up, but require
registers to be filled in a precise way, hence the design of the multiplication needs to
be tailored around them. For instance, adjacent elements in memory can be loaded in
multiple registers using the ldmia instruction, but then SIMD instructions can be used
only if the two values contained in each register can be multiplied by values in the
corresponding halves of other registers, and optionally also accumulated. Since they did
not have such a (mild) restriction, they instead optimised for memory access patterns.
Unfortunately, it is hard to give precise comparisons in terms of overall performance as
their cycle counts lack contextualisation for different frequencies.
5.5.5 Comparison with other schemes
In order to capture how my work on Frodo sits in the panorama of lattice-based KEMs
at large, I report a comparison with other candidates of the NIST standardisation effort
too. This can be found in Table 5.4.
The results reported for FrodoKEM-640 are those from Table 5.1, which reports cycle
count in the 168 MHz regime, in line with the other schemes too. I decided to include
some representative schemes from the NIST standardisation effort, of which I picked
the parameter set that matches the security level 1 from NIST, the one matching at least
128 bits of security, same as FrodoKEM-640. The chosen schemes are KYBER [SAB+19],
NEWHOPE [PAA+19] and SABER [DKRV19]. The implementations from which I derived
the numbers from, instead, are taken from the references in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Comparison between my work and other schemes. My results are those of
Table 5.1.
As expected, all these schemes perform better than Frodo. This is due to the fact that
they are all based on variants of the LWE problem which introduce further algebraic
structure in order to improve the performance of implementations. Indeed KYBER and
SABER are based on module lattices, while NEWHOPE is based on ideal lattices. See
Section 2.4.3.4 for an introduction on this two types of lattices. As Table 5.4 shows, us-
ing xoshiro128∗∗ greatly contributes in bridging the performance gap between schemes
based on plain LWE and those based on variants, however Frodo is still far from the
latter. What is abundantly clear from this comparison is that the choice of Frodo over
other schemes is really a trade-off between security and performance.
5.6 Cost of countermeasures
So far I have been presenting how I implemented, optimised and improved the unpro-
tected version of FrodoKEM-640. It is interesting to evaluate how the countermeasures
described in Chapter 4 affect performances. The extent to which a countermeasure is
preferable over another one must indeed be informed both by its security guarantees
and by whether the scenarios in which it is applicable match the scenarios in which it
is applied, but also by potential penalties in terms of performance it incurs once it gets
implemented.
In the remaining of this section I give implementation details for all countermea-
sures considered and defer an overall comparison of performances to Section 5.6.5.
125
CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF FRODOKEM-640
5.6.1 Masking the accumulator
Masking the accumulator from Section 4.1.1 is fairly straightforward to implement on
the ARM Cortex-M4. Indeed embedded devices usually have easy-to-access routines to
generate randomness from, for instance, analog noise (see Section 5.2).
To apply this countermeasure it therefore suffices to draw the required amount of
randomness before every matrix multiplication involving a secret matrix and subtract-
ing it after the multiplication has occurred, as described in Algorithm 12.
5.6.2 Shifting rows against extend-and-prune
At the end of Chapter 3 I showed how the extend-and-prune strategy really fits how
computations are carried out in FrodoKEM. Results, especially with a wider beam size,
were indeed daunting. Luckily, Section 4.1 started on a much brighter note as I showed
how a simple change in how matrix multiplication is computed suffices to structurally
prevent extend-and-prune all together. As I briefly discussed there, the countermeasure
is deterministic and can be implemented with almost no effort in pseudocode, as shown
by Algorithm 13.
Despite its conceptual simplicity and apparent easiness of implementation, shifting
rows is not as straightforward as it seems when it has to be combined with the opti-
misations described in Section 5.3, especially when A is an operand and is generated
on-the-fly. A comprehensive list of the attack scenarios considered in Chapters 3 and 4
combined with implementation considerations follows.
• In case a matrix multiplication is computed between a secret matrix and a “small”
matrix, i.e. of dimension n×n or n×n, the shifting rows technique is easy to apply
because all rows and columns are present in memory. A simple preprocessing of
the two vectors the inner product is computed upon, then, suffices.
• In case A is an operand of the multiplication and is generated on-the-fly, differ-
ent PRNGs affect the process in different ways. In more detail, when A is the
left operand, e.g. in the computation of AS during KEYGEN, then a simple pre-
processing as before suffices both when AES or cSHAKE are used, but not when
xoshiro128∗∗ is used. This is due to the fact that I chose to generate A column-wise
with xoshiro128∗∗, hence rows never fully lie in memory. Dedicated routines are
needed. Conversely, when A is the right operand, e.g. in the computation of S′A
during ENCAPS, then the shifting rows technique can be directly applied when
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Algorithm 22 Shifting vectors in memory
Input: Vector v ∈Znq, shift s < n.
Output: v∗ ← vÀ s.
Parameters: n = 640, q = 215.
1: for 0≤ i < n do
2: v∗+ i ← v+ (i+n− s (mod n))
return v∗
AES or xoshiro128∗∗ are used, but not when cSHAKE is used. Again this is be-
cause cSHAKE never generates full columns, which are required by this kind of
matrix multiplication.
It must be noticed that the design choice of generating sub-matrices with AES pays
off in flexibility when applying this countermeasure. In the two cases where optimisa-
tions are incompatible with the shifting rows countermeasure, I drop them and imple-
ment ad-hoc routines to still realise the countermeasure. In what follows, I describe the
different implementation aspects categorised above, while postponing a discussion over
achieved performances till the end of the section.
5.6.2.1 Implementation with vectors in memory
This is the simplest scenario, where the two vectors involved in the inner product com-
putation are fully present in memory. In particular, two pointers to them exist and the
elements of the vectors can be reached by adding an offset to the base pointer. This is
the case for multiplication between “small” matrices, when A is the left operand and is
generated by either AES or cSHAKE, or when A is the right operand and is generated
by xoshiro128∗∗.
Algorithm 22 shows the simple routine that is needed to shift a vector of length n by
an index. The result is such that the new vector v∗ has the desired layout, as described
in Section 4.1.2, and has adjacent elements in memory. The value of the shift s is set
accordingly. Algorithm 22 is run before any ip_n call, completing the implementation
in this scenario. Note that, for the scope of the function, v∗ occupies a different position
in memory than v. The latter is then overwritten at the end of computation.
5.6.2.2 Implementation with vectors generated on-the-fly
When A is the right operand, hence its columns are needed, and is generated with AES,
parts of the optimisations are still possible. Recall from Section 5.3, and as shown in
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Algorithm 23 load_a_temp_aes with shifted columns
Input: Vector a_cols ∈Znnq , index i and shift s < n.
Output: a_temp← [a_cols[i+n− s (mod n)], . . . ,a_cols[i+n− s+7 (mod n)]].
Parameters: n = 640, n = 8, q = 215.
1: for 0≤ k < 8 do












Figure 5.3: How the matrix A is generated and accessed when using cSHAKE to imple-
ment the shifting rows countermeasures.
Figure 5.2, that AES can generate columns whose elements are not adjacent in mem-
ory. The algorithm I used to pick the correct elements was load_a_temp_aes, hence by
modifying it I can leave the actual multiplication routine untouched.
The modification is straightforward and is shown in Algorithm 23. The vector a_cols,
see Figure 5.2, contains the elements of A generated so far. The index i in input corre-
sponds to the index of the second loop of the AES branch of Algorithm 18, while s < n
is the amount by which columns are shifted, according to Section 4.1.2, and is equal to
index j in the AES branch of Algorithm 18.
Algorithm 23 is then used to choose appropriate values from a_cols, while Algo-
rithm 22 is used to modify the secret vector in the multiplication in such a way that
computations are consistent with the new layouts.
When A is the right operand and is generated with cSHAKE a more involved pro-
cedure is required. I take the computation of S′A as a running example to demonstrate
the concepts behind this implementations. There, S′ is fully present in memory in row-
major order. On the contrary, A can only be generated row-wise, making it hard to shift
columns.
Figure 5.3 shows how to traverse the matrix A in this scenario. The multiplication
between the first eight positions (Figure 5.3 only shows four for compactness) of each
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Algorithm 24 S′A multiplication with shifting rows countermeasure
Input: Seed seedA ∈ {0,1}128, output vector bp ∈ Znnq initialised with error matrix E′,
and secret vector sp ∈Znnq .
Output: bp← bp+S′A.
Parameters: n = 640, n = 8, q = 215.
1: a_cols← {0}8n
2: for 0≤ k < n,k ← k+8 do
3: for 0≤ j < 8 do . Unrolled loop
4: a_cols+ j ·n ← cSHAKE(seedA,16n,28 +k+ j)
5: for 0≤ i < n do
6: if i > 0 then
7: for 0≤ j < 6, 0≤ t < n do
8: a_cols+ (7− j) ·n+ t ← a_cols+ (6− j) ·n+ t
9: a_cols← cSHAKE(seedA,16n,28 + (n− i+k (mod n)))
10: a_temp← load_a_temp_cshake(a_cols+ i)
11: row_by_chunk((spÀ i)+k,a_temp,bp+ i)
row of S′ and first eight elements of the first column of A is performed normally. This
is depicted in the left panel of Figure 5.3. In the original algorithm, see Algorithm 18,
the same eight positions of all rows of S′ were then multiplied by the corresponding po-
sitions in the whole a_cols. Here, instead, the rows of S′ are shifted with Algorithm 22
while a_cols is transformed as follows. The last row is discarded and all others are
moved one position down. The first row is then replaced by the last row of A, such that
the first eight elements of the second column of a_cols correspond to the first eight
elements of the second column of A when is shifted by one position. This process is
shown in Figure 5.3, where the bottom row is discarded (hence red), all those above it
are shifted down and the first one is filled with elements form the last row of A. This
process is repeated n times, once per column of A. This is again repeated n/8= 80 times,
by using different portions of the rows of S′. Algorithm 24 shows all the steps and is the
equivalent of the cSHAKE branch of Algorithm 18.
Finally xoshiro128∗∗ poses a different kind of problem when A is the left operand.
Since I adopted the convention to always generate A column-wise to favour ENCAPS
and DECAPS over KEYGEN, the latter is the most affected algorithm. Moreover, the
state of xoshiro128∗∗ is exactly the length of the seed to generate A, hence no addi-
tional information containing which column to generate is present: the seed is fed into
xoshiro128∗∗, which then sequentially generates the full matrix from first to last col-
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umn. Like cSHAKE, this is unfortunate when one has to shift rows.
The solution to this problem is conceptually simple but heavily impacts performance:
every time a row is needed, the algorithm has to generate the whole matrix A and
only retain those elements belonging to it while discarding the others. In my actual
implementation, I leveraged a time-memory trade off: instead of keeping elements of
one row only, I keep those of eight. Once rows are generated and stored adjacently
in memory, they can be shifted and multiplied (with SIMD instructions) with shifted
columns of S.
5.6.3 Hamming weight homogenisation
The Hamming weight homogenisation is straightforward to apply, by means of the for-
mulae described in Section 4.2. In particular, the long-term secret S can be transformed
in KEYGEN and stored in the secret key in that form. The ephemeral secret S′ needs
to be transformed once in ENCAPS and once in DECAPS, for a total of three homogeni-
sations. All multiplication routines need to change accordingly to apply the correction
factors from Section 4.2: this is easy even in multiplications by A, because the factors
can be computed incrementally as A gets generated, and applied at the end.
5.6.4 Blinding and masking
I have already mentioned in Section 5.6.1 how generating randomness on embedded de-
vices is not particularly cumbersome, thanks to dedicated routines. This already solves
the biggest problem usually associated with blinding and masking, i.e. their hunger for
randomness. It turns out that implementing Algorithms 14 to 16 and integrating these
countermeasures into FrodoKEM-640 is made particularly easy thanks to the possibil-
ity of reusing some functions which are already part of FrodoKEM, which I list next.
• seedX
$←− U ({0,1})128 and X ← cSHAKE(seedX) from Algorithm 14 can be imple-
mented in the exact same way seed generation and expansion of the matrix S′
are implemented. The algorithms responsible for these two functions are called
randombytes and cshake, respectively.
• M ← Mx −XS (mod q) from Algorithm 14 and M ← M−B′S̈ (mod q) from Algo-
rithm 16 are implemented with the same function that carries out the equivalent
operation in the unprotected version of DECAPS, called frodo_mul_bs.
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Implementation Function cSHAKE AES xoshiro128∗∗
Unprotected
KEYGEN 88,288,589 95,593,272 14,205,132
ENCAPS 92,814,363 99,800,669 14,927,835
DECAPS 93,776,021 100,747,140 15,731,086
Masking
Accumulator
KEYGEN 89,708,474 95,849,902 14,470,564
ENCAPS 93,070,942 99,999,392 15,219,012
DECAPS 94,018,015 100,946,093 16,002,015
Shifting
KEYGEN 99,672,887 106,638,677 179,531,964
ENCAPS 2,926,299,959 110,560,054 26,914,166
DECAPS 3,180,899,262 113,971,892 30,335,248
Hamming
KEYGEN 93,805,284 100,083,325 15,757,593
ENCAPS 94,880,533 101,562,513 20,208,843
DECAPS 95,849,749 102,531,755 21,016,805
Blinding
KEYGEN 88,318,863 95,480,794 14,204,353
ENCAPS 92,844,883 99,688,430 14,926,810
DECAPS 94,355,746 101,209,561 16,289,292
Masking
KEYGEN 89,907,891 96,035,898 14,700,598
ENCAPS 92,815,678 99,731,847 14,931,691
DECAPS 94,056,792 100,979,193 16,090,799
Table 5.5: Cycle count of KEYGEN, ENCAPS, DECAPS of unprotected and protected im-
plementations. Results are averaged over 100 executions and obtained at 168 MHz.
• Finally, I implemented the many steps which add or subtract matrices with di-
mensions n×n anew, and as they are component-wise operations the implemen-
tation is trivial.
5.6.5 Performance results
It is now time to compare the performances of all countermeasures proposed against
that of the unprotected implementation. The metric I chose to carry out the comparison
is cycle count when the board runs at 168 MHz, i.e. default frequency. I believe this is
preferable over downclocking to 24 MHz, as done in Section 5.5 to compare with other
works, because grasping the differences in performance is more intuitive.
Table 5.5 shows, for each alternative implementation and each PRNG used to ex-
pand A, an average based on 100 executions of KEYGEN, ENCAPS and DECAPS. Note
that experiments reported in the cSHAKE and xoshiro128∗∗ columns have negligible
standard deviations, while experiments reported in the AES column have a standard
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deviation approximately equals to 295,500. This is enough to justify why some counter-
measures seem faster than the unprotected version, while in reality the distributions of
clock cycles are very similar. Several conclusions can be drawn from these numbers.
When thwarting extend-and-prune, a trade-off exists: shifting rows (or columns) was
presented as a deterministic countermeasure that breaks the structure extend-and-
prune relies upon. It is indeed very easy to implement by changing how A is accessed
and traversed, however the implicit assumption that A must fully reside in memory is
required. As described in Section 5.6.2, when this is not the case accessing the required
portions of A is extremely costly because those portions need to be re-generated several
times to accommodate how the multiplication routine changes. This fact clearly reflects
in Table 5.5, where shifting rows has devastating consequences on performances, espe-
cially on cSHAKE, which can only generate full rows, and on xoshiro128∗∗, for which the
index of column to be generated cannot be given. For these reasons, shifting is prefer-
able only on devices with enough memory to store A, for instance the ARM Cortex-A72
used in the original specifications, which is powerful enough to cache A.
Hamming weight homogenisation affects each PRNG slightly differently, because
the corrections factors that are needed to maintain correctness are computed depending
on how A is generated. The impact is rather small, where the apparent bigger impact
on xoshiro128∗∗ is simply due to its speed: the overhead is a greater percentage of the
total cycle count than in the case of cSHAKE and AES because many cycles are spent
to generate A in the latter two case, and are therefore unrelated to the countermeasure
itself. All in all, the strong assumption it requires, the security arguments reported in
Section 4.2 and the small yet noticeable overhead make this countermeasure a poor
choice.
A very different discussion applies to blinding and masking. These countermeasures
are meant to protect the long-term secret matrix S, which already excludes any mod-
ification to the ENCAPS algorithm and, more in general, to any routines involving A.
This is a huge difference compared to previous countermeasures, because generating
and computing over A is the main bottleneck, hence masking and blinding have a big
advantage in terms of performance. Effectively, this means that they are not compa-
rable with other countermeasures proposed here. Performances between blinding and
masking are extremely similar, with differences being mainly due to experimental er-
rors rather than actual run-time differences. Therefore, any preferences on one or the




The journey I have narrated in this thesis started off from the three questions I listed
in Chapter 1. According to Question 3, the practicality of post-quantum schemes needs
to be assessed by implementing and benchmarking them on several different platforms.
In the original submission [NAB+17], FrodoKEM was implemented on a x64 Intel pro-
cessor and on a microprocessor of the ARM Cortex-A family, to which I added my imple-
mentation of FrodoKEM-640 on the ARM Cortex-M4 in Chapter 5. Questions 1 and 2,
instead, inspired me to evaluate the security of post-quantum implementations. This is
the reason why I explored several attack techniques in Chapter 3 and suggested some
countermeasures, both novel and from the literature, in Chapter 4.
6.1 Summary of contributions
All in all, there are several points which are worth summarising.
• The most valuable lesson from Chapter 3 comes from Section 3.5, which con-
tains an apparently counterintuitive concept. Parameters to instantiate a scheme
are usually derived from the analysis of applicable attacks: a scheme is as se-
cure as the efficiency of the best one against it. The spectrum of attacks con-
sidered to derive parameters of Frodo are mostly mathematical attacks against
LWE [NAB+17]. Parameters are set in such a way that the their running time is
deemed infeasible. Clearly, including side-channel attacks in the analysis is cum-
bersome: their effectiveness depends on a great deal of unknowns, most of which
cannot even be estimated in general as the same attack might perform drasti-
cally differently whether algorithms are implemented on one platform over an-
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other. Nonetheless, the story told in Chapter 3 points out that one can gain some
general insights from side-channel analysis too. For the attacks analysed in this
thesis, larger (square) matrices offer a wider surface for adversaries to retrieve
sensitive information from leakage. This could potentially inform the recommen-
dation to prefer small parameter sets (or non-square matrices, as is the case in
EMBLEM [SPL+17]) on target platforms where power analysis is a concern, like
IoT devices.
• Chapter 3 is also a neat confirmation that many tools and techniques developed
in the side-channel literature still apply to post-quantum algorithms, and even
become especially relevant. This is the case, for instance, for the extend-and-prune
technique which found a fertile ground for application in operations like matrix
multiplications involving secret elements.
• This opens the way for the study of countermeasures developed for post-quantum
algorithms, which I addressed in Chapter 4. In this domain, there is space for
both ad-hoc countermeasures, like those in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and well-known
techniques that just need to be adapted to the specific computation, as in Sec-
tion 4.3. Despite there being a common ground between the two kinds, which is
what made possible the comparison in Section 4.4, there simply cannot be any
clear winner: leakage profile, assumptions on the adversarial powers and goals,
number of traces available are all different dimensions that yield different trade-
offs in terms of whether a countermeasure is better than another one both in
terms of security and practicality.
• Yet another interesting point raised in Chapter 3, which comes as another con-
firmation of the relevance of side-channel theory to the realm of post-quantum
cryptography, is the trend of improvement among Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 and Sec-
tion 3.4. At each step of such a ladder of better and better attacks, an adversary
would drop assumptions about the leakage profile and would infer the information
needed on the “shape” of the leakage from the device itself through experiments.
In terms of the quantities defined in Section 2.3 (which come from the reference
textbook on side-channel analysis [MOP07]), the adversary is exploiting more and
more portions of the information leakage called Pexp, culminating in the close to
perfect exploitation capability by means of the extend-and-prune technique.
• Picking a specific device is not only important for side-channel security, but also
134
6.2. RELEVANCE TO OTHER SCHEMES
for implementation and optimisation of a cryptoscheme. In Chapter 5, I showed
how instructions native to the ARM Cortex-M4 turned out to be very beneficial
for the performance of FrodoKEM-640. Despite many careful optimisations, how-
ever, little could be done to avoid the fact that A simply does not fit in the mem-
ory of such a small device, therefore had to be generated on-the-fly, with all the
drawbacks this brings. For this reason, I put forward the idea of using a dif-
ferent, more efficient, subroutine to generate it in Section 5.4. I believe this in-
compatibility with the published version of FrodoKEM [NAB+17] is necessary to
speed up FrodoKEM on embedded devices. The only apparent drawback of using
xoshiro128∗∗ instead of cSHAKE or AES in the generation of A is that it has not
been designed with security in mind. However, as I argued in Section 5.4, the only
requirement for A is not to exhibit statistical pitfalls to avoid weakening the un-
derlying LWE problem. Clearly, in the proof of security it is no longer possible to
swap xoshiro128∗∗ with ideal functions but the pseudorandomness of A should
follow from an heuristic argument, extensively corroborated by the original pub-
lication of xoshiro128∗∗ [BV18].
Finally, it must be noted that although the whole thesis rotates around Frodo, many
arguments do not depend on its specifics, but rather focus on aspects of the underlying
structure of LWE with “small” secrets. For this reason, similar conclusions can be drawn
for other post-quantum schemes sharing the same structure as Frodo. In what follows,
I will detail how my work is relevant for other KEMs submitted to the first round of the
NIST post-quantum standardisation effort.
6.2 Relevance to other schemes
In order for some of the arguments discussed in this thesis to apply, a candidate scheme
needs to be based on the LWE problem with “small” secrets, i.e. where the latter get
values from a much smaller range than the whole Zq. Matrix multiplications are the
real core operations to which the majority of conclusions apply. This means that many
variants based on LWE are not suitable: just to name the two most famous ones, Ring-
LWE is based on a particular kind of polynomial multiplication which allows, after
a suitable transformation, component-wise multiplication and addition of coefficients;
Module-LWE uses very small matrices (whose dimensions range between 2 and 5) of
the same polynomials as Ring-LWE. For these reasons, the following list only contains
schemes based on variants of LWE based on operations over Zq.
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EMBLEM [SPL+17] is a KEM whose security is based on a variant of the LWE prob-
lem according to which secret matrices are drawn from the uniform distribution
over a small interval of the kind [−B,B], where B is much smaller than the mod-
ulus q. The latter is a power of two and error matrices follow a discrete Gaussian
distribution. The structure of EMBLEM closely resembles that of FrodoKEM and,
in fact, all matrix multiplications contained in KEYGEN, ENCAPS and DECAPS
are laid out precisely in the same order and involve equivalent matrices. This
makes all conclusions drawn in Chapters 3 and 4 applicable to EMBLEM as well.
For the sake of a more quantitative comparison, the parameter B, that effectively
determines the cardinality of the range from which secret matrices are drawn, is
only set to 1 or 2, depending on the parameter set. This means that there are only
three or five, respectively, possible values for each position of any secret matrix. In
addition to that, the public matrix is A ∈Zm×nq for m = 1003 and n = 770 or m = 832
and n = 611, respectively. Differently than FrodoKEM, A is not symmetric: a com-
parison is still possible in terms of a projected success rate of extend-and-prune
from Section 3.4 by taking the minimum of its dimensions as the number of traces
for each parameter set. In terms of Figure 3.7, therefore, both parameter sets of
EMBLEM would sit very low on the y-axis and somewhere in the middle of the
x-axis. According to the conclusions drawn in Section 3.5, this would make EM-
BLEM easier to attack than FrodoKEM, given the very low number of candidates
compared to the number of traces per candidate available to an adversary. On the
implementation-side, the size of A would still be problematic on a device equipped
with the ARM Cortex-M4. EMBLEM, however, uses a modulus of q = 224 for both
parameter sets, therefore a single element would be 8 bits bigger than a halfword
in a 32-bit microprocessor, defeating the benefits of SIMD instructions.
KCL [ZJGS17] is a family of algorithms among which there is a Key Exchange Pro-
tocol based on LWE. In this case, the comparison is straightforward as the au-
thors of KCL explicitly acknowledge being inspired by FrodoKEP [BCD+16], to
the point that its parameters are extremely similar to those reported in Table 2.3
and the distributions of secret and error matrices to those reported in Table 2.4.
This means, in particular, that all conclusions derived in the single-trace analy-
sis from Chapter 3 are particularly relevant to KCL as it does not have a KEM
counterpart.
LOTUS [PHAM17] is a KEM based on the hardness of the LWE problem with secret
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and error matrices drawn from the discrete Gaussian distribution. The latter is
set to have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 3.0, meaning that
the returned range is comparable to that of NIST2. The dimension of A, which is
a square matrix in this case, ranges between 576, i.e. similar to CCS2, to 832, i.e.
similar to CCS4. A crucial difference between LOTUS and FrodoKEM, however,
prevents an equally meaningful comparison than with EMBLEM. During EN-
CAPS, LOTUS does not use an ephemeral secret matrix but an ephemeral secret
vector. As a result, encapsulated keys are smaller, only matrix–vector and vector–
matrix multiplications take place during ENCAPS and during DECAPS, but the
long-term secret matrix needs to be up to 27 times bigger than the secret matrix
in the NIST2 parameter set of FrodoKEM (the secret matrix in the biggest pa-
rameter set in LOTUS is of dimension 832×256, against the 976×8 of NIST2).
Consequently, single-trace analysis from Chapter 3 only applies to the KEYGEN
algorithm of LOTUS. Also, despite SIMD optimisations from Chapter 5 being pos-
sible thanks to the modulo of q = 213, the secret matrix of the smallest parameter
set is circa 120 KB in size, i.e. almost filling the total memory of 192 KB. Given
that the error matrix to compute the public key is as big, different on-the-fly com-
putations than for FrodoKEM would be needed.
6.3 A note on the evolution of Frodo
By the time I started to write my thesis, the NIST post-quantum standardisation effort
took a step forward and passed from the first round, which this thesis is based upon, to
the second round. Submitters had the opportunity to make small modifications to their
schemes in case they were admitted to the second round. This is the case for FrodoKEM.
In order to fill the gap between my work, which is based on the version from the first
round, I now list the main modifications it underwent from the update dated March
30th 2019 and how they affect the results in my thesis.
• A new parameter set with n = 1344 was added to target a higher security level.
Clearly this has no effect on the thesis.
• The standard deviation of FrodoKEM-640 was raised to account for a mistake in




• Matrices drawn from χ are no longer generated with multiple calls to the PRNG
with different domain separators, but with a single call that outputs more bits.
Effectively, this change makes the two versions of FrodoKEM incompatible as dif-
ferent matrices are produced from the same seed. Apart from the values inside
the matrices, however, every argument in the thesis still holds.
• cSHAKE was replaced by SHAKE to reduce the number of calls to the underlying
primitive KECCAK. As above, this change makes versions incompatible, however
nothing changes dramatically because cSHAKE is simply a wrapper to KECCAK
with pre-defined parameters, and so is SHAKE. Again, conceptual notions from
this thesis continue to hold.
• Several changes in the security proofs were made, none of which have a noticeable
effect on anything written in this thesis, as I am more concerned about implemen-
tation aspects.
6.4 Future directions
My work on lattice-based cryptography, particularly on LWE-based schemes as exempli-
fied by Frodo but applied to other schemes too in Section 6.2, has approached two main
topics: performance and side-channel security. There are several natural aspects that
could definitely be pushed forward in both areas. I discussed several ideas to improve
performance, such as using platform-specific implementation paradigms (e.g. SIMD) to
boost performance on certain devices and using non-cryptographic PRNGs to expand
public matrices. Natural next questions to research would be which other platforms
can benefit from tailored implementations and what other ideas can be deployed to
speed up even further LWE-based schemes, which are definitely behind in terms of
performance compared to other schemes. A similar line of reasoning can be applied to
side-channel analysis: the more attack techniques and countermeasure the community
explores, the more confident everyone can be that real-world implementations of lattice-
based schemes are secure in the wild.
I acknowledge that the above might sound a bit vague, as indeed they are future
directions which are particularly specific to lattice-based cryptography, nor to post-
quantum cryptography in general. All cryptographic primitives should be made faster
and more secure in a side-channel sense therefore, despite obvious, the above research
questions are definitely valid and worth pursuing. However, there is another direction
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in the area of side-channel analysis of lattice-based cryptography which has always fas-
cinated me and is, in a sense, rather unique. It has to do with the idea that leakage could
somehow be accounted for in the underlying lattice structure. This is not a new idea in
side-channel analysis, since it is tied in with the concept of leakage-resilient cryptog-
raphy [DP08], for which a designer models leakage as a function on certain inputs and
shows the scheme secure even in presence of such leakage. For lattice schemes, there
seems to be very natural ways to “weaken” secret keys while still retaining an accept-
able level of security [GKPV10]. This fact can be used to build schemes where leakage
of some form is allowed, therefore being still resistant when it occurs in practice. On
the other side of the spectrum, understanding better how leakage can be exploited to
weaken the underlying lattice problem is useful to analyse more sophisticated attacks
where leakage, thought of as partial information on the secret material, is actually used
as a pre-processing step for lattice reduction algorithms. If this was the case, even an
unsatisfactory side-channel attack like the one described in Section 3.3 might still turn
useful to leverage the extra information gained, which is not enough by itself to break
the scheme, as a base to mount a lattice attack.
This is a research question which I personally find really intriguing and that, I be-
lieve, has great potential. Despite I was not able to pursue it directly during my PhD,
I am very happy that the paper and the code on which Chapter 3 is based upon were
recently acknowledged by Dachman-Soled, Ducas, Gong and Rossi [DSDGR20], who did
manage to make a significant contribution in this direction by providing a framework in





ARM assembly code for inner
product








@Load and prepare the data
@ i->0
movs r4, #0










APPENDIX A. ARM ASSEMBLY CODE FOR INNER PRODUCT
@Add
adds r3,r3,r5












List of papers outside the scope of
this thesis
I published and released several works beside those that contributed to the content of
this thesis. A list of all other papers of mine follow.
• I published a conference paper [BM16] and its journal version [BMM17], together
with Guido Bertoni and Maria Chiara Molteni, called “A Methodology for the
Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic”. We explored particular al-
gebraic structures to model the propagation of glitches in combinatorial circuits
and how they could affect security. These papers deal with a very different area of
cryptography than post-quantum cryptography, therefore they are not included in
this thesis. Moreover, the material published in those two papers was collected in
M.Sc. thesis.
• Daniel Martin and I released a paper in which we analysed some aspects of key
rank [MM18]. For the same reason as above, this paper is not included here.
• James Howe, Ayesha Khalid, Francesco Regazzoni, Elisabeth Oswald and I pub-
lished the paper “Fault Attack Countermeasures for Error Samplers in Lattice-
Based Cryptography” at the IEEE ISCAS conference [HKM+19]. Despite being
relevant to the main theme of my thesis, my contribution to the content and
write-up has been fairly marginal, which is why I have not included it here. This
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